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
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REPRINT FROM THE PANDIT.

THE
SAMBANDHA-VĀRTIKA
OF
SUREŚVARĀCHĀRYA.

*being a metrical expansion of the introductory
portion of Sankarāchārya's commentary on
the Br̥ihadāranyaka-upanishad.*

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TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

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


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PREFACE

The word *sambandha-vārtika* means literally "the commentary on the connection" and is an expansion in metre, by *Surē-svarāc'hārya*, of the introductory portion (a translation of which is printed at the end as an Appendix) of Sri Sankaracharya's commentary on the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, dealing, in general terms and without reference to any text-book in particular, with the mutual relation between, and the comparative importance of, the two portions of the *vēda* which treat of rituals and knowledge respectively. But Surēsvara is not fettered completely by his original, and carves out for himself a broad path of his own. His originality of intellect and power of lucid exposition have long been recognised by scholars everywhere. It is practically undisputed that he was a direct and contemporary disciple of Sankara. He was known in his secular life by the name of *Maṇḍanamisra* and also as *Viśvarūpīchārya*, and was a staunch follower of the *mīmāṃsā* school and a hater of the philosophy which gave preference to knowledge over ritual. On conversion by Sankara to the latter school, he became an ascetic and assumed the name of Suresvaracharya. This tradition, which is found in Vidyanāya's *Sankaravijaya*, will, if true, render doubly valuable the commentary now translated, as being the utterance of an advanced and impartial scholar of both these antagonistic schools. Antagonistic they really are, because the vexed controversy whether ritual or knowledge is essential to the exclusion of the other, shows no sign of seeing an end, though arguments are advanced to the effect that they are but sister systems, the one being termed *pūrvā-mīmāṃsā* and the other *uttarā-mīmāṃsā*, and though authoritative teachers like Sankara and Suresvara have tried to reconcile the two philosophies by declaring that ritual too is an indirect means to liberation, since it purifies the soul and helps the birth of knowledge. This, very briefly expressed, is the substance of the present work.

Very little need be said about the translation itself. Errors there must be, and in large numbers too, being almost inevitable when the work that is translated contains numerous technical words and phrases and expresses abstruse ideas in pithiest verses. Nor does the nature of the work allow of a free translation which any one unacquainted with Sanskrit may read and thereby form a fairly good idea of the original. The aim of this publication will be fully realised if it helps, however slightly or indirectly, the student of Vedanta philosophy to understand the text of Suresvara's work without the aid of a professional expert (the pandit) and without having to follow his annotator, Anandagiri, into the complex labyrinths and by-ways wherein most often it is his wont to stray.



THE SAMBANDHAVĀRTIKA OF SUREŚVARĀCHĀRYA.

1. I bow with devotion to Him Who is considered as multiple¹ by those whose conception of *Atman* is blinded by the deep-rooted delusion that springs from their extreme nescience and from the consequent sense of universal duality; who, nevertheless, is the indivisible, changeless, eternal, all-pervading One, far beyond the scope of all word and thought, in Whom all the worlds rejoice.²

2. With the object of clearing away certain doubts created by sophists, this work is begun on a small scale, to bring out, by logical reasoning, the meaning of the *bhāṣhya* (or *vṛitti*), written for the instruction (*lit* pacification) of the virtuous, wherein the venerable teacher (*Śankara*), pursuing the path of his predecessors, has examined the import of the entire Vedas under the pretext of a commentary on the *Kānvōpanishad*.³

3. Here (as elsewhere) the word *upanishad* has but one meaning, namely, the knowledge of the Supreme Self (or *brahmavidyā*); for,⁴ the literal interpretation of

¹ The allusion here is to the *Mīmāṃsakas* who uphold the distinction between the enjoyed (*bhōgya*) and the enjoyer (*bhōktrī*.)

² Hence, Himself full of bliss, since one must possess what he is able to impart to others.

³ Another name for the *Bṛihadāranyakōpanishad*, also called the *Vājasaneyibrahmaṇōpanishad*.

⁴ The objection is raised that the word *upanishad* is a *rudhi* word, used as the name of the several Vedic texts so called. This is met by saying that it should be interpreted etymologically as a *yōga* word, and, the several parts of the Scripture are named *Upanishads*, because they teach *upanishad* or *brahmavidyā*. See sloka 8.

10. Thus, under the guise of an etymological explanation, suitable to the context, the commentator has indicated that the sole purpose of all *upanishads* is final liberation (*mukti*.)

11. The commentator then says, "For (the benefit of) such as wish to escape from birth and death," with the object of establishing a mutual difference (or contrast) between the doer of rituals (*karmādhikārin*) and the aspirant of spiritual knowledge (*jñānādhikārin*.)¹

12. He alone is authorised to study the *Vedāntas*, who has renounced all action (*kriyā*), and who wishes to be free from birth and death (*samsāra*), and, also to understand the unity of the Self (*aikātmya*).

13. Even the Scripture, in the passage. "This only, etc." (*ētam ēva*),² says that he alone who has relinquished all action (*karman*) has the right to acquire knowledge whereby to understand the real nature of the inner Self (*pratyag*).

14. To stimulate a desire for realising the supreme Self, the reciting of the Vedas (and other rites) are prescribed ; but all of them must be renounced if *Brahman* is sought to be attained. This is supported by the use of *ipsanti* in the Vedic text (quoted above).

15. With a view to bestow knowledge on a student so entitled, it is next written, "From the cause of births and deaths, etc.,"³ a phrase full of evidently right principles.

¹ That is to say, only seekers after knowledge are fit to be students of this *Upanishad*.

² यतम् एव प्रजाजिनो लोकम् दृच्छन्तः (or ईच्छन्तः) प्रवर्जन्ति ।

³ *Sankara* writes that his *bhāṣya* is intended to confer on the student a knowledge of the identity of the soul with *Brahman*, and that this knowledge is the instrument of liberation from the root of *samsāra* : संसारहेतु-निवृत्ति-साधन-ब्रह्म-ज्ञान-एकत्व-विद्या-प्रतिपत्तये ।

16. Since no other topic is comprised in the teachings of *Vēdānta* than the unity (of the soul with *Brahman*), a knowledge of that unity, therefore, will dispel spiritual darkness.

17. This sacred Vedāntic *upanishad*, was compiled with great pains to facilitate the acquisition of that knowledge which alone could destroy nescience, the origin of *samsāra*.

18. A true understanding of the nature of the Supreme Self alone can root out the ignorance of that Self, and such an understanding springs from the (spontaneous) awakening of the soul (*ātmotpatti*). Nothing else¹ is necessary for the dispulsion of darkness.

19. The methods for obtaining what is sought and the persons authorised to pursue those methods, have now been differentiated with respect to the *karmakāṇḍa* and the *jñānakāṇḍa*. Now, directions are given for such persons in the pursuit of those methods.

20. 'May we not take it that final liberation, like happiness (*svarga*, etc.), is by virtue of scriptural injunctions (*vidhi*)?'² For, without something being enjoined to be done (*kārya*) there can be neither a person authorised (*adhikārin*), nor the relation of cause and effect between sacrifices and their fruits.

21. 'It is so even in temporal matters; why not so

¹ That is, not only is *karman* not necessary for gaining the highest knowledge, but even reflection or meditation (*prasaṅkhyāna*) is only secondary.

² Or, in other words, even liberation (*mukti*) is the result of performing *karman*. This and the next two are the arguments of the opponent, the *Mīmāṃsaka*.

in Scripture?¹ There are also passages in the *Vēdas* to show that liberation is dependent on the carrying out of Vedic injunctions.

22. 'Just as there are mandatory texts like "One should perform sacrifice, etc." in the case of temporal happiness, so, too, there are texts like "One should worship" in regard to emancipation (*mukti*).'

23. No, it is not correct to assume a common means for the attainment of temporal happiness and of final liberation, for the two are essentially different in the facility or difficulty, in the certainty or uncertainty, of their attainment.

24. What is best (*jñāna*) is one thing, and what is agreeable (*karman*) is another (i.e. the two are different) both of them affect the same individual with different results (*mukti* and *svarga*). Good (final liberation) will come to him who chooses the best, but he who chooses the agreeable will lose the fruit (heavenly happiness, etc. which are only temporary).²

25. Having examined the nature of the life (in other worlds) that results from the performance of action the *Brāhmaṇa* (lit. one who has studied the *Vedas*) will begin to despair (by reason of the transitoriness of such life), thinking, "How can that which is non-action *mukti* be the effect of action (*karman*)?" And, to gain that knowledge, he must needs go, *samidh* (fuel for the sacred fire) in hand, to a teacher who is well-versed in the *Vedas* and ever bent on a contemplation of the Supreme (*brahmanishṭha*).

¹ The *Vedas* are supposed to conform to common usage. Hence there too there can be no *adhikāra* without a *kārya*.

² *Kaṭha*, II. 1.

26. Is not liberation, like temporal bliss, a thing to be accomplished,¹ being of the nature of something not attained? Not so; liberation is not even a thing to be accomplished, for, it is not like temporal happiness.

27. Since the knowledge of the Self destroys the nescience of a person when the obstacles to his progress have spontaneously disappeared, it is therefore said, in figurative language (*upachārāt*) that liberation is to be accomplished by such knowledge.

28. As a sick man is restored to health by medical treatment, so also does one obtain liberation when his ignorance of the Self is destroyed by spiritual wisdom.²

29. Scripture says "This was *Brahman*, etc.,"³ and *Brahman* alone, etc."⁴ So the student (who desires liberation), like one who is asleep, is merely to be awakened by Scriptural teaching, but not to be made to act, by it.

30. What purpose does injunction serve, since knowledge is independent of human endeavour. Such texts as do occur are meaningless in this connection, since they cannot have a mandatory signification.

31. The objection that there can be no authorisation (*adhikāra*) without something ordained to be done (*kartavya*), will be confuted later on,⁵ by saying that it

¹ Hence, requiring a means of accomplishing it. *Mukti* is not like *svarga*, the result of conscious effort.

² The medicine is not the direct cause of health, which is but the natural state. It simply removes the ailment. So knowledge merely removes *avidyā*, and is hence figuratively said to be the means of *mukti*.

³ ब्रह्म वा इदं अथ ब्रवीत् ।

⁴ ब्रह्मेव सन् ब्रह्माप्येति ।

⁵ See verse 228. That is, the privilege of performing sacrifices, etc., may be hemmed in by limitations, but knowledge is open to every one universally, and hence requires neither *adhikāra* nor *vidhi*.

(knowledge) may be prescribed for all.

32. Another (opponent) says, "If you desire to attain liberation (*śrēyas*), which is no other than the natural condition of the soul, that end can be accomplished only by performance of rites (*karmabhyah*), for *karman* is mentioned in the Vedas [as the means to *purushārthas* of which *mukti* is one.]

33. "Since, in *Śruti* as well as in *Smṛiti*, *karman* alone is ordained to be done, there can be no other means than *karman* both for final liberation (*mukti*) and for temporal happiness (*abhyudaya*).

34. "Let us endeavour and reason it out, considering it in its Vedic aspect. For, every Vedic text can only mean either a prohibition or an injunction.

35. "'But (says the opponent's opponent), I have already quoted several Vedic passages, which are not injunctory; and therefore what you say is unreasonable.'

36. "There will be consistency of meaning (*ĕkavākyatva*)¹ if such passages are construed to be injunctory, on the authority of the aphorisms, "Because the Vedas aim at rites, etc.,"² and "Since it explains the injunction, etc."³

37. "But if we construe these texts which do not enjoin actions as syntactically different (*vākyabhēda*),⁴

¹ This is a canon of the Mimamsa, by which a merely affirmative passage, occurring in the same context as a mandatory text, is interpreted to be explanatory of the latter, and, therefore, to be included in the injunction. Of a different interpretation the Mimamsaka would say that his is the more natural and the other is strained.

² आसायस्य क्रियार्थत्वात्, etc.

³ विधिना तु एववाक्यत्वात्, etc.

⁴ That is, as not explanatory of, or as not supplementing, the injunctory passage.

such an interpretation will be far-fetched. 'Now (says the opponent's opponent again) the reward of final liberation is said to be everlasting (not transitory).

38. "'How can it be everlasting, if it is the reward for performing rites (*karman*); for, nothing in this world that results from *karman*, is known to be permanent (*dhruva*) ?

39. "'Liberation must be the result of some means Hence (if *karman* is not the means), what remains, namely, *jnana*, must be the means,¹ since it is also so said in the *Vedānta*.'

40. "It is not so, since *mukti* is established to be the result of *karman*. 'But (the opponent's opponent again) how can it be permanent if it is the fruit of *karman*?' Listen, then, to my explanation.²

41 & 42. "By the non-performance of prohibited rites (*nishiddha*) and of rites having special objects (*kāmya*), by the performance of prescribed (or necessary) duties (*nitya*), by the consequent removal of impediments, and the wearing out, by enjoyment and suffering (*bhōga*), of the germs of a second bodily life, the inner soul will reach liberation by dint of *karman* alone in the manner aforesaid, even without any instruction as to the unity of the Self (*aikātmya*).

43. "It may be said, 'In such Vedic passages as "Having realized him, etc." and "knowing *Brahman*, etc."³ a reward (*mukti*) is prescribed for knowledge of

¹ Though not directly, at least as the means of removing the impediments to *mukti*.

² Surāṣvara's opponent tries to show that *mukti* may be permanent, and yet be the result of *karman*.

³ निश्चायतं मत्पुमुक्तात्पुमुच्यते and ब्रह्मवेदब्रह्मैवभवति. १

Self (*ātmabōdha*).¹ Not so; they are mere explanatory remarks (*arthavāda*).

44. "This is because we see everywhere in Scripture (*Sāstra*) that passages prescribing rewards in the case of the materials and the preparation for rites and the rites themselves, are but explanatory remarks¹ (*arthavāda*), as, for example, the passages enjoining a reward for the use of *parṇamayī*.²

45. "Since the soul must be purified by *karman* (*karmaṣāṣhatvāt*)³ knowledge of the Self also depends on *karman*. And, though you hold that the *Vedānta* is not injunctory, you must, however, concede that such passages are mere explanatory remarks (*arthavāda*)."

46. It is not so; since final liberation and temporal happiness differ from each other, both as to their means (*hētu*) and as to their nature (*rūpa*),⁴ your argument is, therefore, unsound.

47. You say that liberation is the natural (or unmodified) condition of the soul (*svarūpa*) and that this is the result of avoiding rites with special objects, etc., (*kāmyādivarjanādibhyah*).

48 & 49. Is the soul, then, previously out of its

¹ Compare द्रव्य-संस्कार-कर्मसु परार्थत्वात् कलघुतिर् अर्थवादः स्यात् । (Jaimini's Sūtras, IV. 3. 1.)

² The use of the wood called *parṇamayī* for the *juhū* or sacrificial ladle, is said to be meritorious, and rewards are ordained for its use.

³ *Karman* purifies the soul which is the doer (*kartṛ*), and is hence the indirect cause of *jñāna*. With this verse ends the argument of Surēśvara's opponent, who holds that *karman* is the only means to *mukṣi*.

⁴ The means of *mukṣi* is *jñāna* which springs from *vivēka*, while that of *abhyudaya* is *karman* which springs from *avivēka*. The nature of *mukṣi* is *dhruva*, and, of the other, *adhruva*.

natural state, so that it stands in great need of a means for bringing it to such a state? If so, that state cannot be its natural condition, in which it does not, of itself, exist, but to which it has to be brought by forcible means. If, on the other hand, it already exists in its natural state, why seek for a means to attain that state?

50. If (it be said that) even in its natural condition, it might be performing rites, then there will be no liberation at all.¹ Hence the liberation of the soul cannot be the result of avoiding prohibited rites, rites with special objects, etc.

51. If it be argued that liberation is the removal of the unnatural state (of the soul) that results from the repeated contact with objects of sense, what is the cause (we ask) of such contact?

52. If you hold that such contact is accidental, then, since there is nothing to prevent such contact even after liberation, there will be, according to you, no liberation at all.

53. If you say that the cause of such contact is virtue and vice (*dharmādharmā*), then, do virtue and vice cause this contact by force, even for the soul which is, by its very nature, non-attached (*asanga-svabhāvasya*)?

54 & 55. In the same way as the *bhallātaka* (marking nut) produces a stain on cloth, it is not possible even for an able and intelligent potter to make a pot of the atmosphere (*vyōman*) which is not of the nature of a pot, as he could make one of clay; nor can the (cool) breeze cool the fire. If you say that the soul is of the nature of a doer, etc., then you need not, in the least, hope for liberation.

¹ Since for performing *karman*, a corporeal existence is necessary.

56. For, the nature of things, like the heat of the sun, cannot change. If a thing loses its nature, it becomes unnatural (or non-existent, impossible), like the sky-blossom (*kha-pushpa*).

57. Just as fire does not, in any case, lose its heat without itself being quenched, so, too, unless the soul ceases to be the doer, etc.,¹ there can be no liberation by any other means.

58 & 59. You may say, "Since the bondage of the soul (*ātmasamsṛiti*) is the *kārya* (result) and not the *śakti*,² of its being doer and enjoyer, if we suppose that its *śakti* alone remains, the soul's liberation is possible by reason of its freedom from all misery."³ Not so; it leads to a fallacy whether we differentiate between *śakti* and *kārya*, or not.

60. For, there is no difference between *śakti* and its *kārya*. If we assume such a difference, the invariable relation (of cause and effect) will be lost.

61. If they differ in their essence, there cannot then be the relation of cause and effect. If they do not differ, then, since they become identical, how can they be cause and effect?

¹ And hence loses its nature as doer.

² *Śakti* is the inherent power of a cause to produce its effect. The following extract from Anandagiri's gloss makes clear the aim of stanzas 55, etc. आत्मेति ॥ कर्तृत्वादित्थं भावस्तावदात्मा तस्य विषयसम्बन्धधर्माधर्मावाचनस्तदभ्यासकास्वास्थ्यनुत्पद्ये काम्यादिवर्जनमित्यर्थः । स किं कर्तृत्वादिकार्यस्वभावः किं वा तच्छक्तित्वस्वभावः । आद्ये कर्तृत्वादिकार्यध्वस्ता आत्मनो मुक्तिसदध्यस्ती वा । नाद्यद्वत्याह । माकांक्षीरिति । न द्वितीयद्वत्याह न चेति । कर्तृत्वादिकार्यस्वरूपत्वं प्रतिष्ठितं तच्छक्तित्वभाववत्पक्षमालम्बते नन्वेति ॥

³ For, *anartha* is the *kārya*, not the *śakti* of *kartr̥itva*, since during sleep, for instance, when *śakti* alone remains, the sense of misery is altogether absent.

62, 63 and 64. We have not known of a cause that does not produce an effect, or of a result that is not caused. If they do not differ, then, when the *kārya* is destroyed, its *śakti* too would be destroyed, since they are identical. And when the nature of *śakti* is lost, that of which it is the *śakti* (*śaktimat*)¹ also loses its nature, since these two are not distinct from one another. This leads to the same undesirable conclusion referred to before, namely, the non-existence of the soul.² Hence such an argument is unsound.

65. If it be argued that liberation is merely the non-resulting of *kārya* from *śakti* owing to the complete absence of its causes,³ such a reasoning is improper, since *śakti* and the causes of the *kārya* will still exist.

66. Moreover, there is an invariable connection of the nature of *śakti*, between causes (*nimitta*) and effects (*naimittika*). Hence it will be like the heat of fire, etc.⁴

67. For, if *kārya* is dependent on *śakti*, then since the cause (*kāraṇa*, hence *śakti*), always exists, there will therefore be incessant manifestation of *kārya*, like that of heat in summer.⁵

68 & 69. In the same way, even if we suppose that *kārya* is independent of *śakti* (*śaktyatantratvē*) the same fallacy would result, for, since the cause (*kāraṇa*) ceases

¹ The *śaktimat* is the *kartr̥*, or *ātman*, since it is *kartr̥tvādisvabhāva*.

² See stanzas 56 and 57.

³ And not, as the former opponents said, the destruction of *śakti* or *kārya*. The causes of *kārya* are *dharmādharma*, etc.; which will not cease to exist even after *mukti*.

⁴ i. e. the causes must produce their effects even after *mukti*, as fire inevitably produces heat.

⁵ Here *Ānandagiri* makes out *śakti* and *kāraṇa* to be identical, meaning *pushtakalākāraṇa* or *samagra-hētu*.

to exist forever, the *kārya* will also never be produced, as, for example, cold in summer. Therefore such an argument is fallacious. If *kārya* be said to result without a cause, then it would be so produced for ever.

70 & 71. Further, how can it be *kārya*, if it is not dependent on *kāraṇa*? It is not possible, even for the ablest of men, to vow the avoidance, from their birth to their death, of all prohibited rites, rites with special objects, etc.; for, even the most diligent have been known to fall into minute errors.

72. At least such a possibility is to be doubted, and this itself disproves the proposition.¹ But you may say that he, to whom it might be so possible, will be liberated.

73. It cannot be as you say, since it is illogical. With respect to liberation, a *certain* means, namely, *jñāna* must be predicated.²

74. A wise man ought not to speak of success as depending on mere accident. Such a thing would be within the scope, not of human effort, but of destiny.

75. It cannot be said that it is also within the scope of human effort, on the principle that injunction implies endeavour; for, there is no injunction (*ākhyāta*) to that effect.³

76. There is no injunction anywhere in the *Vēda* that he who longs for liberation should avoid rites with

¹ For none will venture on a doubtful project, which is especially not an easy one.

² And not a doubtful means as you suggest.

³ Such a principle will hold good, only when there is a *vidhi*. But there is no rule that a *mumukṣu* should abandon *kāmya*, etc. Here *śakti* means *manuṣyaśakti*.

special objects, etc., that will enable you to say that endeavour is implied in the injunction.

77. Since then the abandonment of *kāmya*, etc., is a mere product of your fancy, it cannot, in any way, be argued that human endeavour also plays a part in such abandonment.

78. Not by the performance of prescribed rites, etc., nor by the abandonment of *kāmya*, etc., can liberation be attained ; for, in that case, knowledge (*vidyā*) would become fruitless.¹

79. Even if heaven (*svarga*), etc., cease to result from *kāmya* rites, and the corresponding results (hell, etc.,) from prohibited rites,² still there is nothing to prevent their resulting from other causes or by themselves (*arthāntarāt svabhāvāt vā*).

80. If you say there is no proof positive of their springing from other causes, such a thing is at least open to doubt ; and that very doubt is enough to vitiate and disprove your proposition.

81. There is not even this doubt, since such persons, as disobey all injunctions (*vidyā* and *karman*) are also subject to pleasure and pain, as is evident from the passage, "Then, of these two, etc."³

¹ Since such passages as निचायते मत्सुखात्समुच्यते : would be meaningless.

² i. e. even after the avoidance of *kāmya*, *nishiddha*, and other rites, there will be no *mukti*, since heaven and hell may result in other ways.

³ अथैतयेः पद्योर्नक्षत्रेण च न..... Compare Vedānta-sūtras, III. 1. 18, all which show that such persons enter the lowest forms of creation, which is called the third way, the other two being the *dāvayāna* and *pitrīyāna*.

82. Though the non-performance of prescribed (*nitya*) rites is sin, and their performance not, yet there is no proof that such sin cannot result from other causes¹ or by itself.

83. If it be said that sins already incurred will be atoned, by the present performance of *nitya* and other rites, still there springs a doubt, as before, with respect to sins that might be incurred in the future.

84. Though sins, which yield evil fruits (*anabhishta-phala*), might be obliterated, virtues, that lead to temporal happiness, will not cease, being the very thing you desire.²

85. It cannot be said that virtue, like vice, is an evil (even for one who longs for liberation), for, what is enjoined cannot be an evil. It is not like hawk-sacrifice, etc.,³ since there, the fruit being evil, it too is evil.

86. If it be said that liberation results from a knowledge of the unity of Self, it is vain, then, to argue that it depends on performance of rites. That knowledge is a direct means to attain it, is seen from passages like '*tam etam*, etc.'

87. It has been shown⁴ that rites which, in the manner aforesaid, purify the doer, are also helps towards a knowledge of the unity of Self.

88. Therefore he who knows the true signification of the Vedas, will learn the fruitlessness of rites, and,

¹Such as non-performance of such rites in a former life or lives.

²Hence a birth in consonance with those virtues, and consequently no *mukti*.

³There the fruit is evil, because it contravenes the principle नष्टिस्वात्.

⁴In the Vedānta-sūtras.

destroying his sins by penance, strive for a knowledge of the unity of Self.

89. ¹He who is, by reason of action in former lives, free from all desire, is qualified at the very outset, and does not stand in need of further rites.

90. For, he who is free from worldly attachment and thirsts for knowledge, longs only for accurate knowledge and for nothing else. Rites are needed when an object is to be accomplished, but are unnecessary when the end has been achieved.

91. Religious studentship is known to have been properly begun, in the case of *Vāmadēva*, *Maitrēyī* and *Gārgī*, because (immediate) renunciation is enjoined.

92. Since the means of attaining heaven, such as Vedic and Smartic rites (*ishṭāpūrta*), are of endless variety, it is difficult to understand why (even if *kāmya*, etc. be abandoned) there cannot be other causes (of another birth,) for other causes may exist.

93 & 94. The same reasoning applies in the case of prohibited rites (*nishiddha*) and of prescribed rites (*nitya*) Hence such methods do not guarantee liberation; for, there exists *karman*, both good and bad, stored up through innumerable lives, and, like the killing of a *Brāhmaṇa*, giving rise to endless births.

95. The existence of *karman* that has not begun to bear fruit (*anārabdhaphala*) is indicated in such passages as '*tatah śeshēṇa, etc.*'² and '*tad ya iha, etc.*'³

¹Stanzas 89, 90 and 91 justify *sannyāsa* even in the first *āśrama*.

²सर्वथास्माद्वस्वकर्मनिष्ठाः यत्कर्मफलमनुभूयततः शेषेण विप्रिष्टदेवतातिवृत्त-
पायुः शुतवृत्तवित्तमुक्तमेधसोऽन्नमप्रतिपद्यन्ते विप्रिष्टसो विपरीतानवयन्ति ।

³तदा हृदयमखीयचरणा रमणीयां योनिमाप्स्येरन्, etc.

96. The fruit of performing prescribed rites is not the mere removal of impediments,¹ but other rewards also are directly mentioned, for example, in the *Amra-smṛiti*.²

97. The passages in the *Smṛiti* of *Apastamba* "The mango being the cause, etc." declare that even prescribed (*nitya*) rites produce results.

98. The consequences of doubt have already been indicated.³ It can now be affirmed with certainty that *sakti*, as long as it lasts, will be producing some result or other.

99. For, in the absence of result, the cause itself will be non-existent. Of the effect and its cause, neither will exist independent of the other.

100. Thus, by understanding the Supreme Self (*antarātman*) to be of the nature of doer and enjoyer, there will be, in the light of the arguments heretofore advanced, no hope of liberation at all.

101. Since man is liable to err, liberation, according to your theory, will be a matter of doubt for the twice-born, but one of certainty for the donkey, etc.⁴

102. But was it not said⁵ that knowledge is a

¹ Hence the opponent argues that *nitya* rites will not stand in the way of liberation by bringing about further births.

² आद्ये फलार्थे निमित्तेऽप्यागम्यावनृत्यद्योते । एवं धर्मं धर्ममागमर्या अनृत्यद्यन्ते नोचेदनृत्यद्यन्ते न धर्महानिर्भवति ॥

This is summarised in the next verse.

³ See stanza 80.

⁴ Since the liability to err and hence the danger of sin are only for the *adhikṛita*, and not in the least for the *anadhikṛita* or unauthorised beings like the donkey.

⁵ See stanza 45.

mere department of ritual, and that the soul is a doer of sacrifices? It is not so, since this kind of knowledge that is dependent on ritual, is not what is required (for liberation).

103. For, even without any reference to sacrifices, the soul is undoubtedly the doer, for it is the doer of all actions without exception. Hence what you say is unsound.

104. It cannot be said that without a knowledge of the Self, it would be impossible to perform rituals, in the same way as it would be impossible to use the sacrificial ladle without a knowledge of the *parna* wood.

105. But (it may be said that) a prudent person will not perform rites to secure a higher world, without first satisfying himself that there is a soul (separate from the body) as the basis of a future bodily life.¹

106. Thus, then; the knowledge of *Ātman* cannot be a part of ritual, since a doer² is the only thing necessary for rites (*ishṭa*), as in the case of one desirous of fruit (*phalārthivat*).³ Further such a knowledge is not prescribed as essential for rites.

¹ For, the aim of rites is the enjoyment of heaven, etc. for which bodies like those of gods and other superhuman beings are necessary, though the same soul will continue to dwell in them.

² That is, only a doer is necessary and not a knowledge of the doer. Verse 103 shows that the soul is the doer not only of sacrifices but of all actions in general. As an example of the general not being part of the particular, the *phalārthin* is brought in. The desire of fruit is the incentive to every action, and the necessity for understanding it is not therefore confined to Vedic rites alone.

³ क्लार्थो रागो फलमर्थो विषयोऽस्येति व्युत्पत्तेः । सत्त्विकर्तुः सर्वप्रवृत्तिहेतुरपि न कर्माङ्गं साधारणत्वात्तथाकर्तृज्ञानमित्यर्थः ॥ Anandagiri.

107. 'But, even so, the knowledge of *Ātman* must enter into every rite by reason of its compatibility (*sāmarthyāt*),¹ thought not by virtue of any injunction.'

108. It is not so; for, only he is directed (or authorised) to perform rites, who has not grasped the truth (*tattva*) and who is characterised by what is called not-self.²

109. The existence of the *Ātman* in its natural state (*svarūpē*) is spoken of by the wise as liberation (*niṣ-śrēyasa*); and the contact of the *Ātman* with any other condition is the result of nescience (*ajñāna* or *avidyā*).

110 and 111. The *Ātman* may itself be conscious of its impending condition of not-self. But it does not follow therefrom that, for a liberated soul in its natural state, the character of doer, enjoyer, etc., rites and the enjoyment of their fruit, and the external organs of sense, can result from any other cause than ignorance of the self (*pratyag*).

112 and 113. The same is the cause of the external (physical) body, of caste that is inherent therein (*samavāyint*), of old age, death and birth, whose seat is the body (*dēhādhikaraṇām*), and of wife, child, riches, etc. which are external to the body, all of which tend to fit the soul, by itself unauthorised (*svataḥ anadhikārinah*), for the performance of rites.

114 and 115. It is thought that these things differentiate the undifferentiated soul by reason of nescience ;

¹ For, without such knowledge, there will be no doing of rites. See verse 105.

² There is no *adhikāra* without a limitation of the soul by a body or bodies (*avachchheda*), and every limitation is the result of ignorance (*ajñāna*).

for nothing in the world has been seen to be the attribute or condition (*viśēshanam svarūpam vā*)¹ of another except through ignorance, but it is seen to be so in every instance through ignorance. The unknowing man does not say 'the thief is staring at me' and attribute the qualities of a thief to the post, except in darkness.

116. 'But there are instances of one thing being the attribute of another even in the absence of ignorance, e. g., *aupagava* (son of *Upagu*), *nripahaya* (the king's horse), *syēnachit* (performer of hawk-sacrifice),² etc.'

117. It is not so; for, in none of these cases is the attribute identically related (*pratyaktayā sambandhah*) to the thing qualified, as in the example "I am lean."³

118. For instance, the meaning of the stem, *upagu*, 'the father,' qualifies an entirely different idea, namely the meaning of the suffix 'son of—' in *aupagava*; and so on, in the other cases also.

119. Not so does a person think of the attributes beginning from that of doer and ending with the body, and the attributes of caste etc. inherent in the body, as essentially distinct from the *Ātman* itself.⁴

120. For, he applies these attributes to the attributeless soul as though they refer to the soul itself; e.g.

¹ This is technically known as *adhyāsa* whose only source is *avidyā*.

² *Upagu* qualifies the suffix meaning 'son of—', *nripa* qualifies *haya*, and *syēna* qualifies *chit*. Now, the ignorance of the speaker or hearer is not an essential condition of the attributive relation in these examples.

³ Here, it is the ego itself that is supposed to be lean. But in the instances cited by the opponent the thing which qualifies was entirely different from the thing qualified.

⁴ For the list referred to, see verses 111, 112 and 113.

'I do,' 'I am blind,' 'I am a twice-born,' 'I am a child,' 'I am burnt,' 'I am cut,' etc.

121. The relation of the qualifying and the qualified cannot exist between them except by reason of nescience. And it must be known that this alone is the reason of the soul being obliged (or privileged) to perform rites.

122. Further, it is because those only who are ignorant of the unity of self are authorised to perform rites, that qualifications are laid down for persons officiating at the *Brihaspati*-sacrifice, etc.¹

123, 124, 125. The knowledge, derived from Vedantic study, of the real nature of the supreme self (*pratyag*) whose existence is proved by the Vedas etc., puts an end to all action (rites), by destroying the nescience that is its root; for, knowledge is known only to remove ignorance.² But knowledge does not prompt us to action. Hence the passage prescribing fruits cannot be said to be merely explanatory,³ though it is rightly so in the case of the *parna* wood, which is part of ritual.

126. This answers your argument⁴ whereby you asked me to admit these passages to be explanatory remarks though I was unwilling to admit that knowledge was the subject of injunction.

127. I concede that it is an explanatory passage in

¹ Otherwise everyone will be qualified for everything and no qualifications are needed at all.

² And therefore indirectly terminates *karman*.

³ See verses 44 and 45.

⁴ Suresvara repeats the argument of his opponent contained in verse 45.

so far as it is dependent on another passage;¹ but it is not a passage that contains an untruth (*abhūtārthavāla*), since it states only what is recited in Scripture (*sruti*).

128. This is like the passage "The new moon and full moon sacrifices are performed for attaining heaven (*svarga*)."² But it cannot be said to contain an untruth merely because there is no passage punishing with sin the non-doing thereof (*pāpaslōkāśrutēh*).

129. 'How is the reward to be inferred?'³ The fruit derived from the knowledge of the Self is an object of direct perception (*pratyaksham avagamyatē*); and therefore knowledge is not included in ritual.

130. Since performance of rites (*pravṛitti*) is an obstacle to, and, therefore, inconsistent with, liberation, the duty (*adhikāra*) of the aspirant for liberation is to renounce all action (*nivṛittau sarvakarmaṇām*).

131 and 132. No wise man will under any circumstances, desire to return to worldly life (*pravṛitti*) after the destruction of the very sources of such worldly life (such as, greed etc.), like a bewildered traveller who pursues the wrong track, abandoning the easy and safe route that leads to his destination, with water and food accessible throughout, and devoid of all danger.

133, 134 and 135. Having soon realised the divine changeless Self, which is without the properties of doer etc. that are the result of nescience, unprompted to action,

¹ The passage must be either अर्थवाद or अभूतार्थवाद. Suresvara admits it is the former, because it is subsidiary to the महावाक्य which proclaims the unity of the Self.

² So a passage can be both अर्थवाद and अभूतार्थवाद at the same time.

³ That is, there is no other passage to corroborate or confirm the same.

bestower of all the *purushārthas*, and knowable by self-intuition, and knowing that the desired fruit which is eternal and independent of all external means, is dependent on such knowledge alone, how can an all-knowing individual turn his mind, even in jest, to the performance of rituals, with rewards of a different character, dependent on external means, where there are innumerable causes to prompt one to action?

136. Further, for one whose entire ignorance is exterminated by sound knowledge, it is impossible to pursue once more, as formerly, the path of non-knowledge (ritual etc.), because there is nothing to prompt him to action.

137 and 138. Since a wise one who desires as reward a knowledge of the Reality which is gathered from a correct understanding of the Scriptures, never longs for the performance of rites which is an impediment to him, therefore the injunction of rituals, shunned by all aspirants to liberation, is only for the ignorant soul with the qualities of doer etc. which belong to the non-self.

139. The nature of doer etc. is to be abandoned, because knowledge and nescience (*mōha*) are opposed to each other both in their nature and in their effects, and because it is productive of evil, like illness etc.

140, 141, and 142. It is infant's babble to say that the function of doer etc. is the very nature of the soul (that desires to abandon such function); for, if the soul that is directly perceived to be of the nature of non-doer, be said to be of the nature of doer, it is opposed to the knowledge derived from direct perception etc. and even final liberation would become impossible.¹

¹This is to meet the argument that, because the soul is of the nature of doer, etc., it can never shake off its nature. Such an argument leads to a fallacy. If the soul loses its nature, it becomes

‘ Well, then,¹ let there be no possibility of liberation since the soul (*driṣi*), being the enjoyer of fruits, is liable to change,² like fire. Or, if not, let the soul be non-existent like ether (*ākāśa*).’ Not so ; for, the soul is everlasting (*dhruva*) and, therefore, not susceptible of change.

143. How can any change affect the soul (*pratyag*) that is neither corporeal nor incorporeal? Enjoyment is nothing else than becoming conscious, and the soul is always endowed with such consciousness.

144 and 145. It is not liable to change like wind and fire, because it has not, like them, previous non-existence etc.³ In the case of fire etc. which are composed of parts and which have the character of effects, it is proper that there should be manifestation (and change), whenever their nature is attacked by such mighty causes as the adding of fuel or the churning of wood.

146. But, since the soul has no parts, and since it is self-existent, the two chief changes, namely, manifestation and disappearance, can never happen to it.

147. Manifestation, even if conceded, does not necessarily imply change in the thing to be manifested; and, so also, non-manifestation. This is common to all schools of reasoning.

148. Hence, the nature of doer etc. as applied to the soul, must be understood solely to result from the nescience of those who do not admit the possibility of liberation. It is not, however, the real truth.

non-existent, and since there is nothing to be liberated, there can be no liberation. If it retains its nature as doer, then too there can be no liberation by reason of that very nature.

¹ This is the argument of the *lokāyata* or atheist.

² For, enjoyment necessarily means change.

³ प्रागभाव, प्रध्वंसाभाव, अत्यन्ताभाव, and अन्योन्याभाव; change presupposes some or all of these.

149 and 150. The nature of doer etc. is not inherent in the soul, because we know by direct perception what the nature of the soul is.¹ The proofs for the existence of matter cannot be applied in the case of the Supreme and omniscient Self, in the same way as a firebrand cannot set fire to fire itself.

151. The relation of seer and seen, which obtains with reference to the material world, can never be applied to the thing which is the seer itself and whose nature is pure enjoyment.²

152. How can one thing (the self) be cognised by that method of knowledge by which we perceive the not-self, such as the enjoyed, the doer, etc., which are constituted by things entirely different (from the self)?

153. So, too, let not desire, hatred, etc., be deemed to be the properties of the self; for, they are known to be the properties of the mind (*manas*), from the passage, 'Desire is wish (or volition).'

154. The assumption that the soul (*sva*), or the supreme self (*para*), or both, is the cause of desire, hatred etc., leads to the conclusion that liberation is impossible.³ Hence a careful consideration shows that they are the effects of nescience alone.

155. If the soul be the cause of desire etc., how can the knowing soul inflict injury on itself as on an

¹ The true nature of the soul is चैतन्य or pure consciousness. The opponent says that the idea of 'I,' such as 'I do' etc., shows by direct perception that the soul is also of the nature of doer and so on. Verse 150 is an answer to this.

² i. e. there can be no seer of the seer.

³ This is explained in the three following verses. स्वम् is used for जीवात्मन्, and पर for परमात्मन्.

enemy? Hence it is not right that the soul is their cause.

156. In the same way, if the supreme self (*para*) is their cause, then, since the evil is not (necessarily) cured, the reward (i. e. liberation), like the remedy for disease etc., will not be permanent (*ĕkāntika*).¹

157. How can the liberated soul (*dṛiṣi*), which has neither a body (*karāṇa*) nor composition (*samhāti*), get out of the evil? In the same way, if both be said to be the cause, there will be no permanent reward.

158. Since the will of the Supreme Self is unrestrainable, there will be no certainty of liberation. But there is no such fallacy if we suppose their source to be nescience which is without a cause; for, nescience is destroyed (on liberation) through the instrumentality of the Supreme Self (*prasiddha*).²

159. The knowledge to be derived from the authority of Vedantic utterances is of the same nature as that which is admitted to be derived from proofs by which objects of sense etc. are perceived.³

160. If anything else (than the non-dual *Brahman*) be supposed (to be the object of knowledge), the Vedāntas would lose all authority (as regards *Brahman*). Therefore no other object (of knowledge) should be assumed.

161. Even then, does not the injunction of ritual⁴

¹ This is because the supreme self that causes desire etc., for the soul in bondage may do the same after liberation.

² Anandagiri explains प्रसिद्ध as प्रत्यगात्मा स्वप्रकाशत्वेन प्रसिद्धः

³ परागर्थप्रमेयेषु ॥ पराङ्मयः शब्दादयो ऽर्थायेषां प्रमेयास्तानि प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणानि परागर्थप्रमेयाणि तेषु फलत्वेन संमताया संवित् ॥ Anandagiri.

⁴ i. e. the *Karmakāṇḍa*.

lose its authority? Hence, it would surely follow that the Vedantas, too, cease to be authoritative.

162. It is not so, for, all proofs continue to be proofs, only until the realisation of the Supreme Self since all proofs merge therein.

163. After that, no proofs will remain, since they are obliterated by the mere unity of Self, in the same way as the injunction of hawk-sacrifice etc. is rendered nugatory by the injunction of non-killing.

164. Hence, ritual is ordained only for the person who has nescience, and not for the *Brāhmaṇa* who has uprooted every spring of action.

165. Therefore, from the reasoning heretofore advanced, it follows that the duty (*adhikāra*) of the discriminating individual is to renounce all rites, but not, in the least, to perform rites.

166. As long as we speak of a doer, the stainless soul (*vastu*) cannot be realised; and, if the pure soul is realised, all talk of a doer must likewise cease.

167. Like light and darkness, the two ideas of doer and non-doer, being opposed to each other, cannot exist in the same thing and at the same time.

168. It cannot be said that, like standing and walking, the one follows the other in succession and that they are therefore not inconsistent, because, the knowledge of Self has for its object the Supreme Soul.¹

169. Fire that is felt to be hot cannot, either by degrees or suddenly, grow cold of its own accord, but may do so if acted upon by some agent.²

¹ Sureśvara admits the transition from doer to non-doer, but denies the contrary. Knowledge of Self leads to *Brahman* and not to *karman*.

² But the Self cannot be made to change its nature.

170. If you say that there is no inconsistency because the same object (Self) may appear differentiated or undifferentiated, it is not logical, since your statement is in itself contradictory.

171. The many cannot logically be one, nor the one, many; for, knowledge is only of what is real. If it be otherwise, it will be false knowledge.

172. How it is contradictory, will be explained later on. The only object of knowledge (*mēya*) is the unity of Self, since that alone remains unknown.

173. Things that differ from each other are known by reasoning based on absence¹ (*abhāvēna pramāṇēna*). Hence your statement is contradictory.

174. Whether duality (*samsṛiti*) be supposed to be different from or identical with *Brahman*, it would follow that *Brahman* is not-*Brahman*, or, in the same way, that knowledge is fruitless and *Brahman* is divisible.

175. It is a fatal fallacy if you say that *Brahman* is possessed of nescience; and, if it is not possessed of nescience, it follows that knowledge is fruitless.²

176. It cannot be ignorantly contended that *Brahman* has nescience; for, *Brahman*, as actually seen, negatives all idea of nescience.

177. Since nescience is the result of experience, like the experience "I am *Brahman*,"³ therefore, even

¹ i. e. one can be perceived only in the absence of another, since, being different, both cannot be simultaneously perceived.

² Since the *jīva* too, which is identical with *Brahman*, would likewise be free from nescience. This is to explain the latter part of the preceding verse.

³ न तावदविद्यामानविषयः.....आत्मज्ञानं निर्वानुभवविषयः ।
Anandagiri.

nescience, when destroyed by knowledge derived from Scripture (*māna*), becomes of the nature of Self.

178. As long as *Brahman* is not known, it cannot be learnt by perception (*bodhāt*) that it has nescience. And, if it is accurately known, false knowledge (*mṛishā-dhīh*) will not remain unaffected (or undestroyed).

179. He who has nescience is not capable of discerning that nescience himself. Hence, considering the true nature of things, nescience is not perceived as such.

180. It is not proper that knowledge should extend to things which have no actual existence (*vastunah anyatra*); and nescience is not a thing that really exists, since it cannot stand the test of (accurate) knowledge (*māna*).

181. That nescience is no more than nescience (or false), is established by this one criterion alone, namely, that it cannot stand the test of (true) knowledge.

182. In your argument, numerous assumptions will have to be made, all of them being opposed to correct knowledge. But in my argument, only nescience has to be assumed, and that, too, is dependent on actual experience.

183. On the mere springing-up of accurate knowledge derived from passages like 'That thou art,' etc., nescience and its effects will cease to have existed, to exist, or to come into existence.

184. Hence it is impossible to see, by any method of knowledge,¹ that there is nescience in him (*Brahman*), or what is the nature of such nescience, or whence it is; for it is exclusively the result of experience.

¹ i. e. ज्ञान, अनुमान, प्रत्यक्ष.

185. 'Let things like deities, materials, doer, etc., be not non-dual (or dual), since it is clearly seen to be so everywhere and since, also, their non-duality is not commonly known.'¹

186. This is not sound, for, there is no proof known as 'being known everywhere' (*sarvalōka*), among the (established) methods of proof, upon the strength of which you argue in this manner.

187. Moreover where a belief exists in the mind of everyone that a certain fact is directly perceived,² such a belief is declared to be illusive.³

188. Just as objects near and within our sight are more longed for than things out of sight, so is the case with knowledge, derived from Scripture, which completely transcends everything, in its application to the Supreme Self.⁴

189. Direct perception, etc., exist only as dependent on self-experience. And, since such experience is its own proof, where is the necessity for proving the existence of Self?

190. And, since a thing is directly perceived not by itself but only on the strength of self-experience, the unity of Self spoken of in the Vedāntas must be understood to be knowable by the Self alone.

¹This is to refute the latter portion of verse 183, where 'nescience and its effects etc.' implies that duality is an illusion and only temporary.

²i. e. if सर्वलोक be included in पश्यतु.

³e. g. in the passage वाचस्पत्यं विद्वत्तः etc.

⁴That is, though Scripture intends only *Brahman*, yet as *Brahman* transcends all, nescience makes it apply to such things only as are actually seen.

191 and 192. With reference to your argument that, because the Vedas and Smṛitis are based on rites, therefore there is no means of liberation apart from rites, who ever maintained that rites do not also form a means of liberation? Have you not heard the Vedic passage, 'tam etam etc.,' and the Smṛiti, 'samskārah etc.'¹

193. Though the knowledge of the unity of Self is not directly inculcated by Śruti and Smṛiti, yet it is not foreign to these two, for, these two alone teach us about the Self.

194. Your argument² that the Vedas do not teach us the true nature of the Self (*vastu*) has already been exploded³ and will also be refuted later on.

195. Your contention,⁴ too, that, in the absence of injunction, the passage (about knowledge of *Brahman*) ceases to have any force, will also be refuted with skill later on by arguments both clear and logical.

196. You have also said: "By the sole reason of their declaring the real nature of Self, we cannot conclude that the Vedāntas aim at liberation (*pumārtha*), for they are seen to abound in narratives⁵ (*ākhyāna*).

197. "From the mere declaration that there was a king called Rama, it cannot be gathered in any case, in the absence of an injunctory passage,⁶ that liberation is the object.

1 इत्येतेष्वर्थादिस्तत्संस्कारायस्य सन्नद्धयः सायुज्यं जयति ॥

² See verse 33.

³ By verse 123.

⁴ See verses 34 and 35.

⁵ Such as stories of fights between gods and demons. And every such narrative does not preach liberation.

⁶ Liberation, as forming one of the four *puruṣārthās*, must depend on an injunction, and cannot be implied from a mere assertion.

198. "Also, knowledge is seen throughout to be subservient to the other (viz. ritual), and, having gathered knowledge from the passage enjoining rites, the wise man performs sacrifice."

199. This has already¹ been, and will hereafter be, met by the argument that the fruit of knowledge is an object of direct perception.

200. 'But the declaration in Scripture that the fruit (of knowledge) is the destruction of misery etc., is merely a statement in praise of the soul (which is the doer).² Hence your argument³ is purely a product of your fancy.'

201 and 202. This is my answer; leaving aside the fruit which is intended by the context and implied by the passage, why do you, like an ignorant person, extract from it the secondary meaning of, raise, which is neither supported by Scripture nor intended by the context?

203. Nor is there any unity of object (*ĕkaviśaya-tva*) between direct perception and Scripture; for, Scripture itself has, in various places, by passages referring to the non-attachment of the soul, pointed out the distinction by alluding to the passing through the states of dream etc.⁴

¹ See verse 129.

² The opponent says that passages like *तदतिशोकमात्मवित्* refer to the *कर्माधिकृतात्मन्*, and are no authority as to the efficacy of *jñāna*.

³ That the fruit of knowledge is the object of direct perception.

⁴ The opponent argues that the direct perception such as 'I am miserable' etc., is opposed to the Vedic declaration that misery ceases. The answer is that the two refer to two distinct objects, misery being connected with the three states of waking, dream and sleep, with which the *pratyagātman* is entirely unconnected and of which it is a mere onlooker. Hence there is no *विरोध*, as there is no *एकविषयत्व*.

204. You said that all this¹ is a castle in the air, for, you did not believe that the fruit derivable from knowledge was the immediate object of direct perception.

205. Your remark might be plausible, if, even from Scripture,² one cannot learn that knowledge bears fruit.

206. A knowledge of the eternal freedom of the soul is derived from the Scriptural passage and from no other source. And an understanding of the meaning of such passage is the result of poudering over the signification of words.

207. The meaning of words is arrived at by the methods of agreement and difference (*anvayavyatirēkābhyām*). Thus does one realise the soul that is free from misery and free from action.

208 and 209. And the accurate conception of the *pratyagātman* becomes clearer, from passages like '*sad ēva* etc.,' as from the exhortation, 'thou art the tenth ;'³ for, there cannot exist the doubt that the passage is no authority, and it is not in conflict with other proofs (e. g. *pratyaksha*).

210. The commentator (*Śankara*) too will deduce later on, from well-established axioms, that the fruit of knowledge is directly established by Scriptural declaration as opposed to the fourfold proof.⁴

¹ एतच्छब्देन विद्वानन्दैकतानं ब्रह्म तत्र कर्तृत्वादिरारोपितस्तस्याऽऽत्यन्तिकी-
ध्वस्तिर्धीफलं विद्वत्प्रत्यक्षाच्च तर्हीरित्येतदाह. Anandagiri.

² i. e. from passages like तत्त्वमसि.

³ See verse 211.

⁴ शब्दयुक्तिप्रसंख्यानात्मानश्चत्वारः पाठावस्थाः प्रमायास्ततो षरोक्षज्ञानं
शब्दादित्येके तच्चिरासप्रसङ्गेन ततो वाक्यादेवसाक्षान्मानफलमपरोक्षज्ञानमिति वक्ष्यती
त्यर्थः ■ Anandagiri.

211. The tenth person, deceived by counting nine, as if in dismay, does not know that he is the tenth,¹ though he has the other nine before his very eyes.

212. In the same way, though duality be destroyed, one cannot, without passages like 'that thou art,' realise the One Soul, owing to the illusion and ignorance existing with reference to the Supreme Self.

213. A firm knowledge of the Supreme Self springs only from passages like '*sad asi*,' which quench the thirst for knowledge and destroy ignorance of Self.

214. The renunciation of all action serves the purpose of assisting one in deriving knowledge (of *Brahman*) from the meaning of Scriptural passages; for, it is directly helpful in this way.

215. For, renunciation is the best of all means to liberation; *that* is knowable by him alone who renounces; and only he who renounces reaches the Supreme Self and the highest state.

216. Scripture itself has declared, in passages like 'subdued, self-restrained etc.,' that any method to attain knowledge of Self must be preceded by complete renunciation.

217. Ritual (*yōga*) is dependent on worldly activity, and knowledge on renunciation; hence a wise man should choose knowledge and renounce (ritual).

218. The gods, fearing (men's) liberation, have covered human beings with delusion (*mōha*); hence the unknowing have become worldly and actively perform rites.²

¹ Unless told that he is the tenth.

² Cf. पशुरेवं सदेवानाम्.

219. Hence, renouncing all action, and destroying nescience by a true knowledge of Self, one should, by means of knowledge alone, reach that Supreme seat of Vishnu.¹

220. So says the Scripture in *Bhāllavi's* section (*śākhā*); therefore knowledge of Self springs from renunciation of all action.

221. The sage *Āpastamba*, too, has declared, in the passage, 'truth, falsehood, etc.,'² that knowledge of Self should be sought through complete renunciation.

222. "He who has not desisted from evil conduct, who is neither self-controlled nor self-composed, and who has not subjugated his mind, cannot attain him (*Brahman*) by knowledge."³

223. The very assumption that the recital of Scripture and other rites are aids to knowledge, indicates that, with respect to the chapter on ritual and the chapter on knowledge, the persons authorised are different in each case.⁴

224. Since knowledge springs from ritual too, it follows that it is a cause and no more; it does not follow that ritual is the only cause.⁵

¹ तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम्.

² मत्यान्ते सुखदुःखे वेदानिमलोकममुं च परित्यज्याऽऽत्मानमन्विच्छेत्.

³ *Kāthōpanishad*, I. 2. 24.

⁴ For, if the same person be empowered for ritual and for knowledge, there will not be this distinction, namely, that the former is an accessory to the latter.

⁵ Ritual is also productive of *jñāna* through purification. It is a remote cause. But renunciation of ritual is the direct and proximate cause.

225. Clean-shaven, unmarried, non-attached, and pure in mind and pure in body for ever, the ascetic is fit to become *Brahman* itself: so says Scripture.¹

226. These and other similar passages from Scripture, coupled with millions of passages from the *Smṛitis*, emphatically prescribe the renunciation of all action as the means to knowledge.

227. Even your objection that without rites there can be no authorisation, will not stand, if the means of knowledge is as stated above.

228. For, considerations as to authorisation arise only in the carrying out of injunctions (*vidhimārgē*); but when knowledge of Self becomes the object, there is no question as to authorisation.

229. For, the question of authorisation is pertinent in respect of things that depend on human endeavour, but is out of place in respect of things that are self-dependent (*vastu-tantra*); moreover, knowledge is identical with liberation.²

230. The experience of Self to be attained in the *Vedāntas* is the same as the experience which commonly results when the not-self is the object of knowledge.³

231. From the Scriptural passages, 'knowledge, bliss, etc.,⁴ and 'the soul alone etc.,'⁵ it follows that

¹ अथ परित्राह्मिष्वर्णवासा मुषहो ऽपरिग्रहः शुचिरद्रोही भेदागो ब्रह्मभूयाय भवति.

² वाक्योक्त्यनुद्धिव्यक्तमात्मरूपं सकार्याविद्यार्थसित्वाज्ञानं न च तद्ध्वंसस्ततो ऽतिरिच्यते. Anandagiri.

³ शब्दादौ विषये प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमेये फलत्वेन प्रसिद्धायाऽऽत्मस्वरूपभूता ऽनुभूतिः सैववाक्यजायां सुद्धौ व्यक्यते.

⁴ विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म.

⁵ आत्मैवाऽनन्दः

liberation (*pumārtha*) is the only knowable thing that does not stand in need of a knower etc. (*mātrutvādyana-pekshinah*).

232. In whomsoever springs up the knowledge of *that*, to him does knowledge come and to none else, just as it came to the holy sage *Vāmadēva* even while he was yet in the womb.¹

233 and 234. And such knowledge merely removes nescience. As the idea of being a forester ceases to exist when the prince who has been bred up as a forester is reminded of his birth, in the same way does nescience with all its effects melt away when the nescient soul regains knowledge of the unity of Self from passages like "That thou art."

235. This being so, no injunction whatever should be assumed in this case; it will be useless, even if assumed, for it serves no purpose in this connection.

236. The fruit of injunction is production (*utpatti*), acquisition (*āpti*), purification (*samskāra*), or alteration (*vikāra*).² Liberation differs in character from all these; hence, injunction would be purposeless in its case.

237. Since the resulting of the soul's freedom from nescience is not dependent on anything else, there is therefore neither action, nor reward, nor anything like an incentive to action.

238. Hence, the absence of injunction in this case is in no way a defect. On the other hand, it is celebrated as the best ornament of the *Vēdānta* philosophy.

¹ Cf. गर्भस्यैतच्छयानो वामदेव एवमुवाच.

² पुरोडाशोत्पत्तिः संयजनविधिफलम् । पयसोऽवाप्तिर्दोहनविधिफलम् । त्रीचणविधिफलमुलूखलादिसंस्कारः । ब्रीह्यादिविकारोऽवघातविधिफलमिति चतुर्विधमेव क्रियाफलं प्रसिद्धमित्यर्थः Anandagiri.

239. "I am commanded by injunctions," and "I am *Brahman*," are two ideas which are contradictory to each other, and, therefore, cannot both exist in the same place at the same time.

240. Being himself the lord (over Scripture),¹ he cannot be commanded by his own servant as by a master. He can only be drawn to attention (*sambōdhanīya*), as a king that is asleep is awakened by his bards.

241 and 242. The interpretation (of Scripture) as injunctory etc., must be taken only as referring to prescribed rites (*dharma*); because rites alone are premised as knowable, but not *Brahman*,² because it (*Pūrvamīmāṃsā*) begins with "Hence, therefore, rites etc.," because it explains injunctions as referring to rites, because every word in it refers to rites, and because its passages collectively taken (*āmnāya*) also refer to rites.³

243. Words actively referring to rites (*bhāvārthāḥ karmaśabdāḥ*) can be understood as referring to rites only.⁴ Hence the science of twelve chapters (*Pūrvamīmāṃsā*) must be taken as applying only to rites, which are dependent on human endeavour.⁵

¹ विविदिषुरपि संसारमार्गादुत्तीर्णत्वाद्देवस्य स्वामी.

² The reference here is to the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* aphorisms, which begin with 'अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा,' and not, like the *Brahmasūtras*, with 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा.'

³ Cf. तद्व्युत्पत्तिनां क्रियार्थेन समावायेऽर्थस्य तच्चिन्तितत्वात्. *Mīm. Sūt.*

⁴ Cf. भावार्थाः कर्मशब्दास्तेभ्यः क्रियाप्रतीयेतैव ह्यर्थो विधीयते. *Mīm. Sūt.*

⁵ Verses 235 to 243 are to refute the argument that, because the *Mīmāṃsā* is based on an interpretation of the whole Vedas as injunctory, knowledge too must be the object of injunction. *Surēṣvara* says that the scope of that science must be limited to the topic with which it specially professes to deal.

244 and 245. It (*Pūrvamīmāṃsā*) cannot affect the interpretation of the *Vēdānta*, for, it is no authority therein. An authority cannot be shaken by a thing based on other methods of proof (*māntaraih mitam*). A proof being effective only so far as its object is concerned, it cannot be an authority elsewhere.

246. "Hence, therefore, a desire to know *Brahman* etc."¹ is consistent in itself, since it is as scrutinising and as logical as the science for the interpretation of rites.

247. This being so, passages like "That thou art," which have the same meaning as the whole *Vēdānta*, are consistent (with the *Karmakāṇḍa*). Otherwise there will be contradiction.²

248. Neither instruments nor rules to regulate action are needed, where *Brahman* is explained by Scripture as being identical with Self.

249. Injunction, rules of action, and instruments, are appropriate, in the case of one, who is desirous of fruit, being enjoined to do rites.

250. There can be no such desire (of fruit), in the case of Self, as in regard to not-self, in one who has attained all the four aims (*purushārthās*), and who has, by himself, avoided all misery.

251. When such desire ceases, the need for rules and means of action also ceases; for, all the four aims (*sumartha*) are freed from obstacles and become the very essence of the soul.

¹ i.e. *Uttaramīmāṃsā* or *Vēdānta*, whose *sūtrās* begin with 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा.'

² Because their objects are different (*धर्म* and *ब्रह्मन्*), the two *āṇḍās* do not contradict each other. If they deal with the same subject, as the opponent contends, it would follow that the *Vedas* themselves are inconsistent.

252. The learned do not approve of a hypothesis (*bhāvanā*) that has not the three component parts; and no injunction is known that is not based on such hypothesis.¹

253. 'If nescience is the only impediment to liberation, then what you said might be true;² but, since the individual soul (*samsārin*) is either a part (*ēkadēṣa*) or a modification (*vikāra*) of the Self (*ātman*), is liberation, even then, possible only by the means you suggest or is it by means of performing rites?'

254. Even then, the duty (of the aspirant for liberation) will be the avoidance (*nivṛitti*) of all future bondage, and not the engagement in rites (*pravṛitti*).

255. Since the individual soul, which owes its separateness to the nescience of Self, is not, in reality, other than the Self, therefore, even on that supposition,³ the duty (of the *mumukshu*) is to destroy nescience and not to perform rites.

256. So also, even if the individual soul be a modification of Self, it is not necessary to perform rites, since there is nothing to be done, and since the becoming one with the cause (*Brahman*) is brought about by itself (*svataḥ-siddha*).

¹ भावना is the necessary basis of every विधि and consists of the three essentials, फलाकांक्षा, इतिकर्तव्य and करण (or साधन). Since there are no two kinds of *vidhi* known to the Vedas, since every *vidhi* is based on भावना, and since all the three elements of भावना are wanting in the aspirant to liberation, it follows that liberation is not subject to injunction.

² Namely, that knowledge is the only means, though indirectly to liberation. This verse is the contention of Surēṣvara's opponent who argues on the footing that the *jīvātman* is either a part or modification of the *paramātman*. This is refuted in the following four verses, *et seq.*

³ That the *jīvātman* is separate from the *paramātman*.

257. As the pot is transformed into clay, in the same way indeed does the modification of the Self (*jīva*) become the unmodified Self. And this is the result of understanding the truth (*tattvāwabōdha*).

258. If the effect and cause are different, where then is the relation of cause and effect? And, if they are not different, then, since they are identical, where again is the relation of cause and effect?

259. Liberation consists in the modification (individual soul) of the Self which is pure knowledge, becoming one with its cause (the Self); and, since this is brought about by itself, the argument that liberation has to be accomplished (by rites), fails.

260 and 261. Therefore, whether the individual soul be a part or a modification (of *Brahman*), on either supposition, the performance of rites is fruitless; nay, instead of tending to liberation, it may even be productive of misery; nay, more, rites, when engaged in, will certainly create impediments to liberation too. Hence the performance of rites serves no purpose with regard to liberation.

262. If it be said that the modification (*jīva*) is entirely different from the modified (*paramātmān*), then liberation would mean the complete annihilation of the modification (*jīva*).

263. Herein also ritual is useless, since there is no fruit derivable therefrom. And like ritual, knowledge too is purposeless in this case for want of fruit (*phalābhāvāt*).

264. If bondage is natural, it cannot then be the

mere result of nescience;¹ and if the *jīva* be considered to be a part (*ēkadēṣa*) of *brahman*, then too, as before, the fallacy of the very thing being destroyed (*svarūpanāṣadōsha*) would follow.

265 and 266. If, on the other hand, bondage be not natural, but is the result of nescience, then, whether the *jīva* be a modification or a part of *brahman*, the view² already advanced will have to be maintained. That view is also acceptable to us, and does not conflict with any demonstrated conclusion. Hence, injunction is not necessary for liberation.

267. If so, the suppositions that *jīva* is a modification, a part, etc., are all in vain, for, nescience will include all these cases.

268 and 269. Wholeness is liberation; hence, it is through nescience that it falsely appears as not-whole. Therefore, when nescience is destroyed by a knowledge of the true Self, what remains is the whole.³ Therefore, too, any kind of injunction is useless with regard to liberation.

270. So much is logically established. Your suggestion 'because Scripture aims at ritual etc.,' is further refuted as follows.⁴

¹ For, what is natural or *svābhāvika*, and not the result of *avidyā*, cannot be destroyed by *vidyā*. This holds good whether *jīva* be a *vikāra* or *aṃśa* of *brahman*.

² viz. that the two *kāṇḍas* are different, the persons authorised in each case are different, etc.

³ Cf. पूर्वमदः पूर्वमिदं पूर्णात्पूर्वमुदच्यते । पूर्वस्यपूर्वमादाय पूर्वमेवावशिष्यते ॥

⁴ See verse 199, 'will further be met etc.' For the opponent's argument see verse 36, 'आज्ञायस्य क्रियार्थत्वात् etc.'

271. Since the word 'Scripture' there¹ means only a part of Scripture, it follows that injunctory passages alone aim at ritual, since otherwise the rest would be meaningless.²

272. While there are passages in the chapters on ritual which are clearly injunctory, by holding that the word 'Scripture' means otherwise, passages which do not intend any rites are rendered meaningless.

273. Hence, for the reasons aforesaid, it is not right to say that the *Upanishads* are injunctory, since their object is entirely different (*pārthagarthīyāt*).³

274. With reference to your argument, 'because they occur in the same context as injunction etc.,' that will apply only to such passages, since otherwise they themselves would be meaningless.⁴

275. This reasoning cannot apply to Vedantic passages, for, the fruit in their case is directly perceived.⁵ It has already been pointed out in great detail that the fruit derivable from a knowledge thereof (i. e. of *Vēdānta*) is entirely different. Further, a different (injunctory) meaning will not suit the Vedantic passages at all.

¹ viz. in the *sūtra* आन्वायस्य क्रियार्थत्वात्.

² The word *āmnāya* must mean only such passages as are injunctory; for, if it includes declaratory passages also, it would be meaningless to say that the latter too prescribe rites.

³ Therefore they cannot be said to be meaningless if they do not aim at ritual.

⁴ See verse 36. विधिनात्वेकवाक्यत्वात्. Thus the passage वायुर्वेद्ये पिष्ठादेवता may be taken along with वायव्यं चेतमानमेत. But this reasoning cannot apply to a merely declaratory Vedantic passage occurring in an entirely different context by itself.

⁵ वेदान्त is दृष्टफल. The fruits of ritual, like स्वर्ग etc. are नदृष्ट and stand in need of injunction.

276. "But the rule is that, when there is unity of signification, it is illogical to create multiplicity of contexts; for example, the passage '*dēvasya tvā* etc.'"¹

277. Since the rule also is that, when the meaning is different, the contexts are different, as, in the passage '*ishētvā* etc.,'² it is equally illogical to assume unity of context.

278 and 279. On the other hand, the inclusion of the chapter on ritual in the chapter on knowledge, can only be by reason of the one being useful³ to the other, the relation between them being that between a general and a particular passage (*vākyaikavākyatva*). This will be further explained by arguments to be advanced hereafter.

280. It is therefore established that the whole of the *Upanishads* have a separate fruit of their own (*pārthagarthya*), that they negative all injunctory signification, and that the knowledge of Self alone is the means to liberation.

281. It should also be known that perfection in the path above specified consists in the cessation of all activity of speech, mind, or body.⁴

¹ Compare अर्थैकत्वादेकवाक्यं साकांक्षं चेद्विभागे स्यात्. Thus the passage देवस्य स्वाहवितुः etc. needs completion of meaning by the passage निर्वपामि etc. Hence these two are एकवाक्य. Hence also the कर्मकाण्ड and the ज्ञानकाण्ड must have unity of context.

² हृद्येत्येति शायामाच्छिनस्युर्जस्येत्यनुमार्ष्टीति छेदनानुमार्जनयोर्मध्येन विनियोगात्.....जनैकं यद्विरिति राजानितम्. Anandagiri.

³ Ritual, being a means of purification, is a help to knowledge. Anandagiri says, by way of analogy 'द्रव्यार्जनविधेः क्रतुविधिभिर्जात्येकवाक्यत्ववत्.....तयोर्जात्येक्येऽपि साधनादिभिर्कर्मभिर्भावः'.

⁴ The mere study of the *Vedānta* does not endow one with knowledge, unless it is coupled with *śama*, *dama*, etc.

282. It follows too that the person authorised in this case is the aspirant to knowledge who has renounced all action, and not the performer of rites who is ever striving after performance.

283. Authority is given even for the ignorant person, who, on learning from Scripture about the true nature of *Brahman* and the Self, cherishes a desire for knowledge and liberation.¹

284. "Not so. It has been pointed out, in a former place, by a consideration of the beginning and the conclusion of Scripture, that, by reason of consistency of meaning, the performance of rites is its sole aim.

285. "Hence, the person authorised is he who performs everything that is ordained by Scripture. Otherwise, if diversity of context be established, diversity must also be assumed in the persons that are authorised."

286. Not so. We have already demonstrated the divergence of context. Therefore there is no room for the objection you put forward.

287. Moreover, it is not possible for a man, even within the whole period of a man's life, to accomplish all that is ordained by Scripture, so that (as you say) he may be authorised for a knowledge of the Self.²

288. Rewards have a secondary significance (*artha-vāda*), and, in the case of knowledge that is derivable

¹ The opponent's argument is that, if one has no idea of *Brahman* at all, there can be no desire in him for knowing it, and, if he has already known *Brahman*, a desire for knowledge is out of question. Hence there is no *adhikāra* at all either way. *Surēśvara's* answer is contained in this verse.

² See verse 285 *supra*.

from *Vēdānta*, since there will be no one that is authorised, Scripture will cease to be an authority by itself.¹

289. Further, liberation would not be desired, until it is understood by any proof (*māna*) ; and, if it has been understood, then, *a fortiori*, there would be no desire for it, since it is no other than the natural condition of one's own Self.²

290. It is not right to contend that there can be, in men, no desire for liberation ; for, it is seen also that such kinds of happiness etc. are desired as are not limited by space and time.³

291. Again, if the fruit of knowledge were as uncertain as the fruit of *agnihōtra* etc., then there might be some difficulty as to the person authorised, since there would be the doubt that, even if performed, it will not bear fruit.

292. *Agnihōtra* etc. will not bear fruit if performed by a *Śūdra* who is unauthorised, though he too is desirous of fruit. Hence it (authorisation) is laid down with precision.

293. But, here, nothing more is sought from the *Śāstra* than liberation, which depends solely on the springing up of knowledge that destroys nescience.⁴

¹ Verses 288 and 289 are the several consequences following from the argument of the opponent that both the *karmakāṇḍa* and the *jñānakāṇḍa* have the same *adhikārin*.

² Hence, if there could be no desire, there could be no *adhikārin*, and both the *kāṇḍas* would therefore lose their inherent authority.

³ And liberation is such a kind of happiness

⁴ Hence there is no difficulty as to the *adhikārin*, in regard to liberation.

294. If it be asked whence arises that knowledge, the answer is that it springs from the cessation of bondage. That bondage is either past, or future, or present.

295. It is for this reason alone that liberation is not attained even after a complete study of Scripture and its interpretation. The same is pointed out in Scripture by the illustration of the golden mine.¹

296. 'The knot that ties the heart is rent asunder, all doubts are destroyed, and all actions fall into non-existence, when That which is both greatest and least (*parāvara*) is realised.'²

297. By this passage and others, it is declared that the fruit of knowledge is not unperceived. The same is shown by the passage "How shall he become a *Brāhmaṇa*? By his attributes etc."³

298. Why should not liberation be the object of desire, since we commonly find excessive liking in men who long for the attainment of eternal happiness and the destruction of everlasting misery?

299. Since there is no difference in the degree of excessive desire (*prityutkarsha*) with regard to fruits perceived and unperceived, the wise person chooses nothing but the highest bliss (liberation).

300. The happiness that is the reward of ritual, is transitory, since it has to be achieved by means (*sādhana-sādhya*); but liberation is declared to be eternal, since

¹ viz. that people, other than professional detectives of mines, will not discover a rich mine of gold hidden deep beneath the surface of the earth, though they may walk over it never so frequently.

² This verse is taken *verbatim* from *Muṇḍakōpanishad*, II 2. 9.

³ सप्रज्ञः केनस्याद्येन etc.

it is dependent on manifestation alone (*abhivyānjaka-tantra*).

301. 'All rites are either useful by being productive of purification, or, are included in the chapter relating to knowledge. Hence their fruit is not different.'¹

302 and 303. This cannot establish syntactical unity, for, none longs for an end (*pūmartha*) which consists in the attainment of an unprofitable fruit at the termination of the performances prescribed. He who thirsts to attain complete bliss will not be content with gaining but an insignificant portion of it.²

304. "Perfection of bliss (or liberation) is also denoted by such words as heaven, the dominion of heaven, etc. Nor does the word heaven indicate any degree of bliss."³

305. No wise man exerts himself without rightly understanding the object he strives after. If the word heaven be taken to denote any indefinite degree of bliss, then sacrifices like the *agnishṭōma* in the month of *chitrā* will be connected with the fruit derivable from the animal etc.⁴

¹ Hence, knowledge is the primary aim, and rites are but accessory thereto. Therefore the opponent again presses the argument contained in verse 285 *supra*.

² i. e. he who longs for *mōkṣa* will not even dream of *svarga* and such other evanescent fruits.

³ The opponent argues, from the passage स्वर्गकामोयजेत स्वारावकामोयजेत etc., that the word *svarga* implies liberation, and hence there is no साधनभेद in the two *kāṇḍas*.

⁴ The fruit of *chaitra-agnishṭōma* is the gain of cattle. And the pleasure derivable from drinking their milk etc. will hardly be different from the pleasure of *svarga*, if the opponent's view were to be adopted.

306. If it be said that it denotes a degree of bliss comparatively higher than that derivable from sons or cattle, even then heaven will not mean liberation, since it does not admit of any known criterion.

307. If liberation be the fruit of performing rites with special objects (*kāmya*), then, as soon as any such rite is performed only once, the aim is fully accomplished, since some bliss of indefinite description is at once obtained.¹

308. That liberation cannot result from rites, is evident from passages like 'they perish,'² 'having examined etc.,'³ and 'those who here etc.'⁴

309. "But, I imagine that it is extreme rashness to renounce, for no reason whatever, rites such as sacrifices etc., which are prescribed by Scriptural passages that are clearly injunctory."

310. If so, it is greater rashness to give up the perfecting of the knowledge of the unity of Self, which is clearly ordained by the passages of the *Upanishads*.

311 and 312. If the authorisation be closely examined with reference to each chapter of Scripture, no such rashness will appear, for the very reason that the Scriptural passages themselves establish a difference of authorisation (for the two *kāṇḍas*). Hence it follows that they too are authorized who are desirous of becoming *Brahman*.

¹ This is Sureśvara's argument, even granting that heaven means some indefinite bliss and, therefore, liberation.

² 'सुखाद्येते' इत्येवमनिर्वर्तकायजमानादयः सुश्रुते गच्छन्ति नश्यन्ति. Anandagiri.

³ प्रदीप्यतोकात्मकर्मचितान् ब्राह्मणो निर्वेदमावासात्प्रकृतः कृतेन etc. See verse 25.

⁴ तद्वद्वृत्तमखीयचरखारमखीयां येनिमापद्यन्ते etc.

313. "Why is it that the commentator, even after affirming that the said chapter is connected with the chapter on ritual, has not stated in detail the particulars of such connection ?

314. "Such detail is not given even in the commentary beginning with 'it is presently explained,' for, what follows deals only with the authority of Scripture as to a thing that is self-established."

315. After establishing the authority of Vedantic utterances, the connection above-mentioned will be explained. Therefore the commentary, 'even all etc.,' is first written to establish that very authority.

316. "Does he at least refer to the connection later on? How is it that no connection is referred to, coupled with a locative phrase¹?" This is the answer.

317. There will be no such connection, if the two chapters differ in aim, since one is independent of the aim of the other. Nor will there be such connection, if the two chapters are identical in aim, since then there will be syntactical unity.²

318. So, too, no connection can exist between the two chapters, if both of them are not authoritative. Nor can any connection be predicated, if both or either of them is authoritative.³

¹ ज्ञानकायस्य धर्मकाण्डे सम्बन्धोनाख्यत इति सप्राम्यनपदं द्रष्टव्यं नञ् मुद्राव्याख्येपोदृष्टव्य इत्यर्थः. Anandagiri.

² 'Connection' implies duality and is incompatible with unity.

³ मानस्ये द्वयोर्मयो ज्ञानानभिज्ञत्वान्मानमानयोश्च संस्तेरवाप्यत्वात् । द्वयोर्मानस्ये च नतत्वात्त्वमानव्यवस्था । अन्यतरस्येव मानस्ये च साधनादिभेदादिति । Anandagiri.

319. Further, the said connection is indicated by the Vedic passage "*tam ētam* etc." itself, when closely examined. Bearing this in mind, the teacher has not explained the connection in detail.

320. Having established by argument the authority of the *Vēdāntas*, he will clearly explain later on the connection with the chapter on ritual.¹

321. "The passage, '*tam ētam*, etc.' enjoins only prescribed rites (*nitya*), like recitation of Vedas etc., as being instrumental in giving rise to a knowledge of the unity of Self."²

322. The passage '*tam ētam*, etc.' points out that all rites whatsoever have for their aim the creation of a desire for knowledge. This is because the application is different.³

323. "The only purpose of the ritual chapter of the *Vēda* is to take such common instruments as sheep, corn, etc., and to enjoin which of them ought to be offered and which not.

324. "It conveys no real meaning to say that the chapter on ritual deals with objects and means which are established by entirely different proofs.

¹ viz. the connection of ritual with *vividisha*, (the former being the cause of the latter), which is established by the passage "*tam ētam* etc.," this passage being known as the विविदिषापाठः.

² *Nitya* as opposed to *kāmya* rites, which, having each a special object of its own, cannot also be instrumental to *vividisha*.

³ From the two passages "अग्निहोत्रेदध्या जुहोति" and "दध्नेन्द्रिय-कामो जुहुयात्", we gather that the offering of curd is both *nitya* and *kāmya*. So, *kāmya* rites, though they have their special objects like heaven etc., may yet have, apart from these, the object of creating *vividisha*. This difference of application is called संबोधापेक्षान्वयः.

325. "The *Vēda*, as a whole, has, for its object, the attainment of a knowledge of the unity of Self. Apart from this, there is no other connection between the chapters on ritual and knowledge.

326. "Prescribed rites and occasional rites (*nitya-naimittika*) have for their final object, the knowledge of the unity of Self through the purification of the doer, and nothing else.

327. "As for rites with special objects they are not even fit to be performed, since they are censured by the Vedic passages¹ 'They perish etc.', 'having examined etc.' and 'They who here etc.'"

328. The co-existence in this manner of injunction and prohibition, is not at all consistent. It will be consistent, if the censure be confined merely to the desire of fruit.²

329. "Further, passages, occurring in the chapter on knowledge, which enjoin worship of some kind or other, are also intended to make one fit for the knowledge of the unity of Self."

330. From the passage 'being released etc.', and the passage about flame etc., it is clear that acts of worship do not directly lead to liberation (*svārtha*).³

331. Such⁴ is the proper connection of the chapter on ritual (with the chapter on knowledge). And there is no reason to support any other kind of connection.

¹ See verse 308 *supra*.

² It is not the very performance of *kāmya* rites that is prohibited, but their performance with desire of fruit.

³ They indirectly lead to liberation through the attainment of *satyalōka*, etc.

⁴ viz. that rites are a help to knowledge by way of purification.

332. It cannot be said that, like the knowledge of the *Sāmanveda* etc., the knowledge of the unity of Self is subservient to ritual, for, there is no means by which this knowledge may be so connected.

333. Nowhere does Scripture connect with ritual the knowledge of the unity of Self, in the same way as the '*aindi*' hymn defines the particular worship that is intended. Nor is such connection indicated at least, as in the passage, "I cut *darbhā* grass, the abode of gods" etc.

334. Nor can it be said that, as in the instance of the ladle and its being made of *parṇa* wood, knowledge too, by virtue of any passage,¹ connects itself through the doer with ritual; for, it is not in that context at all.

335. It may be that the direction about *parṇa* wood is auxiliary to sacrifice, since it is necessary to explain the quality and the material of the ladle, and it explains the nature of such ladle.

336. But the knowledge of the unity of Self, which destroys the nature of doer etc. that are essential for ritual, cannot be auxiliary to ritual, since, it will not be objectless even if it is self-dependent.

337. The ladle etc. may refer to sacrifice, because their application to it is invariable; but the soul (*kartā*) cannot refer to it, because it exists elsewhere too,² and therefore deviates in its application (*vyabhichārāt*).

338. It is not even in the same context, since it is not spoken of where rites are begun to be dealt with.

¹ e. g. the passage "The Self must be realised etc."

² For, the doer is present not only in *vaidika* rites, but in all secular movements too.

339. The rule is that, when once a connection in general with rites is established by inference (*linga*), that connection is particularised therefrom by name (*nāmnah*) and by order (*kramāt*).

340. But the connection of the knowledge of the unity of Self is not like that of the several rites mentioned in the chapter on rites with special objects. Therefore, there is no connection with rites at all of the knowledge of the unity of Self, since there is no kind of proof whatever to establish it.

341. Nor can it¹ be construed to be an explanatory remark (*arthavāda*), for, it is syntactically distinct from the injunction, and, further, since the knowledge derivable from it has perceptible fruit, it cannot be inferred that the fruit of such study is unperceived (*adrishṭa*).

342. On the other hand, from the passage "*tam ētām* etc.," we may conclude that sacrifices etc. are part of ritual.

343. Others contend that, with the mind sullied by desire, one cannot hope to realise the Supreme Secondless Self, since every desire is not fully accomplished.

344. Having, by a contemplation of the unity in duality and other actions, attained the fruit which is the very end of the thread,² a man enjoys the world of *Prajāpati*, and then realises the unity of Self.

345. It is not so. Not by the fulfilment of desire can such desire be destroyed even after hundreds of years.

¹ viz. the passage which speaks of knowledge as fruit.

² The thread (*sūtra*) has reference to the different kinds of enjoyments which form a series in the ascending scale.

It will wax stronger by being adhered to, and its cessation can only be by knowing its evil.

346. Never does desire cease by the enjoyment of desires, but will increase more and more, as fire by the addition of fuel.

347. Therefore, since this expedient fails, one should give up all desire, and take to the understanding of the Self by which all misery will cease.

348. Further, the mere learning from Scripture about supreme bliss (*ānanda*) without grasping it by direct perception, is not sufficient even to retard the desire for such kinds of happiness as are directly perceived.

349. Therefore, the means for the cessation of desire is the contemplation of arguments against it. The performance of such actions will only lead to the contrary.¹

350. The seat of *Prajāpati*² is not the invariable means to liberation ; for, no difference whatever is seen, as between the various limitations of the one Reality.

351. There is no difference in the atmosphere, as limited by a pot or by a bucket, by distance or by nearness, by things existent or non-existent.

352. It cannot be said that all manifested things are identical with Brahman, having regard to the quality of pure existence, for, that will destroy their very relation to one another.³ Hence the so-called distinction is purely external.

¹ i. e. to the continuance of desire.

² See verse 344 *supra*.

³ By destroying their mutual distinctions they are identical with Brahman and he is without distinction.

353. Even if the relation be said to be that of cause and effect, the effect is not distinct from the cause. Nor is there any difference in the one Reality, as bracelets etc. create difference in gold.

354. Hence, the one Reality does not differ in *Prajāpati* or in the insect. This is established by logic as well as by Vedic passages like "therefore whosoever etc."

355. When all the desires that dwell in his heart are forsaken, then does the mortal become immortal, then does he realise *Brahman*.¹

356. The one God, that is contained in every creature, all-pervading, the soul within every being, the doer of all action, in whom all creatures live, the all-seer, the self-conscious, the absolute, the attributeless.

357. If it be said that, in one of three ways,² there is a coordinate relation (*samūchchaya*) between knowledge and ritual, this too is untenable, since, as pointed out before, the whole aim of the Veda³ is to teach the unity of Self.

358. As the two are not enjoined by the same passage (or context), and as there is no identity of fruit (*sādhya*) between them, how can there be coordination between knowledge and ritual as between matter and its attribute?

¹ This verse is taken *verbatim* from the *Kāthopanishad*, II. 6. 14.

² The three possible coordinations are गुण (ritual being secondary to knowledge), विपरीत (*vice versa*), and समप्रधानत्व (equal importance).

³ i. e. the *Vedānta*.

359. Inasmuch as ritual and the knowledge of unity of Self are respectively dependent on multiplicity and unity, how can there be coordination, since there cannot be between them the relation of one being an aid to the other?

360. The knowledge of the true nature of the gods and the materials (for sacrifice) has become a part of ritual;¹ for, only in so much is it ritual proper, and not if performed in ignorance of either the materials or the gods.

361. Thus qualified, the ritual becomes more effectual and the fruit thereof more plentiful in consequence. But it cannot be coordinate with ritual, for, a part cannot be coordinate with the whole.

362. What is called the knowledge of the unity of Self is entirely destructive of nescience. How then can there be ritual simultaneous with such knowledge, or any desire, while the object aimed at (*Brahman*) is in sight?

363. A knowledge of the *Brāhmaṇa* caste or other caste prescribed, which is necessary for the achievement of the object sought for, in the case of *agnihōtra* and other rites, is nothing but consistent with the rites themselves.

364. But a knowledge of the real nature of the unity of the Self puts an end to the distinctions of caste etc., and hence not only do rites become unnecessary, but they even cease to be performed.

365. False knowledge, like that of the serpent, is the cause of the running away etc., but the individual

¹ And not coordinate with ritual, as the opponent would have it to help him by way of analogy.

repents his past conduct when the idea of the serpent is dispelled by a knowledge of the rope.

366. Ritual cannot extend to liberation, since the acts of acquisition etc. are absent therefrom; nor are the *Veda*, *Smṛiti*, etc. applicable thereto. Hence there can be no coordination.

367. Knowledge, moreover, is subjective, being entirely restricted to the internal Self (*pratyag*); but ritual is objective, being dependent on external objects.¹

368. What is objective cannot exist simultaneously with knowledge which is subjective. Ritual may be purificatory, but the cessation of nescience can result from knowledge alone.

369. The knowledge of the Self is real knowledge; rites are solely dependent on nescience. When real knowledge is attained, how can ritual remain, since the very root of ritual is destroyed?

370. Knowledge is eternally existent, owing to the eternal proximity of the Self. But ritual is transient, being multifarious. And the transient must give way to the eternal.

371. The worlds attainable by ritual are evanescent, but by a knowledge of *Brahman*, one becomes the lord of himself. Who will long for beggary, when the kingdom of the three worlds is in his hands?

372. Knowledge, being dealt with in a separate context, need not be supplemental to rites; nor can knowledge, which is self-dependent, be auxiliary to anything else, for that will be inconsistent.

¹ The rule is that what is subjective is superior to what is objective.

373. Since knowledge is based on reality and is not dependent upon the knower, it is therefore said to be self-dependent (*svatantra*), for the purpose of uprooting ne-science.

374. Nowhere at all do we read in Scripture that freedom from birth and death (*anāvṛitti*) can result from rites, but we see it recited in many places in Scripture that such freedom can result from knowledge alone.

375. Knowledge is definite (*ēkarūpa*), since its object is the Self which is a unit ; but, rites are multifarious, being dependent on several agents and causes (*kāraka*).

376. For liberation which is definite, what is indefinite (*bhinnarūpa*) cannot be the means. For liberation which is definite, the means too must be definite.

377. Therefore do the *Śāstras* point out that, as the result of various actions, the doer enjoys various fruits by being born among gods or men or the lower animals.

378. Some others contend in all seriousness that some passage in the *Vēdu* hints at the cessation of some distinction.¹

379. (They say :) "Thus, for example, in the passage about the person desirous of reaching heaven, the distinction between the body and the soul is said to cease, and the person authorised, who is also the enjoyer of heaven, is entirely different from the body.

¹ *Surēśvara* is a little humorous in this verse. He is stating the views of his opponent who contends that there are passages in the कर्मकाण्ड which speak of all differences terminating, and hence that *kāṇḍa* may be assumed to enjoin knowledge.

380. "Even in the passage 'by milking the cow etc.,' a difference in the person authorised is ignored, since a person once authorised can also be authorised again, and none need specially be authorised therefor.¹

381. "This negation of difference is also easily seen in the prohibition² of such activities as are the result of passions etc. Such activities are also prohibited by the injunctions themselves, by virtue of their enjoining other activities.

382. "Even in the secular world, the pursuit of an undesirable route is prevented either by actual prohibition or by the pointing out of a different route. Let the same be taken to be the case in the *Vēdās* too.

383. "Thus all injunctions without exception have for their object the authorisation of the knowledge of Self, by virtue of the cessation of all activities which have passions etc. for their source."

384. It is not so ; for, all the ritualistic injunctions of Scripture do not intend any fruit other than what is specified as *the* object in their respective passages.

385. Since Scripture aims at performance, it cannot anywhere import the cessation of any difference. In the face of passages which enjoin fruit, how can we infer cessation of difference, which means the absence of fruit?

386. Further, the realisation of the Self (*vastu*) can never result from the cessation of differences, because

¹ The person who performs *darṣa* etc. for attaining heaven, may also perform *gōdāhana* if he is desirous of acquiring cows.

² The opponent extends his argument to the prohibitory portion of the *Vēda* also.

liberation is possible even in the absence of such cessation and because such cessation exists even in deep sleep.

387. If duality is real, it is impossible to dispel it ; and, if it is only an effect, then, when the cause ceases, the effect too will cease, but not of its own accord.

388. It is impossible for anyone¹ to bring about the complete cessation of all distinctions. The closing of the senses etc. in sleep is spontaneous and not the result of Scriptural injunction (*śāstratah*).

389. Moreover, since they again spring into existence on waking, it is to be suspected that they have not been destroyed altogether. If it be said that they arise newly, then too there is no cessation by your own showing.

390. It cannot be said that the cause of duality is destroyed by the cessation of duality, for, nowhere is the cause destroyed by the cessation of the effect.

391. Since nescience which is the cause is destroyed by a knowledge of the reality, it follows therefore that the cessation of differences is fruitless for the purpose of destroying nescience.

392. Because, by a knowledge of the rope, the idea of the serpent and other like illusions vanish, it does not follow that the rope is visible in darkness, even in the absence of any illusion about the serpent.

393. If Scripture be an authority for such cessation, the Self cannot be realised, since the aim of such cessation is different. If Scripture be an authority for the spontaneous realisation of the Self, it cannot be an authority either for cessation or for both.

¹ Without the help of knowledge.

394. You cannot terminate what is yet to happen ; what is past has ceased by itself ; and things that exist at present, being of the nature of effects, will perish of their own accord.

395. If the Scripture aims at cessation, the fruit of action would be uncertain ; and if it aims at fruit, it cannot import cessation ; nor can it import both, owing to the difference of context.

396. If, by the mere cessation of duality, every misery might be banished and liberation secured, then knowledge would become fruitless.

397. Thus, while liberation is attainable through the destruction of nescience by a knowledge of the true nature of the unity of Self, it serves no purpose to create the hypothesis of cessation.

398. Since injunctions are restricted to their respective rites, and do not consequently stand in need of each other, tell me how there could be unity of authorisation in respect of such injunctions.

399. If every injunction and every prohibition be supposed, even in the absence of any authority therefor, to import the cessation of nominal and other distinctions, then liberation would be but an accident and Scripture would become objectless.

400. You may say : " As one climbs to the terrace of a mansion by means of a flight of steps, in the same way does ritual help the attainment of the knowledge of Self by the gradation of heaven and other effects.

401. " To take another instance, the direction to go to a village which is on the way to town is auxiliary to the direction to take that route to the town."

402. Not so. The going to the village may rightly be said to be ancillary, since it is not the primary object of desire. But heaven etc. cannot be ancillary, since they too are objects primarily sought after.¹

403. "Or, heaven etc. may serve as inducements to liberation, just as extolling the merits of the wayside village is an inducement to reach the town."

404. It is not so. It may hold good in the case of human speech where other proofs are available; but the hidden intention etc. cannot be gathered from Scripture, owing to the absence of a speaker.

405. If it be said that the place where one is led by such inducement be the primary object of such inducement, then, since there is no direct guidance for reaching the town, why will a man strive for it at all?

406. If it be said that, by the natural course of things (*vastuvrittēna*), a visit to the village is necessary before reaching the town, even then the reaching of the town is a matter of course (*arthāt*) rather than one of inference² (*mānatah*).

407. It cannot thus be said that ritual too may incidentally be an aid to knowledge, like the injunction for earning wealth;³ for, the only way of gathering the intention of Scripture is by the right construction of the spoken word.

¹ The visit to a village on the way is not the primary object of the traveller to town, and hence requires no separate injunction for itself. Not so in the case of *svarga* etc.

² The traveller reaches the town not by virtue of any inducement by way of extolling the merits of the wayside village.

³ The earning of wealth is enjoined with a view to personal comfort, but is also incidentally useful for the performance of sacrifices.

408. If Scripture intends heaven etc., it cannot intend the realisation of the unity of Self; and, if it intends liberation, it cannot intend heaven; nor can it intend both at one time owing to the difference of context.

409. Further, heaven etc. being themselves of the nature of fruits, cannot, like sacrifice etc., be taken to import other fruits.

410. It may be said: "There is no flaw in my argument, for, in the manner aforesaid,¹ these² are helps to the acquisition of the knowledge of Self."

411. This may be true in the case of prohibitions, which are helps to renunciation by prohibiting activities in such common directions as are induced by passions etc.

412. But how can it be said that injunctions too restrain the passions etc. (*rāgādi*), since they imply neither exclusion (*parisamkhyā*) nor selection (*niyama*)?

413. For, injunctions generally teach us such aims as have not been attained as yet. But an injunction which assumes that an aim has been achieved, may be said to imply the exclusion of other aims.³

414. There can be no exclusion merely because the fruits are identical, as in the case of service and the *Sāṅgrahaṇī* sacrifice;⁴ for, the rites enjoined by Scripture have no fixed time for bearing fruit.

¹ See verses 399 and 400 *supra*.

² i. e. injunctions and prohibitions.

³ Compare विधिरत्नान्तमप्राप्ते नियमः पादिके सति । तत्र चान्यत्र च प्राप्ते परिसंख्येति गीयते ॥

⁴ One may become lord of villages, either by serving the king or by performing the *Sāṅgrahaṇī* sacrifice. The enjoining of the latter, the opponent therefore says, must necessarily mean the exclusion of the former.

415. The fruits of Scriptural rites are not directly perceived, but the activities promoted by the passions etc. produce fruits that are directly perceived.¹ Further, as an instrument to acquire villages, service is not inconsistent with *Sāngrahaṇī*.

416. Scripture is an authority for the proposition that ritual bears fruit, and no more. Therefore, there is nothing inconsistent of any kind in a person desirous of abundant fruit performing both service and *Sāngrahaṇī* either successively or simultaneously.

417. If injunction means the exclusion of all activities without exception which spring from the passions etc., then it would follow that even prescribed activities are excluded, owing to want of the necessary materials.²

418. There is no difference whatever between activities which aim at known fruit and those which aim at unseen fruit; for, even rites with special objects, being in the nature of means, are brought about by desire, passion, etc.

419. Thus while the two kinds of activities are alike in their tendency to strengthen our worldly attachment, by what preference can one of them be said to tend towards liberation?

420. If you do not even accept that rites are but instruments to secure desires, then your reasoning would fail, and the reward would be a matter of accident.

¹ Therefore there is no similarity of fruit. In the next sentence Sureśvara shows that the analogy itself falls to the ground.

² Since even the earning of wealth and materials would be excluded according to that view.

421. It is but light talk to argue that, since all desires cease by the complete enjoyment of desires, injunctions are, by this means,¹ accessory to liberation.

422. How can activity put an end to the very thing which has prompted it? Further a person, once active, will not desist from the action which is the means to realise his desire.

423. He will, at any rate, cherish a disgust for knowledge that will destroy all human pleasures. So runs the proverbial song of the man of desire, "Better in the vacant *Brindāvana* etc."²

424. As regards the argument that this part of the *Vēda* somewhere hints at the cessation of something,³ it is unfounded, since the Scripture does not imply the same, nor does the cessation of the body, etc. follow therefrom.

425. Though Scripture intends heaven alone, its meaning cannot be strained to import cessation, for, the cessation of the body etc. is established by words which clearly refer to it.

426. When the very elephant is seen, one need not infer it from its footsteps. The passage 'not huge etc.' directly negatives the existence of the body etc.

427. As for those who said that, by the opposite method,⁴ there is unity of authorisation between know-

¹ Injunctions prompt us to action, action brings enjoyment of fruit, and such enjoyment quenches the desire for the same.

² अपिब्रुवावनेष्टुये प्रतापस्यं न वृक्षति । ननुनिर्मिदप्रपोषकवर्षवपि-
नैतम ॥

³ See verse 378, *supra*.

⁴ i. e. knowledge is auxiliary to ritual. See verse 357 *supra*.

ledge and ritual above spoken of, let them point out any proof for so connecting knowledge.

428. It cannot be said that *hava*, as in the case of the sprinkling of rice, the context (*prakriyā*) implies it, for such implication (*miti*) is no more than the indirect inference of a connection between what is spoken of (*prakṛit*) and the seeds of pure happiness or misery (*aparva*).¹

429. It may rightly be said of the word 'rice' that since it cannot convey any meaning about the nature of the rice, it must necessarily imply the connection between the thing spoken of and the germs of future weal or woe.

430 and 431. Nor can such connection be said to be syntactical (*vākyaṇa*), as in the instance of the ladle being made of *parṇa* wood, for, in that case, owing to the invariability of the relation between the ladle etc. and the rite, it will clearly imply ritual, even without any unity of context.

432. It has been pointed out that the ladle etc. is directly connected with ritual by syntactic unity. But the same cannot be said of the knowledge of Self, for, it is not recited in the same context.

433. Nor do we see any invariability of connection between the Self and ritual. Hence its connection with ritual is not amenable to any proof whatever.

434. Thus, since it is not known how knowledge is

¹ The reference is to the sprinkling of rice which is enjoined as part of the new-moon ritual etc.

accessory to something else, the passage enjoining fruit¹ is not a mere explanatory remark. Therefore also, the authorisation is different in the case of knowledge and in that of ritual.

435. Such a connection may be necessary to explain away inconsistency (*arthākshēpa*)² in the case of the individual soul which is fit for ritual and which is the doer and enjoyer. But the same cannot hold good in the case of the Upanishadic Self which has shaken off all difference.

436. Since, as may be gathered from the authority of direct Scriptural utterance or otherwise, it is established that asceticism is possible even in the earliest stage, it is no authority to quote the *Smṛiti*, 'debts etc.'³

437. It cannot be shown by any argument that liberation can follow from rites and rites alone. This will be elaborated later on. It is clear therefore that liberation cannot result from ritual.

438. Nor can it be said that the knowledge of the unity of Self, to bring about liberation, must be augmented by continued meditation (*abhyāsa*), or that such

1 i. e. that the fruit of knowledge is liberation. It would be *arthavāda* to say that the acquisition of knowledge is secondary to a different main purpose, but it is not *arthavāda* to say that knowledge bears such and such fruit,

2 The inconsistency is that, without a knowledge of the soul, one would not plunge into the performance of rites which can only produce happiness in lives to come. See verses 104, 106 *supra*.

3 *आयमानो वेदाङ्गवर्त्मनिर्जन्मप्राप्त्यायेत* and *अथानि जीवय्याकृतवने* *साधेनिर्जयेत्*. The discharge of the debts need not be in the same birth as that in which the pursuit of knowledge is authorised. Thus this view also does not support the theory of the subordination of ritual to knowledge.

knowledge is only a help to such meditation (*bhāvanā*).¹ This too will be explained later on.

439. It will also be pointed out that, since the reality known as the unity of Self is attained by unaided self-experience alone, knowledge cannot therefore be an accessory (*sāmpādika*).

440. Others say : "The Self, being an established entity, is knowable by other proofs, and that, like any other thing such as corn, it needs not Scripture to establish it.

441. "Since it is within the scope of ordinary proofs to distinguish and identify one's own self by the methods of agreement and difference through the states of waking, dream and sleep, it does not require in addition the Scripture to establish it.

442 and 443. "Man is thus enjoined by Scripture² to control his desires during the said three states (*tad-vāsanā-nirōdhē*), or to control his mind, but not to understand the Self. Therefore, since it is established by other proofs, Scripture has no application to it.

444. "Even if there be no need for other proofs, still, the Self, being of a self-resplendent nature, manifests itself of its own accord,³ after the desires of the mind are brought under restraint.

445. "Thus the *Vēdāntas*, like the passages about *jyōtiṣṭōma* and other rites, are authority only by way

¹ The opponent's argument is that knowledge is neither the only nor the direct cause of liberation, inasmuch as it needs to be supplemented by *abhyāsa*.

² By passages like *तद्विद्यानिरुद्धाः* etc.

³ And not by virtue of Vedantic knowledge.

of enjoining action,¹ but are no authority with regard to the Self (*vastu*) that can perceive itself (*akṣavat*).

446. "Since the connection of the Self with bondage is the result solely of desire, liberation can therefore result only from restraint, irrespective of the existence or non-existence of any other cause.²

447. "Words uttered have no independent authority (*anapēkṣatva*) in any case if they do not contain an injunction; and injunction has no application to an established entity.

448. "For the position that the *Vēdānta* is also proof of the Self, the instance of an injunction which is also a recital of merit, cannot be quoted, since such recital of merit is confined to the rite in question.³

449. "Moreover, we discern throughout the Vedas that only objects of experience constitute the aim of man, but not experience itself.⁴

450. "Since it is thus established that objects of knowledge alone can be the aim of man, it follows that the words of the Veda⁵ merely convey an idea but afford no proof.

451. "If the Vedas import an established Self, such Self is not found in the sphere of ritual to encompass any human aim which means something yet to be realised.

¹ i. e. by enjoining the restraint of desires (निरोधनियोगतया).

² e. g. आत्मा.

³ e. g. अग्नेर्हित्वाग्निमन्त्रमुवाच. Compare अन्नमुनेषु कर्मसात्त्विककर्मयोगित्वात् (Mim. Sut.)

⁴ The soul, being *svaprakāśa*, cannot be a *parushārtha*.

⁵ Like विज्ञान, आनन्द etc.

452. "If, on the other hand, the Vedas do not import the Self which is a known thing, it cannot properly be subservient to ritual.

453. "If you say it is comprised in injunction on the strength of the passage 'Worship thy own Self,' then you adopt the very argument I advance.¹

454. "It is therefore clear that Scripture is authority only by way of enjoining rites." So say some whose sole wish is to impute an injunctory signification to Scripture.

455. Your loud acclamations have no propriety, for, even without an injunction, a desired object may be achieved, even in secular affairs.

456. We learn that the contact of the Self with bondage is not real, since such bondage (*anartha*) is dependent solely on desire (*vāsanā*) for the reason that the former exists only when the latter exists.²

457. Since by mere reasoning the cause of contact with bondage is thus discerned, it follows that the bondage ceases when the cause is destroyed.

458. Since liberation is established by you, as by the Buddhists and others, even without the aid of Scripture, Scripture will therefore become entirely useless.

459. As the results of actions done in innumerable bygone lives are endless, it is inconceivable that men could combat such results in a single life.³

¹ That the *Vedānta* is an authority only by way of injunction but not for the existence of the Self.

² *Vāsanā* is the impression of pleasure or pain in the mind, which alone gives rise to a feeling of bondage (*saṃsāra*).

³ In verses 455 to 459, Sureśvara extends his opponent's argument to prove its absurdity.

460. If the inner darkness cannot be destroyed by the direct realisation of the Self, how can it be destroyed by mere intellectual culture (*jñāna-abhyāsa*) which is itself obliterated by the experience of misery etc.

461. It will also be shown in its proper place¹ by clear logical reasoning that liberation cannot result from the method of restraint alone.

462. This Self, in fact, is signified neither by words nor by sentences, but its true nature is conveyed only by such passages of Scripture as negative that idea.²

463. In deep sleep and other such states, liberation does not result, though desires (*vāsanā*) are absent; nor then does the liberated self manifest itself, though there is total want of intellectual activity.

464. Nescience is the only cause of the contact of the Self with all kinds of bondage (*anartha*). The same is the cause even for the attachment to it of desire.

465. We shall also point out, by clear logical reasoning, that Scripture can have an independent authority even in the absence of injunction.

466. Even according to you, you interpret Scripture as injunctory, solely because the Self perceives itself; for, otherwise, perception (*anubhūti*) of Self cannot be the result of injunction.

467. How can the Self which is the very essence of experience, be dependent on anything,³—the Self, which nescience cannot make non-manifest nor can knowledge make manifest.

¹ See verse 761 *et seq.*

² e. g. नापमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यः etc., and such other passages.

³ Such as injunction etc. The idea is that *ātman* is self-manifest, and nescience and knowledge are only remote causes.

468. Since the knowledge of the self-dependence of *ātman* is necessary for the understanding of things other than Self, the Self whose very essence is perception (*anubhava*) does not stand in need of anything objective.¹

469. Who ever had the knowledge that objects of experience alone can be the aim of man (*purushārtha*)? For it is only the result of perception that can be such aim.²

470. How can experience (*pratiti*), which is the effect of perception itself (*māna*), be entirely dependent on an object of perception? To be the result of the act of perception, it depends on the Self which is both the seer and enjoyer.

471. The object of any kind of knowledge cannot be other than the realisation (*anubhava*) of Self, and much more so in the Vēdāntas.

472. Even all movements, secular or spiritual, in this world, are for the sake of an enjoyer. Hence none but the enjoyer (*ātman*) is supreme (*pradhāna*).

473. From passages like "not for the sake of the husband etc."³ and "This Self is dearer etc." it is clear that, in all the world, nothing but the Self is supreme.

474. It being thus, neither a knower, nor knowledge, nor action, nor object (*mēya*), nor fruit (*phala*), can be hypothesised to explain its supremacy, since it alone is supreme as enjoyer.

¹ Injunctions etc., being objective, require a subject, the Self. How then can the subject solely depend on the object?

² This is in answer to verse 449 *supra*.

³ *Bṛihadāranyakōpanishad*, IV. 4. 5.

475. It is clear that even the conditioning of the Self as doer is only for the sake of the enjoyer; for, even all things other than the Self are spoken of as serving the enjoyer alone.

476. Moreover, no entity other than the Self can come within the sphere of knowledge; but how such an entity is conceived of will be explained later on.

477. Ignoring what has been stated above, and solely bent on interpreting Scripture to be injunctory, some people contend that the only aim of the Vedāntas is ritual.

478. "Since the authority known as Scripture aims solely at ritual, how can it aim at the unity of Self as you said before?

479. "It cannot be said to be an independent authority by reason of its teaching us the established entity (*siddha-vastu*), for, I say that that established entity is realised by other proofs.

480. "We learn, from secular practice, the invariable signification of words; and, in secular practice, an established fact, known by other proofs, is spoken about, only with a view to action.¹

481. "No meaning can be gathered from a sentence which prescribes neither activity nor renunciation. Hence it is no authority for the unity of Self (*vastu*).

482. "Nor can any connection be inferred from a sentence which is a bare assertion of fact. The authority

¹ The meaning is that the words of Scripture import ritual, according to वृत्त्यवधार. It cannot be said to import ऐकान्य, for, if it is meant at all, it must be as subsidiary to some ritual or conduct.

of a sentence is inferred, when the injunotion contained therein is followed.

483. "From such an understanding of the sentence, the signification of the words is learnt. From this it follows that the sole aim of the Scriptural sentence is ritual.

484. "As for those who maintain that the Scriptural passage signifies a connection between the action and the agent (*kṛiyākāraka*), the methods of agreement and difference render their contention baseless.

485. "It cannot be contended that ritual too is capable of other proof; for, ritual and its purpose is understood only from Scripture (*śabda*) and not from secular data.

486. "The passage is spoken of as prompting action, merely because it speaks of action (*pravartanā*), and thus implies authority (*pramāṇa*). If the passage directly prompt action, it would then be the motive to action (*kāraka*).¹

487. "But in interpreting the word,² it need not be doubted that passions etc. constitute the motive. Passions etc. directly incite us to action, but the word only implies an incentive.

488. "Since we see exertion in the carrying out of a master's orders, and since passions etc. have no place herein, it follows that the activity of the doer (of rituals etc.) is not the result of passions.³

¹ The Scriptural passage is not in itself a motive, as desires, passions, etc.

² Such as the use of the potential mood (लिट्).

³ The opponent means that neither शब्द nor रागादिः, but कार्यं, is the प्रवर्तक.

489. "The activity of the hearer does not spring from a knowledge of the master's inner feelings such as anger, pleasure, etc., for, anger etc. cannot be understood from the mere word.

490. "The potential mood and such other forms are not declared to signify anger etc. The latter become motives for men, when they are understood by other means.¹

491. "Passions etc. are inferred from indications like the words "Fie," "Sirrah," and so on, and then become incentives for the discharge of the duty.

492. "Therefore, and for the reason that, being told to go, he goes without any purpose of his own, the signification of the imperative mood etc. can be separated, though mixed up with desires etc.

493. "It may be said that, when bare words like 'go' etc. are uttered, long sentences promising reward and so on are inferred and hence only desires etc. prompt activity.

494. "It is not so; for, even if a long sentence be used, we see, when we analyse the significance of the words, that the activity of the man results only from the use of the imperative etc. and not from anything else.

495. "Since, even where desires are absent, a child obeys orders on the mere hearing of the imperative word, it is apparent in such cases that that alone constitutes the incentive.

496. "But it is said: 'It is curious that this meaning is not gathered from any other proof, but from the word, whose connection is entirely unknown.

¹ i. e. by means other than the spoken word.

497. “‘If even a word whose connection is unknown can convey a meaning of duty, why then do you hate us and abuse us?’¹

498. “‘Thus, since no other cause is found for activity except the word, the meaning of duty is clearly singled out (as the cause).’

499. “The arguments *pro* and *con* arise only after an understanding of the meaning of the sentence. But the meaning of the sentence itself does not depend upon them and is thereby distinguished from the rest.”²

500. “It is an intention coupled with a duty (*kar-tavyatā-vivakshā*) that we learn even from sentences uttered by men. Intention is not duty. Intention is only what is intended by the meaning of the word.”³

501. “The meaning of the word is not dependent upon the intention, for, the former is understood earlier. Hence, duty is clearly discerned as the incentive, though combined with command etc.

502. “Such things like command, which affect the minds of human beings,⁴ are not the meanings of words, but only the distinguishing features (*upādhayah*) of such meaning. Further, multiplicity of meanings is not recognised.

¹ If a verb in the potential or imperative mood could, apart from any context, signify नियोग or injunction, why should not the words ब्रह्मन् and others also convey their proper meanings irrespective of other proofs?

² i. e. from the meaning of words etc. नियोग by itself does not depend on other proofs, but only when coupled with *upādhis* like आज्ञा.

³ i. e. from words in the potential mood and so on. This verse refutes the argument that सिद्धता and not नियोग is signified by the potential mood etc.

⁴ But the *Vēdas* are अपौरुषेय.

503. "In the absence of some one who intends, there is no place for things which depend upon intention. Hence it follows that in the *Vēda* duty alone is meant.

504. "Such commands like 'Sacrifice, O thou lighter of fire' which are found in the *Vēda*, being ancillary to the rules of ritual, are dependent on such rules and not on intention.

505. "Since duty is thus distinguished from command etc. as being the meaning of the word, let it in the same way be distinguished from ritual etc.¹

506. "Action (*bhāva*) is not the same thing as duty, though both are to come into existence only in the future; for, duty is not understood by hearing the present tense as by hearing the potential mood etc.

507. "'But in this case it is the use of the (present) tense that excludes the meaning of duty. You have not perceived this doubt at all, because you are ignorant.

508. "'In truth, it is the use of the tense here that excludes the idea of duty. Is duty then different from action, because the present tense does not imply it?'²

509. "In instances like 'a mat must be woven,' even in the absence of any action, a duty is understood as different from action and before the reward is thought of.

510. "But, is it not the action which signifies duty, by virtue of the aphorism 'of them alone?'³ Not so,

¹ This is an answer to the contention that ritual or its fruit may be the meaning of the potential mood etc.

² Verses 507 and 508 are the arguments for the identity of कर्त्तव्य and कर्त्तव्यता.

³ तयोरेव (भाव कर्मयोरेव) कृत्यत्वसमर्थाः. Pan. III. 4. 70.

for, action is only the distinguishing mark (*upādhi*) of duty, as in the case of command etc.,¹ and hence the aphorism is faultless.

511. "Further, the grammarian has declared that duty may also be meant by command etc.² Again, it is not possible to argue that duty can signify action.

512. "As the sentence 'he weaves a mat' signifies mere action, so too the sentence 'a mat must be woven' may imply action; but the same is not apparent.

513. "Since the meaning of object (*karman*) is derived from the idea of duty in the shape of the thing desired to be done, the accusative case does not come in, though the object is not specified.³

514. "The thing desired and duty are not the same. The difference is seen in instances like 'shall desire,' 'must be desired,' and so on, although the same suffix occurs there too.⁴

515. "Thus, by their mere connection with duty, action, reward or incentive, share the nature of duty, but not by their own force.

516. "'As in the secular world, so in the *Vēda* too, it is not mere duty that is meant, but the *Vēda* speaks of duty coupled with the means, effort, and result.

517. "'Hence, since other proofs come in, as in the case of a sentence prescribing diet for the patient who longs for health, it follows that the *Vēda* is not independent (*sāpēksha*).

¹ See verse 502 *supra*.

² प्रेषाति सर्मप्राप्तकालेषु कृत्याश्च Pan. III. 3. 163.

³ Compare तिङ् कृत्यत्तत्तमासेरनभिहिते कर्मणि द्वितीयादिभक्तिर्भवति ॥

⁴ The suffix cannot mean अभिष्टत्, for, then, in इच्छेत्, शब्दस्य, etc., desire itself will be the object of desire, and so on *ad infinitum*.

518. "Hence the injunction (*niyōga*), like command etc., is coupled with action and reward. And by the intrusion of such other proofs, the authority of Scripture is destroyed in instances like the *chitrā* sacrifice?'¹

519. "Not so. It is proper that, in the secular world, by the coming in of other proofs, duty should be characterised by command etc. and that action should be for some benefit.

520. "Injunction in the secular world, is, by nature of its aim, dependent on the mutual connection of means and end. Hence too one is enjoined in the capacity of doer.

521. "Since he acts of his own will, it is as doer alone that he could be enjoined; and words like 'he who longs for health' become mere attributes of the doer.

522. "But in the *Vēda* the knowledge of the connection between means and end, is derived from the injunction itself and not from any other source, because it is not amenable to any proof such as perception etc.

523. "Thus the aspirant, referred to by the words 'he who aspires for heaven,' is not the agent (*akāraka*), but, being united to action by virtue of the injunction, becomes a doer.

524. "Since desire of fruit is paramount, such desire becomes an attribute to the individual, without prejudice to its own importance. Hence he is enjoyer and aspirant, but not an agent (*kāraka*).

525. "The idea of agent is out of place, when one who is inactive is prompted to action.² To one already active, the causal form must be addressed, just as he who is already cooking must be made to cook.

¹ चित्रयायजत पशुकामः.

² e.g. he who desires health must take medicine.

³ In the *Vēda* there is no activity previous to the carrying out of the Vedic injunction, as there are no other proofs to arouse such activity.

526. "Will not the genitive case be used, in the absence of the relation of the deed and the doer? Not so, since this general use of the genitive is restricted to the relations between nouns only.¹

527. "The other cases like the accusative are used to express the relations between the verb and the connected noun. And the tenses like the present etc. are used to express the relation between the meaning of the noun-stem and that of the root. There is thus no incongruity.

528. "The two words 'blue' and 'lotus,' though having the meaning of nouns, have lost all difference as between themselves and become one and the same. Hence the genitive case is not proper.

529. "The aspirant who is enjoined by the use of the potential mood is not the object of the verb, for the injunction is not the act. If it were so, the accusative would be used.

530. "Therefore the aspirant, who is not yet the agent, being enjoined to fulfil his own duty, perceives the object he is to achieve.²

531. "Injunctions, as in the case of kings etc., are known to have objects capable of achievement. The meaning of the verb denotes the aim. Hence the injunction is connected with the latter.³

532. "Though the gender and number are not expressly mentioned, they must be understood as recited

¹ Hence no genitive is used for स्वर्गकाम in स्वर्गकामोपजेत; though it expresses a relation between नियोग and स्वर्गकाम.

² The opponent's proposition is नियोजयान्वय पूर्वकोऽधिकारान्वये कर्तृत्वयः

³ Hence नियोग and यग do not clash with each other.

in Scripture as also the doer etc. which are necessary for the fulfilment of the final object.¹

533. "Therefore he who longs for heaven must perform his duty. How? By the performance of sacrifice. This is the meaning which Scripture conveys.

534. "Further, without quenching the aspirant's desire for heaven, sacrifice cannot, in any sense, be the instrument for achieving his purpose.

535. "For, if the desire is undestroyed, the individual, though he has achieved his aim, will still be liable to injunction, being in the same condition as formerly.

536. "Thus the duty (*adhikāra*), having made the object dependent on sacrifice for its fulfilment, is dependent, in its turn, when fulfilled, on the object.

537. "There is no inconsistency by reason of the absence of a consequent reward. Such a doubt will arise only if the fruit is to be accomplished by action; but the potential mood does not signify action.

538. "Since Scripture is contrary to such doubt, the absence of such reward cannot be doubted, being entirely unknown. Such a doubt may arise when there is no authority for the existence of such reward. But the consequent nature of such reward is not signified by Scripture.²

539. "Hence, if a person thinks that his efforts will be fruitless, though he is enjoined to perform ritual,

¹ Hence a male and a single individual are meant. The three *kāraṇas* are कर्ता, कलम and प्रतिकर्तव्यता.

² Scripture only says that a particular sacrifice must bear a particular fruit. But the resulting of such fruit depends on व्युत्पत्ति, and is consequently not directly implied by the कलमवृत्ति.

he is not fit to perform such Vedic ritual, being ignorant of the *Vēdas*.

540. "Hymns, explanatory passages, and names, being only incidental to ritual, are not authority by themselves. Hence the *Vēdas* are authority only for ritual.

541. "Therefore it must be said of the *Vēdāntas* that they are either auxiliary to ritual or devoid of authority." This is thus explained away.

542. The very existence of an intellect and its functions presupposes an intelligence known as the Self which is different from them, which is self-established, and which they subserve.

543. As the earthen pot, no sooner than it comes into existence, is filled with air in accordance with the inherent nature of the air and not by virtue of any activity in the pot itself, in the same manner are intellects pervaded by the Self (*drisā*).

544. Intellects identify themselves with pots, miseries, etc., by reason of the properties of substances and so on. But their identity with the intelligence which is the same as the causeless Self, is by virtue of their very nature.

545. Since the existence or non-existence of intellects and their functions depend on the Self which admits of no proof other than itself, it must therefore be understood that that Self is always self-established.

546. "If you say that the Self is self-established because it admits of no proof, then the Scripture will lose its authority because it teaches what is already known."

547. It is not so; for, the Self is not realised by direct experience prior to the understanding of Scripture, but is directly realised only after such knowledge.

548. Since, from self-experience, knowledge and ignorance of Self are seen to exist, on what strength do you argue inconsistency in a thing so clearly seen?

549. Even the perception of sleep etc. in which the mental functions are absent, is dependent on the unrealised inner Self.¹

550. It does not result from a perception of absence, for, the perception of absence supposes the existence of a perceiver, and the absence of a perceiver etc. cannot be dependent upon the very perceiver etc.

551. How is Scripture no authority for that, without proving which, the not-self cannot be proved, in the nature of things?²

552. Since they loudly criticise us again and again as thoughtless, the following is in answer to them.

553. For refuting the said contention the teacher spoke the words "the whole Veda etc." plain in meaning and full of cogent reasoning.

554. The words "the whole Veda etc." is the consequence of treating the whole *Vēdas* as teaching us the unknown. The so-called difference between the two chapters is based on the difference in the nature of what is taught.³

555. It is knowledge which manifests the things of this world, and it is the same, whether it manifests a thing

¹ This is in answer to the contention that non-knowledge, being opposed to knowledge, cannot itself be proved by knowledge or experience.

² Perception, inference, etc., by which the material world is known, presuppose the Self.

³ The *Vedānta* teaches the Self which is established. But the कर्मकाण्ड teaches heaven etc. which are things to be accomplished.

which depends on such knowledge, or which is self-dependent. It is the thing known that varies.

556. Therefore the whole *Vēda*, teaching as it does the unknown, must be understood as teaching us the reality which is either established or to be accomplished.

557. Or, the words "the whole *Vēda* etc." are justified by unity of context (*ēkavākyatva*), since the study of both chapters of the *Vēda* culminates in the attainment of liberation.

558. The object sought for is no less than liberation which means the attainment of perfect happiness and the destruction of all misery.

559. Or, the words "the whole *Vēda* etc." mean that the existence of the unreal world is the result of experience alone, and that all existence is dependent on the one intelligence which is known as the Self.¹

560. Or, the words "the whole *Vēda* etc." are uttered, because no unknown entity except the Self can be conceived of.² This will also be explained later on.

561. The same argument which establishes the authority of the *Vēdāntas* also proves the authority of the chapter on ritual.

562. The argument which attacks the authority of the *Vēdāntas* also attacks the authority of the chapter on ritual.

563. Moreover, all kinds of proofs make clear the objects they treat of, and hence become authorities to that extent, and not otherwise.

¹ Anandagiri explains वेद as अनुभव, for the purposes of this verse.

² The Self alone baffles perception etc. and hence the *Vēdas* teach that alone.

564. Since hymns and explanatory remarks are merely connected with injunction, it is proper that they are no authority for their respective objects.

565. The meaning of permanent happiness as reward and of an aspirant for it, is derived from an explanatory remark,¹ only when it is taken in connection with the injunction, and not apart from it.

566. Since a Scriptural passage can have only one meaning, it is impossible to surmise two contradictory meanings, namely, that the explanatory remark is subsidiary to the injunction, and that it also conveys another meaning.²

567. Explanatory remarks (*arthavāda*) are of three kinds. In an impossible case it is a figure of speech. In a possible case, it is praise. If it is a case of neither sort, it is an assertion of fact.³

568. If an explanatory remark, though subsidiary to ritual, can be an authority in itself, what is there to show that the *Vēdāntas*, which are auxiliary to the realisation of unity, are not similarly an authority for their purpose.

569. By the passage 'direct perception etc.' it is meant that, for imparting a knowledge of the unity of Self, there is no other proof than the *Vēda*, which necessarily implies all other proofs.

570. If at first a thing is unknown, then knowledge has its scope. And knowledge assumes that a thing is unknown. Thus there is mutual dependence.

¹ e. g. रात्रिपक्षे प्रतिष्ठितं ह्यवापते यथा रात्रौ उपपन्नं.

² i. e. that it has inherent authority by itself.

³ Examples of the three kinds of *arthavādas* are आदित्योद्योयजमानोद्युषः, अपश्यदोद्योयजमानोद्युषेभ्यः पश्यदोद्योयजमानः, and सुष्टीरुपपन्नमिति:

571. Hence, passages like 'That thou art' do not contradict any proof whatever, since knowledge extends to all things, and since such proof cannot apply to the Self.

572. The attainment of all desires and the destruction of all misery cannot be conceived of apart from the real nature of the Self. They are the result of knowledge.

573. The meaning of such and other passages of the commentary, which treat of the unity of the Self, will be explained logically and at length, by stating the *pros* and *cons*.

574. The authority of the *Vēdāntas* for what they treat of, is not shaken; for, they satisfy the definition of an authority, in the same way as the passage about the *jyōtiṣhtōma* sacrifice etc.

575. You are aware of no rule by which, in secular practice, words are invariably used to signify action and action alone.

576. The sentence "You are happy, my friend, by God's grace; you have a son born who will be prosperous" neither incites activity nor teaches renunciation.

577. Sentences prescribing no duty are known to give rise to pleasure etc., to the same extent as passages like 'go to the village.'

578. The passage¹ does not prescribe activity by saying 'be happy;' nor is his happiness dependent upon its meaning, since it is independent of injunction.

579. It cannot be said that there are special activities² and that the passage aims at them, for, the passage has a purpose, namely, to give rise³ to pleasure etc.

¹ See verse 576 *supra*.

² Like *आतर्क्य* and other ceremonies.

580. It is to avoid the interpretation that they are fruitless that passages like the one about the sprinkling of water are interpreted to aim at what is not directly recited in such passage. This is not needed for a passage which is itself an authority for what it treats of.

581. Moreover, an injunction either incites to activity an individual who has not understood the means, or points out how the end may be achieved by one who has understood the means.

582. Now, in this case, it neither applies to the means such as the birth of a son which is an accomplished fact, nor to the end, namely, pleasure, for a like reason.

583. No further act is necessary to give him pleasure than the birth of a son. The mere mention of the birth of a son achieves the desired object.

584. It is moreover seen that an individual, bitten by what he misconceives to be a serpent, imagines in his mind the effects of its poison, but is freed from the effects of the poison as soon as he is told that it is a garland and not a snake.

585. There is no injunction implied in such a case, even if the sentence 'be not afraid' is uttered. Fear is totally chased away only by pointing out that it is but a garland.

586. An injunction is properly implied where, knowing that an injunction ought to be carried out, an individual subsequently manifests activity in connection with the object of the injunction for the purpose of attaining it.

587. In these passages, on the other hand, which treat of the unity of Self, there is no injunction to be carried out, since the object sought for results immediately from a knowledge of the reality.

588. It is likewise seen that, in the case of persons full of curiosity, their whole curiosity ceases as soon as the narrative is finished.

589. None of these narratives have the virtue of prescribing either acceptance or avoidance for one who hears them, being mere statements of fact.

590 and 591. Even where acceptance or avoidance is seen to follow upon hearing sentences like 'This way is infested with robbers' or 'This spot hides a treasure-trove,' such acceptance or avoidance is not the effect of the words whose force is exhausted by their teaching the bare fact, but the person acts or desists, prompted by his own passions etc.

592. Dragged on by the chain of greediness, he indulges in what he desires and avoids what he hates, not by virtue of the words.

593. But, is not a sentence implied, though not expressed by the speaker, to the effect 'do not go along this route,' or 'take out this treasure?'

594. Not so, for, the meaning of the word does not depend on the intentions of the speaker. Its meaning depends on the inherent force of the word itself and not on any other cause.

595. You too must perforce admit this, since, if the meaning of a word is dependent upon a speaker, the Scripture will be no authority at all.

596. A speaker may even desire a conflicting variety of objects ; and, according to your contention, all of them must be considered to be meant by the word.¹

597 and 598. When a learner, having in his mind a particular action or non-action, desires to know a thing by means of perception and such other proofs, it cannot be said by a man of sense that such action or non-action, though present in intention, is knowable by those very proofs, namely, perception etc.

599. It must also be admitted that with reference to the same object, one wishes to avoid it and another to gain it.

600. If the word could mean action, then every one will think of action, but not of indifference or avoidance. Further multiplicity of meanings is not recognised.

601. Even if it be granted that the passage prompts action, you cannot explain the context of words which are not injunctory.

602. Tell me if they convey their own word-meaning, or import mere action, or an action connected with the word-meaning.

603. If they only convey their word-meaning, how is the meaning of the sentence to be understood. Further, their utterance becomes vain, being unfit for promoting conduct (*vyavahāra*).²

604. If they imply an action connected with the word-meaning, then, since conduct is possible even without their signifying action, it is fruitless to assume action.

¹There will thus be no unity of aim.

²If each word conveys only its stem-meaning, there will be no syntactical congruity.

605. If they import mere action, then no meaning can be gathered from a sentence which is a bare assertion of fact. Such an utterance will be useless.

606. Further, if a word imports mere action, then since there is no other action, it can have no connection with other words which signify the means etc.

607. And, if all words import action, then the meanings of the words will be unconnected, for want of mutual dependence.

608. Nor will any injunction of any special rite be signified. Every word will then import an injunction.

609. In the case of the connection between *sōma* and sacrifice etc., it is the injunction which implies it. For, prior to it, what reason can be urged for such connection?

610. If the established object of the injunction fails,¹ then there is nothing to be performed. If you say that the verb imports the connection prior to the injunction, then my contention wins.² The passage of the commentary, 'then the other for its sake etc.,' is also thus justifiable.³

611. If the understanding of the object as the thing to be accomplished can only be consequent upon understanding the injunction, then how can the injunction be understood as what ought to be done, in the absence of another injunction?

¹ Owing to want of connection between, for example, the *sōma* and the sacrifice.

² Namely, that the relation of a verb to its object can be understood without the aid of injunction.

³ यदेकस्मादपूर्वं तदेतरत्तदर्थं भविष्यति ॥

612. For want of such understanding, your very object must fail. Then the meaning of injunction which you insist upon, is lost, owing to non-performance.

613. If the injunction be understood as what ought to be done, even in the absence of another injunction, then the object too¹ can be so understood of its own accord.

614. If it be said that the object, not being by its nature something to be done, stands in need of an injunction for its own fulfilment, then that injunction too, not being by its nature the thing to be accomplished, will stand in need of the object for an explanation.

615. Thus injunction, to be an injunction, will depend upon the object. There will thus be mutual dependence, and injunction will lose its importance.

616. A thing to be done (*kārya*) is that which depends on human effort for its accomplishment, such as sacrifice etc. Injunction is not a *kārya*, because, by its very nature, it depends upon itself for its performance.²

617. A thing to be done cannot import another thing to be done. That which is not *kārya* can alone be made *kārya*.³ Whiteness cannot exist in whiteness itself, but only in the cloth.

618 and 619. When a pot, an injunction, a sacrifice, etc., which have each their peculiar nature, are spoken of by appropriate words as having been accomplished, to

¹ Such as the sacrifice.

² It does not depend on human effort to understand an injunction as importing something to be done. That is the Mīmāṃsaka view.

³ स्वतोऽकार्यताकपेयागदो विधिना कार्यतेत्यर्थः. Anandagiri.

be accomplished and so on, there is no difference whatever in the manner in which the sound makes us know what is unknown. Thus activity is not dependent on injunction.

620. When the meaning of the word is understood, then, such activity as corresponds with the aim arises spontaneously and not by virtue of the mere sound or its meaning.

621. Who, therefore, being wise, will carry into execution that which is neither the means, nor the method, nor the fruit, nor the aim? Who can guess what its nature is.

622. The imperative force of the word is not the injunction, for it only implies injunction. Nor is it the mental effort, since, if so, it will become knowable by other proofs.¹

623. It is not action, because it has no doer; not the fruit, since it is not desired; not the means, since it has not come into existence; nor anything else, being devoid of any proof.

624. Nor can a thing to be done be defined as that which is not touched by the past, present or future. For, from the mere utterance of the word 'pot,' the pot is not understood as the thing to be done, though the word does not refer to time.

625. An injunction is the activity of the person enjoined. How can it then be the meaning of the potential mood, which cannot be perceived by the senses?² How can such a thing be accomplished?

¹ The Mimāṃsakas maintain that injunction cannot be known by any proof other than the Vedic word.

² Every human activity can be perceived by the senses.

626. It cannot be said that it implies injunction because it implies action ; for, injunction being by nature unpredicable, its existence, origin, etc. cannot be the result of effort.

627. If injunction which is self-established be the means of attaining fruit, then, since the injunction is always so, the fruit too will exist for ever.

628. That alone will accomplish one's end, which depends on human effort. And, since injunction is unpredicable, it can never bear fruit.

629. Things to be done, such as sacrifice, etc., are those whose accomplishment is contemplated, and not things which are already existent, like the sky, or which are absolutely non-existent like a sky-flower.

630. If it be said that in the passage 'Sacrifice should be done,' the thing to be done is something different from sacrifice, then, in the passage 'the thing to be done should be done,' the thing to be done will be different from the thing to be done itself.

631. The same difference is seen in the passage "the thing to be accomplished is the performability of the injunction." Hence, it (*kāryatva*) is not an inherent attribute (*vastu-dharma*), but is only implied by the word.

632. Therefore, whatever is understood from the Vedas as the means for an object to be accomplished, that alone is *kārya*, being something to be done, and no other.

633. The potential mood etc. import an urging; tell me how it can signify injunction. The latter cannot be implied as the object of the urging, for the object is the action which is urged.

634. Even this urging cannot be other than teaching what is unknown, since it incidentally points out all the possible faults in the action and since there is no proof to the contrary.¹

635. The urging is not identical with the potential mood etc., since the latter implies something else (*jñā-pakatva*), and also because the same urging is implied, though the declensional forms are different.²

636. It cannot be the relation of the potential mood to the action designated, since such relation (*śakti*) cannot be expressed (*anabhidhēya*). Nor can it be the act of a prompter, for, there is no prompter in Scripture.

637. Thus the prompter is the Scripture which teaches the unknown truth as the means for the desired end; and such teaching is the urging.

638. So, too, the Scripture is authoritative only because it teaches the real nature of the Self, and not because of its prompting; for, the latter is absent in the case of direct perception and other proofs.³

639. Just as the injunction, carried out on the authority of Scripture, inevitably bears fruit; so too, the performance of the means⁴ bears fruit.

640. And no failure of fruit, as in the case of the injunctory meaning, need be suspected; for, even the

¹ i. e. to the effect that प्रेरणा is not अज्ञानज्ञापनम् ॥

² Thus the लोट् form, जुहोति, and the लिङ् form, यजेत, both imply प्रेरणा.

³ The authority of प्रत्यक्ष etc., does not depend on their प्रेरकत्व, but because they make known what is unknown.

⁴ Therefore the potential mood does not imply injunction, but only sacrifice etc. as the means to the end.

means is authorised by Scripture. Failure of fruit is only in the case of human plans.

641. Sacrifice and other actions are not found always to bear subsequent fruit, even in secular practice. Hence there is no fallacy in the general syllogism "because it is an act etc."¹

642. In the same way as the potential mood etc., by their own inherent force, imply an injunction unaffected by time, they also likewise import sacrifice etc. There is thus no difference.

643. Moreover, by this interpretation, there will be a connection between the means and the end, and not the farce of an intervening gap as in the other interpretation of the potential mood etc.

644. Succession is assumed only when there is no direct connection,² and not in any case where there is such connection. But even this condition does not exist in this case as it does elsewhere.

645. In the Scriptural passage, the brownness, though connected with the purchase, is seen to produce the result only as distinguishing the instrument. It is not independent, for, if so, it will be useless.³

646. The sacrifice, though connected with the injunction, will not in any way bring about its fulfilment without producing the fruit. And since there is no such fruit, it ceases to be a means.

¹ वाग्रादिक्रियाऽनन्तरफला क्रियात्वान्मर्दनवत्. There is no fallacy of अनेकान्तिक here, since all actions do not bear future fruit, and acts like सेवा etc. form an exception.

² e. g. in अश्वया जीवार्ति, or he purchases soma with a brown cow.

³ The brownness affects the purchase only as an attribute of the instrument, viz. the cow.

647. Nor do you approve of any other circumstance which intervenes before the fulfilment of the injunction. Thus, owing to the non-production of fruit, it has no connection even with the injunction.

648. Therefore, on the authority of Scripture, you must accede to the production of fruit, though the same is unperceived. It will be so, even for me.¹

649. Since I accept the authority of Scripture, the fruit will come into existence for me even in the future. But for you it must be prior;² and, if it fails, the sacrifice too fails as a means.

650. If the production of fruit is made to result from the fulfilment of the injunction, then since according to you, there is no diversity of injunction, all kinds of fruits will result at once from a single performance.

651. If it be said that the fruit is determined by the particular rite with which the injunction is connected, that is the very reason why the injunction does not produce fruit, since the latter depends on the nature of the rite.

652. Moreover, that which merely distinguishes is unreal. But he who contends that all is real knows that the Scripture which treats of the means and the end is authoritative.

653. Thus, injunction has no place even in your chapter on ritual. It will be explained in detail how it finds no place also in the chapter on the unity of the Self.

¹ i. e. even under the contention that the meaning is not injunctory, the springing of fruit is accepted and the injunction therefore rendered vain.

² i. e. prior to the fulfilment of the injunction. The acceptance of the intermediate springing up of fruit would make the assumption of a second fulfilment useless.

654. The sentence "the self should be realised" is not a commandment for knowing the thing itself, since it depends on the meaning of the verb, and since it can have no application to the thing.

655. Whether the unity of self is accomplished or not, injunction is out of place in either case. Neither the sky nor the sky-flower stands in need of any human effort.

656. Nor can the injunction refer at least to the realisation, for, thus it will be liable to the fallacy of mutual dependence; namely, the injunction will depend upon the realisation, and the realisation upon the injunction.

657. Nor can it be said to be incidentally implied, like the sacrificial post etc.,¹ by the Vedic passage itself; for, the unity of Self is self-established whereas the sacrificial post etc. have to be brought into existence.

658. If, however, Scripture reveals the established reality, then, Scripture will be intelligible in that light, the passage in question² will refer to that reality alone, and injunction will become useless.

659. The passage "all is Self etc." is not inapplicable to the reality, so that there is no incompleteness in meaning to warrant the importation of an injunctory word.

660. The knowledge that the Self is Brahman needs no injunction at all, for, it springs spontaneously in him who has heard the passage.

¹ यद्ययूपादिर्यूपेऽशुभधातीत्यादि विधिशेषतया दूरतत्त्वतीत्यादिनाऽप्यन्ते तथा ब्रह्मणोऽपि द्रष्टव्य विधिशेषत्वेन सत्यज्ञानादिवाक्येनार्पणम्. Anandagiri.

² सत्यज्ञानमनन्तब्रह्म etc.

661. A knowledge of the injunction "sacrifice must be done" does not depend upon another injunction. If it depends, there will be no end to the chain. Nor can that other injunction depend on the first, which is merely confined to the rite.

662. When the thing to be done is understood, then the subsequent action is the result of injunction; and the knowledge of the injunction is derived from the action. Thus there will be mutual dependence.

663. If knowledge of Self springs from the word itself, the individual need not be incited to action for want of fruit. If it does not so spring, injunction is much more needless, since there is no reason for activity at all.

664. If, even after the springing of such knowledge, one be enjoined with a view to greater certainty, tell me whether that certainty of yours is derived from the word itself or from any other source.

665. If it is derived from the word, it is liable to the same objection as formerly.¹ If something else is brought in, then Scripture will become dependent.

666. "But injunction is necessary to dispel what is not to the purpose. For, the purpose will be understood when the thing to be known is pointed out."

667. Not so. For, it is a general rule both in secular and Vedic practice that words convey their especial meanings by their own virtue and not by reason of any injunction.

¹ See verse 663 *supra*.

668. Thus, too, from secular and Vedic sentences, their unqualified meaning is understood. Therefore no injunction is needed.

669. The capacity of Vedic study in bearing direct fruit¹ is the same in the case of the unity of self as in the case of rites. Hence injunction is without use in this instance.

670. If this act (of studying) depend upon another act, then the whole meaning will not at once be implied. Then, in the manner aforesaid,² no injunction need be supposed at all.

671. It is said that knowledge stands in need of injunction to accomplish the aim; for, all fruit depends on injunction, as, otherwise, there will be disregard of fruit.

672. Apart from the elucidation of the thing to be known, there is no other fruit of knowledge as in the case of rites. Hence no injunction need be assumed for this purpose.

673. Even if the fruit³ has reference to the knower, of what use is injunction, since, even without injunction, it results alike in the case of the knower, or the means of knowledge, or the thing known?

674. "But a passage which, being devoid of injunction, treats of what is already existent and is thus merely explanatory (*anuvāḍaka*), can have no authority at all, since it is amenable to other proofs (than Scripture.)

¹ i. e. in bringing out its own meaning.

² See verse 667 *supra*.

³ viz. the understanding of the thing to be known.

675. " But, if the injunctory meaning be conceded, this would gain independent authority, like the passage about the *jyōtishtoma* sacrifice, etc., being untouched by other proofs."

676. If *Brahman* is capable of other proofs, it would be so even if an injunction is assumed. And if it is not capable of other proofs, it would be so even in the absence of any injunction.

677. Is the explanatory character of the passage by reason of the thing being already existent, or because it is known by other proofs? In the former case, it will not be a mere explanation, even if the thing be already existent.

678. Can a passage, which, unaided by any other proof, teaches an existent thing, be otherwise than independent, or can the aim (*Brahman*) fail to result of its own accord?

679. A meaning that is the product of human intellect might stand in need of other proofs; but not a Vedic passage, though it treats of an existent thing, because of the absence of all human agency.

680. From the mere fact that the thing is already existent, a different proof need not be assumed in any case; for the proof so assumed will likewise stand in need of other proofs.

681. A proof, in no instance, depends on another proof merely because it is a proof. A proof is termed as such, only because it teaches what is not taught by any other proof.

682. If a passage teaches the thing to be known without the aid of any other proof, then it becomes a proof by itself. There is no other definition of a proof than the above.

683. Even if the proof which makes known the object stands in need of another proof, then too, the former will be independent of the latter, since both the proofs serve only one and the same end.¹

684. If it be said that the former proof is no proof for want of something unknown which it can make known,² then, since the same is the case with the other proof also, let the former proof have reference only to knowledge.³

685. The fact of a thing being unknown can be established either by a proof, or by some other means, or by itself. Tell me too how the fact of a thing being known can be established?⁴

686. Since the unknown nature of the thing exists even before the application of the proof, the nature of being so unknown can in no way be the subsequent result of such proof.

687. If the character of being unknown is amenable to proofs, like a pot etc., then this will become the

¹ i. e. revealing the nature of *Brahman*. The first proof here referred to is the verbal authority of the *Vēdas*.

² Because *Brahman* is नित्यसिद्ध.

³ Though knowledge exists before a study of the word, yet it is hard for the student to understand at the outset that such knowledge has already revealed its object. To make this clear, it may serve as a proof.

⁴ Since this too is open to the same uncertainty.

inherent nature of the thing and it will therefore remain ever unknown.

688. The same argument applies to ideas of doubt and falsity. Hence everything in practice (*vyavahāra*) must fail.

689. If the proof is a proof though the unknown nature of the thing remains the same before and after, may not the same be said of a thing known which is entirely different from a thing unknown?¹

690. If it be said to be dependent (on the other proofs) on account of their reference to the same object, then all proofs would in like manner become dependent.

691. For one and the same entity, all the organs of sense afford proof. Thus, as above stated, even touch and sight would become false with reference to matter.

692. Even a secular injunction, like the eating of the *haritaki* fruit, would become independent by reason of the absence of other proofs.

693. This is no fault; for, in secular practice, there is a sense of duty resulting from human knowledge, and hence there is need for other proofs. But the contrary is the case in the *Vēdas*.

694. It being thus, the independent authority of Scripture is not dependent upon injunction; for, there is such dependence only where human knowledge comes in.

695. "Not so. The independent authority of the *Vēdas* is because the dependence is solely on injunction. But there is need of other proofs in secular practice, because action (*vinīyōga*) is predominant."

¹ Thus the Vedic word might be a proof too.

696. Not so. When it is granted that words and their meanings are the same both in secular practice and in Scripture, it is not possible to speak of any such difference between them.

697. When the real nature of a thing is established either by its own virtue or otherwise, there is no need for a different proof, for, it will be useless for establishing such nature.

698. Or, if the thing already existent has become apparent either by itself or otherwise, then too a different proof will be needless for a thing which is already apparent.

699. Therefore other proofs ought not to be assumed merely because a thing is already established (*siddha*). There is need for other proofs in the case of human speech, and hence they find a place there.

700. If it be said that some verb is necessary to bring word-meanings into mutual relation, then let such verb alone be assumed; for, is it not established without an injunction?

701. Even if a verb is needed, it is not any verb that is required. If it be selected on account of its appropriateness, then there are such verbs, like "thou art" etc. in Scripture.¹

702. There is no act to be enjoined, since the verbs "thou art," etc. are intransitive. Nor is any non-existent thing to be brought into existence, since the Self is eternal.

703. As the passage teaches the unconnected Self, there is no meaning of connection.² Nor does the word

¹ e. g. तस्यमहि, सोऽहमस्मि, etc.

² i. e. connection between the Self and the individual soul.

'sat'¹ imply mere existence, since it expresses the relation "the Self is *Brahman*" (*sa ātmā*).

704. Hence, for us, the words "*sad* etc." in Scripture signify by clear implication (*lakshanā*) the Self which is not within the scope of words or other proofs.

705. Even if mere existence which is amenable to proof is implied, then too the fact that Scripture treats of *Brahman* cannot be gainsaid.

706. A passage which reveals a thing knowable by another proof, does not nevertheless cease to be a proof in secular practice, as, for example, the words of a trustworthy friend.

707. The words of a trustworthy friend "I have understood that thing" do not lose their authority, being independent of other proof. But it will not be authoritative by itself, if the hearer himself is to understand that thing.

708. The words of an incredible friend are not authority at all, though connected with other proofs. Hence, since the words of a trustworthy friend are authority, though connected with other proofs, they will be authority similarly for the thing itself.

709 and 710. This being so, since the *Vēdāntas* teach some superhuman knowledge which becomes clear on the destruction of all duality, how can they, like the words of a trustworthy friend, be said to be of no authority for that reason? And if their authority is established, the thing they treat of is established too, and hence nothing more need be said about it.

¹ in सदेवसोम्य etc.

711. Further, if other proofs are to be assumed in the case of the unity of Self, by reason of its being established (*siddha*), are they not likewise to be assumed in the case of injunction because the latter is of the nature of something to be done?

712. Injunction is as much a thing to be done as commands and entreaties. Only in this way is it implied by the potential mood, &c.

713. Injunction is of the nature of a thing to be done, because it depends on something else for its accomplishment. And this is not affected by results derivable from other proofs.

714. If it be said that injunction is a result in a special sense, then, such speciality is not absent even in secular acts.

715. If the meaning is that it is cognisable by special knowledge, nothing can prevent the same being said of any thing whatsoever.

716. Only this much depends on Scripture, namely, it teaches what is its object and what not. What ought or ought not to be done depends, not on Scripture, but on reasoning.¹

717. As for the objection² about the unity of Self in consequence of its being established, the same objection applies even to an injunction when it is accomplished.

718. It cannot be said that injunction is not established if its object such as sacrifice etc. is not per-

¹ i. e. whether the act will be a means to achieve the end or not.

² That it is knowable by other proofs. See verse 711 *supra*.

formed. For, if it is not established, the injunctory passages of Scripture will become fruitless.¹

719. What proof can convey more instruction than the Vedic passage which alone is able to express clearly the true nature of things, namely, the unity of Self?⁴

720. The need for other proofs is only in cases where the springing of knowledge depends on a knower etc., and not where all difference is destroyed.

721. "In *Vēdānta* too, the connection between the meanings of words is dependent on an injunctory meaning. In secular practice, the connection, being the result of arrangement, is derived from other proofs.

722. "The arrangement of words is preceded by an intention to speak. And an intention to speak has reference solely to an object which is knowable by other proofs.

723. "Hence the derivation of any meaning from the *Vēdānta* in the absence of injunction is a delusion, like the mistaking of a marsh for a lake."

724. Listen now to what is to be said to meet this argument.

725. Why should the dependence on injunction be accepted for the congruity of word-meanings? Why should not the dependence on other word-meanings be assumed?

¹ The injunction must first be established before anything is done on its authority.

² viz. the sentence तत्त्वमसि. The unity of Self is not amenable to other proofs.

726. Thus, if connection between word-meanings is established even without injunction, then injunction would become fruitless for want of an object.

727. This fault of meaninglessness extends also to other words.¹ If it be said that they convey their own particular meaning, even the other words² may be said to do so.

728. This being so, tell me why injunction is not fruitless, sharing, as it does, the same fate with words which are not injunctory.³

729. "I shall explain. The injunctory word implies what cannot be known by any other proof. And the one purpose it serves is the implication of connection between words."⁴

730. "Such implication does not arise from words which are not injunctory, since they mean things established by other proofs and are therefore merely explanatory."

731. The injunctory meaning is understood even when no connection is apparent. If the connection is known, the injunctory word will express what is already established.

732. If all knowledge of connection be ignored, the word will forfeit its very nature.⁵ Hence, every-

¹ Such as nouns etc.

² viz. verbs etc.

³ If other words depend on the potential mood for their meaning, the latter equally depends on the former for its own.

⁴ See verse 721 *supra*.

⁵ The nature of a word is to express its own meaning in connection with other words. The nature of a sentence is otherwise.

where, a word expresses its meaning only when its connection is known.

733. Any other assumption would lead to inconsistency throughout. If the relation of signifier and signified be confined only to the connection between a sentence and its meaning, then, since each sentence refers only to one particular object, there will be no idea of any connection whatever.

734. A particular thing, such as the quality of a cow, cannot have any application to another particular thing. No connection is discovered, since each is established independently.

735 and 736. Even that connection which is inferred from the curiosity of the hearer following on the understanding of a word, is not clearly discernible. For, how can it be implied only by the word, being defined as it is by some action on the part of the hearer?

737. If it is said to be understood from the word before any inference, why should not the understanding of the word be preceded by inference?

738. Even in the case of a hearer who acts after understanding an injunction from the word, his knowledge of the meaning of the word is derived from inference alone.

739. Since injunction is to be inferred from an act which is an object of direct perception, it too, like all objects of direct perception, assumes a secular nature.

740. If injunction is not an effect (*kārya*), what benefit is to be derived from the performance of sacrifices?

In that event, even the injunctory passage would teach what is already established.

741. Further, as between the word and the inference, priority is hardly discoverable, as between the seed and its products. Hence the priority of the word cannot be assumed.

742. Or, inference may rightly be said to precede the word, since a word whose connection is unknown, cannot be expressive, but only explanatory.

743. He who is taught by inference¹ does not know what is taught by the word. The knowledge of another knower either of the same or of a different object, does not, by reason thereof, become secondary (*anuvādaka*).

744. Only the reason of the action can be inferred from the action itself. And since this is established by secular proofs, there is no proof to establish any Scriptural injunction.

745. Every action is not the exclusive consequence of the idea that something should be done; for, action is seen to result at the sight of things like serpents etc.

746. The fruit of human endeavour is action; and the cause of such endeavour is the action implied by the injunction. The cause of the endeavour cannot be its fruit. All these (contradictory) statements are made by yourself.

747. In the case of attempts to run away from serpents etc., the action is not the fruit, for, there is only

¹ e. g. a child.

an absence of danger, and mere negation cannot anywhere be a fruit.

748. "Injunction is of the nature of proof, being expressed by the injunctory word. Without being in need of any other proof, it is itself a proof by implication."¹

749. The implication is derived neither from the word nor from any other proof. Further, there will be the fallacy of an unoriginated activity.²

750. You have thus to abandon unwittingly the very theory you contended for.³ Let the injunctory Scripture be a proof for anything whatsoever. Of what use is it?

751. Of what is it the proof? Not of sacrifice etc. which are proved by their respective words. Nor is the secular connection of things (*samsarga*) dependent on injunction, for the hearer understands the connection even in the absence of injunction from a passage which is not injunctory.⁴

752. If it be said that the capacity to bear fruit depends on injunction, it is not so, for, even there, its importation by the word itself cannot be gainsaid.

753. Therefore the connection between things, like

¹i. e. an injunction itself implies means, doer, fruit etc.

²नियोगस्य मानान्तरागम्यस्य लिङादेस्तत्र शक्त्यपहादज्ञातशक्तिरपि पुरुषो लिङादिश्रवणात्प्रवर्तते ॥ Anandagiri.

³For, all action based on a word can take place only after the word is understood.

⁴e. g. from the sentence "he is the king's servant."

any other connection, is not dependent upon an injunctory, meaning. Thus knowledge can result even without injunction.

754. Thus all words, placed together in accordance with their respective dependence (*ākāmkshā*), imply a particular meaning by virtue of their mutual relation.¹

755. "Let there be an injunction of the knowledge of Self to bring about such knowledge, in the same way as ritual injunction brings about ritual.

756. "Activity here will also result in the same way as activity in rituals; for, just as a thing not yet done is done, so too, a thing yet unknown is known."²

757. Thus do some who are fond of injunction impose an injunction even on a thing which does not admit of any injunction. This is to be said against them.

758. The scope of injunction is not the understanding of the nature of the rite, but the connection of the enjoined rite with its fruit.

759. The idea of agency is inconsistent with the knowledge of Self, for the Self which is the agent cannot be the subject of injunction.³

760. Grain etc., for example, though carefully examined and understood by direct perception, convey no reference to any rite.

¹ Not by virtue of any injunction.

² The opponent supposes two kinds of injunction in the *Vēdas*.

³ Even supposing that the *jīvātman* or *paramātman* is the doer, neither depends on injunction for a true understanding of its nature, being self-established.

761. "Apart from any injunction as to the meaning of Scripture, there is the injunction as to the means of realisation (*anubhava*), such as thought, meditation, etc., with its own subsidiary means.

762. "Since all realisation is subject to injunction, meditation is enjoined as the means to the realisation, being necessarily implied by the relation of means to end.

763. "The means with the auxiliaries of self-control etc., and with the laudatory passage 'The Self is everything,' is enjoined in the form 'Thou shalt see,' in order to establish the purpose of thought, meditation etc."¹

764. If 'Thou shalt see' enjoin the means, then the realisation must be the end and cannot therefore be a definition of the means. If it be such a definition, it cannot be the end.

765. "It is seen in secular practice that meditation is connected with understanding as means with end. Is it so in Scripture or not? It is subject to injunction because of this doubt.

766. "Since the administering of medicine in the generality of cases is connected with the cessation of fever, it is therefore particularly prescribed even in the case of typhoid fever."²

767. "Though meditation may not be seen in secular instances to directly bear fruit,³ yet, being the

¹ननु पश्येदिति साक्षात्कारोविधीयते पश्यतेत्यस्त्वर्मेणो विधिसम्बन्धाच्च प्रसं-
ख्यानं तद्व्याख्याभावादित्याशङ्क्य तृतीयकल्पं प्रसंख्यानवादिमुखेन प्रतिपादयति ।
Anandagiri.

²Though it be doubtful whether the medicine will have any effect on the fever, or not.

³ viz. realisation.

subject of injunction in Scripture, and in the absence of the certainty that it does not bear fruit, it does bear fruit in our opinion.

768. "The same certainty in spite of doubt exists in the case of cattle etc.¹ Certainty of a contrary nature exists in the case of the sky-flower, since it is devoid of means (and injunction)."

769. Thus do some men attempt to establish, by ingenious arguments the injunction of meditation whose object is said to be the knowledge of the unity of Self.

770. If the importance of the injunctory meaning be maintained, then the unity of Self can never be established; for, the Scripture will primarily mean an injunction, but will not explain the nature of Self, lest it dwindle into an explanatory remark.

771. "Since the unseen character of Self is not put an end to by the understanding of it from Scripture, meditation is enjoined with a view to its being directly perceived.

772. "Since the very desire to perceive will be absent if the object of search is not established by proof,² the injunction of meditation, thought, etc. will be in vain in such a case.

773. "Meditation is prescribed for him who, though having learnt of the Self from Scripture, has yet not experienced the real condition of the Self, and who wishes to realise it on the authority of such Scripture.

¹ Though abundance of cattle which is the fruit enjoined for the *chitrā* sacrifice, may not be obtained in this life, the certainty of fruit is nevertheless not doubted, as the injunction of Scripture can never prove false, and the fruit *must* therefore happen in a future life at least.

² And there is no proof but Scripture to prove the unity of Self.

774. "Scripture does not therefore become double-edged, since it imparts knowledge of its object through the act it enjoins and not without it.

775. "It is the rule that the injunction of an act cannot be overridden by the act itself. Hence it is established that meditation etc. is enjoined as subsidiary to the unity of Self.

776. "Even after having taught the unity of Self, Scripture will not stop short of the ultimate goal of human aim,¹ lest it be considered unauthoritative.

777. "The word of Scripture, like any other such word,² speaks of its object as invisible, and, establishes its own authority, by means of arguments.

778. "But even the argument cannot reveal the true nature of Self as smoke cannot reveal fire. It has therefore the need of meditation etc. to reveal the Self.

779. "In this manner does Scripture directly reveal the Self, and it gains authority by becoming primary to injunction.

780. "Though Scripture speaks thus of its connected object as invisible etc., it will equally teach the unity of Self even in the absence of such a meaning.³

781. "Thus the very Scripture, "which words cannot express etc.," teaches us the fearless *Brahman* which repels all idea of relation (*samsarga*).

782. "If it is not signified by Scripture, neither can it enter into injunction as an object.⁴ Hence the same argument applies to both.

¹ मोक्षोपाय or the means of salvation.

² e. g. स्वर्गकामोयजेत.

³ With the help of meditation etc.

⁴ For injunction cannot treat of something unknown.

783. "On the other hand, without an injunction,¹ one would, after learning of the unity of Self from Scripture, be still unable to experience what it teaches, owing to his ignorance of the means, and would thereby reduce Scripture to an explanatory remark.

784. "Even if Scripture be made dependent on injunction,² there is no proof to establish the Self, and hence the knowledge of the unity of Self will have to be assumed as the fruit, as in the case of meditation on the deity.³

785. "One who has understood the true nature of the Self does not stand in need of meditation etc. But he who is ignorant of it, even after hearing of it from Scripture, does not attain its fruit without their aid.

786. "Though Scripture primarily deals with the Self, yet the final aim cannot be realised without the enjoined process of meditation, which is also necessary.

787. "The experience of the unity of Self cannot be had by the logical methods of agreement and difference alone. They can result only if that experience results, and the latter too results from them.⁴ Thus is their mutual dependence.

788 and 789. "In the same way as the words

¹ viz. the enjoining of meditation etc.

² See verse 770 *supra*.

³ In the injunction as to meditating on a particular deity, the injunctory meaning is so very predominant that the fruit is not indicated at all, but has at best to be assumed, namely, the becoming that deity itself.

⁴ For, no arguments can be applied to a thing which is unknown. Detailed knowledge, on the other hand, is largely based on argument.

"*viśvajit*"¹ and "sacrifice," while retaining their respective meanings, become proofs in conjunction with the word "he who desires heaven," so do Scripture and its arguments, while retaining the meaning of what they deal with, become proofs in conjunction with meditation etc. and not otherwise."

790. Thus do some people argue the existence of an injunction, while admitting that the primary aim of Scripture is the unity of Self.

791. How can that which is pure consciousness stand in need of being established by anything else, while by that alone are established the knower, knowledge and the known which would otherwise be non-established?

792. How can the all-witnessing Self be said to be invisible, by partaking of whose nature, even things that are invisible² resemble the real Self?

793. How can that self-established thing be non-established, by which alone even ignorance which casts a veil over all knowable things is established?

794. What else but the removal of the ignorance regarding it can be accomplished by any proof, in the case of that which is established by its own glory and which is innermost of all things?

795. How can that be indiscernible which remains visible, even in the absence of knower, knowledge and the known, as the witness of that very absence?

796. It has previously been explained, in dealing with fitness to perform rites,³ how no injunctory mean-

¹ The name of a sacrifice.

² Like the ego, the body, the senses, etc.

³ See verses 20, 228 and 252 *supra*.

ing is possible in the case of the unity of the Self owing to the want of the necessary hypothesis

797. Here it will be explained in detail how no injunctory meaning is possible in the case of the unity of Self, even on the assumption of a duty to be done (*niyōga*).

798. The One Self being, by its very nature, always free, its bondage is due to mere ignorance. Means must be sought for what *is to be* accomplished, but not for what *has been*.

799. Since the reality known as the unity of Self is merely hidden by ignorance, why does it need any injunction at all, being devoid of either means or accomplishment?

800. If, for the aspirant for realisation, meditation is said to be the thing to be accomplished, then how can the aim of Scripture be the unity of Self?¹

801. That a passage should command a thing to be done and at the same time refer to something else, is inconsistent. The thing to be done is always what is to be accomplished; the other is for its elucidation.

802. Nor can it be said that realisation, which is an attribute of the person enjoined, is also the fruit; for, meditation, being itself the object of the injunction, cannot be the means towards realisation.

803. In meditation, there is no simple act which is implied by a verbal noun; for, it is admitted that meditation is a repetition of a word and its meaning.

804. If the act to be done is said to be what is implied by hearing (*śravaṇa*), then hearing alone will become your primary aim.

¹ Meditation will then become the primary object.

805. Even in passages where the repetition of rites like the *dākshāyana* oblation is said to bear a certain fruit, the fruit is the direct result of the rite itself with repetition as its attribute, and not of the repetition itself.

806. Even where curd and the like are taken to be the distinctive attribute of the rite, they are so only when the rite itself is established from the verb-meaning.

807. In passages like "one shall see," neither is hearing etc. implied, nor is any fruit of repetition indicated, nor is any object understood other than the literal meaning of the verb.

808. Nor can it be said that, in such passages, repetition is auxiliarily implied, lest Scripture contradict its own plain meaning. Thus, when the thing to be accomplished cannot be derived from the act itself, how can it be derived from the repetition of such act?

809. If further aids like argument etc. are needed even when the meaning explains itself, then Scripture will cease to be authoritative by itself and will become dependent.

810. "If argument etc., which are parts of one proof, cease to be separate proofs each by itself, then, according to our view, all the four parts¹ jointly teach us the unity of Self."

811. It is not so. Like oil, wick and fire, the four parts unite to form the proof, and not to teach us the thing to be known.²

¹ शब्दयुक्तिप्रसङ्गानैरात्मना च मुमुक्षवः ।

पश्यन्ति मुक्तमात्मानं प्रमाणेन चतुष्यदा ॥

² Just as oil, wick and fire make a lamp, and the lamp in its turn makes us see the objects around, so do these parts form a proof, and it is the proof so formed that teaches us the unity of Self, and not the parts themselves.

812. If all the four parts have to unite to produce one fruit, then the statement¹ that knowledge increases step by step by reason of each of these parts, becomes false.

813. They unite and form a proof, owing to the connection between the proof and its components. And the proof, in making its object understood, stands in need of nothing but its own establishment.²

814. For, oil, wick and fire; cause the existence of the lamp, and the lamp, which is thus brought into existence, makes objects visible without any aid.

815. If argument etc. teach the same as is taught by the word, then they become unnecessary. If there be difference, then they will be different from each other as proofs.³

816. If the thing be taught by secular arguments based on dreams etc., then the thing will become non-Scriptural, and Scripture itself will be a mere explanatory repetition.

817. If the arguments be Scriptural, then, since they teach what is taught by Scripture, they will become mere explanatory references, and will not be different from Scripture itself.⁴

818. Or, how can repetition make any difference in the efficacy of meditation? Mere repetition of a proof makes no difference in the thing to be known.

¹ Of the प्रसङ्गानुवादिन्.

² i. e. it needs not even the subsidiary aid of its parts.

³ And cannot consistently join together to make a single proof.

⁴ Thus the first two parts will become one, and there will be only three parts instead of four.

819. In cases where, owing to an impediment like darkness, knowledge is had by steps, there is no united proof, since the thing perceived is varying.

820. It is first seen as a thing, then as a living being, then as human, then as male, then as black, and then as so-and-so. Thus what is perceived is different at each step.

821. The nature of a proof is to produce definite knowledge; and the latter varies. And if the previous proofs are not of that nature, the succeeding one alone can be called a proof.

822. If it be said that the proof is one though the thing perceived is different, on the ground that the substance is the same, then it would follow that perception and other proofs are not different from each other since the object is the same.

823. If meditation, like sacrifice, accomplishes a fruit, while being itself accomplished, then it becomes an efficient cause, whereas scripture is indicative. How can the two agree?

824. Nor can the self which is the knower be a part of the proof; for, the individual soul cannot be so, since it is itself conventional; nor can the supreme Self be such a part, since it is the very thing to be perceived, and how can realisation be the fruit if it be otherwise.

825. If realisation (*anubhava*) is no other than the Self itself, then it becomes impossible, being established by itself. If it consist in the knowledge of Self, then it becomes a proof, which is derived from the Scripture itself and not from meditation etc.

826. Scripture does not lose its nature by mere repetition, nor does argument which treats of the unknown. How then do they increase our knowledge?

827. The proof develops insomuch as the thing to be known develops, and not of its own accord, and *vice versa*. Thus they are inter-dependent.

828. If, even after having generated knowledge, Scripture needs the assistance of argument etc., the same will be the case with regard to heaven etc. and Scripture will then become dependent.

829. Having understood the Self that is devoid of all misery, what more should one expect to gain from Scripture with the help of argument etc. ?

830. What argument is needed by the lamp which, by its own light, dispels our fear of a serpent and the like and creates a correct knowledge of the rope etc. ?

831. The relation of principal and auxiliary cannot exist without syntactical unity ; and the latter cannot be, since one treats of the Self and the other of injunction.

832. Nor is there syntactical unity in the shape of identity of fruit, which would constitute the relation of principal and auxiliary.

833. For liberation that is self-established, anything by way of aid is impossible. Nor can there be an auxiliary otherwise than as an aid to the principal.

834. Scripture does not need the aid of injunction either to establish itself, for it is eternal, or in making known the unity of Self, for it has its own inherent power of signification.

835. The experience of the unity of Self should result even when the meaning of Scripture is meditated upon only once. Otherwise the injunction would lose its authority by reason of that inconsistency.¹

836. No time or number is prescribed, which would make sure the result. Nor can one engage himself in a doubtful matter.

837. For, if he does, he will ascend high, and, meeting with failure, will either act according to his whim or fall down without having reached his aim.

838. Or, as in the case the *Jyōtiṣṭōma* sacrifice, an unseen fruit must be assumed; or, as in the case of chanting the *Sāmaveda*, it must be assumed to be a mere part of a rite.

839. It will then be an injunction contradictory of Scripture.² Aspirants to liberation will lose all zeal, and the injunction itself must fail.

840. The passage about meditation concerns itself only about the injunction, as it is independent of the nature of the Self. And if the Self is not established even from Scripture, what then can be the object of the injunction?

841. If Scripture does not reveal the true nature of Self, then since the object itself is not established and since the passage in question treats only of injunction, it would cease to be authoritative.

¹ Mere repetition of an act cannot produce what the act itself does not.

² The supposition of an unseen fruit is opposed to the teaching of Scripture as to the direct perception of Self.

842. If Scripture does make known the unity of Self, then, since such unity is not impossible of perception, any injunction to remove the imperceptibility becomes fruitless.

843. How can the injunction be established by Scripture, if Scripture itself does not make known the true nature of Self. We do not take a cow to be a horse, in spite of our perceiving that it is not a horse.

844. If it be said that the Self is merely heard of from Scripture, but that the experience of it results from meditation, then, since the Self is undetermined from Scripture, the same may be said even of an explanatory remark.

845. If so, you have unnecessarily denied that Scripture means only injunction.¹ Since it ceases to have any reference to the Self, its sole aim must be meditation (*samprat*).

846. Nor can Scripture be treated as a narrative told and heard, for, it would then be open to the fault of having a beginning etc.² Stories occur in it only as subsidiary to some human aim (*purushārtha*).

847. If, for fear of redundancy,³ a meaning other than injunctory is assumed, then injunction would be useless in making known the unity of Self, and the two parts of the *Vēda* will be distinct.

¹ The *śāmbandhāvartika* holds that the Vedic word refers to the Self, but it can be directly perceived only by the aid of meditation.

² This is opposed to the doctrine that Scripture is beginningless and endless.

³ i. e. both the *śāmbandhāvartika* and *śāmbandhāvartika* being mainly injunctory.

848. It is nowhere to be seen that, when a thing is made known by Scripture, it has still to be sought for in injunction and argument, for, Scripture would then lose its independent authority.

849. What argument or injunction is needed, when a pot is seen by direct perception? If it be said that it is necessary to see that the cause is not defective (*adushta*), this is already established in Scripture owing to the absence of human agency.¹

850. The contradiction of direct perception exists even on the supposition of an injunction. How then can the unity of Self be experienced in opposition to direct perception?²

851. The establishment of such unity by overcoming that contradiction results, not by virtue of any injunction, but from Scripture itself which is the proof. It cannot result from any act which is only the object of that proof.

852. If, then, the function of Scripture be the same for us both, what argument of yours will stand to support an injunction? It has already been stated that Scripture does nothing else than making known what is unknown.

853. Scripture, in explaining once more by arguments the object of our search which it has already made

¹ It is only when defects like alloy etc. which are due to human agency, are present, that any necessity will exist to examine the vessel more closely by other means than direct perception.

² This is to meet the contention of the ~~rebuttal~~ that passages like "that thou art" are opposed to what we are able to perceive directly by our senses.

known by its own force, depends on nothing but its own meaning.

854. This simple fault will not constitute those arguments the cause of knowledge.¹ The independence of Scripture will be affected, only if the thing is not established from the words themselves.

855. The efficacy of sacrificing a white goat in producing supernatural powers is not gathered from the quick-producing power of the god of wind,² but only from the statement of the injunction.³ The swiftness is mentioned merely to induce activity.

856. Even supposing that *Brahman* is different from the individual soul in its three states of waking, dream and sleep, as the genus of cow is different from all individual cows, how do arguments come in even then?⁴

857. What is not established by Scripture or by argument, cannot be established by repetition; for, mere repetition cannot make the word a proof, as is seen in other instances.⁵

858. Repetition has not such a probative force in any other instance; nor can it be said that there is no other kind of proof in this case.

859. "Since the words *Brahman* and *soul* mean something which is not worldly, how can it be said, in the absence of any connection between them, that the *soul* is *Brahman*."

¹ Arguments only help to dispel any impediments to certainty.

² वायुर्वैद्येयिष्ठादेवता.

³ वायव्यं देवतासमेतभूतिनामः.

⁴ Cf. वेदातर्कसमतिराख्येवा.

⁵ Like direct perception.

860. "A word that is related to a known thing can alone aid us in understanding the sentence. If, on the other hand, the meaning of *Brahman* and *soul* are known, then the proof is only secular."

861. The use of the word *atman* in the sole sense of Self does not make it uncommon (*alaukika*); and the word *Brahman* is well-known, in ordinary language, to convey the idea of greatness.

862. After the word-meaning is thus gathered from the word by means of secular proofs, what is there to prevent the Scriptural passage from conveying its own super-sensuous meaning?

863. In the case of results of rites (*apūrva*), deities, heaven, etc., though their word-meanings are understood by ordinary means, their super-sensuous meaning is derived only from the Scriptural passage.

864. There is no coherency in the use of mere words and their word-meanings, since they cannot by themselves complete the sense. Conduct can result only from the sentence.

865. In the practice of elders, a sentence is always uttered to convey its sentence-meaning; and the mutual relation of the words is here taken into consideration.

866. By the addition of new parts and the omission of others, it is clearly seen that the variations of sentences and their meanings have for their cause words and their word-meanings.

867. If, owing to the addition of any new part, any part of the meaning is also an addition, then, the former part is the cause of the latter part, and not its proof.

868. It is therefore understood that sentences and their meanings are composed of parts, since, even in conveying a meaning, the sentence conveys a combined meaning.

869. Thus it is established that a combination of words conveys a definite sense, and that a sentence and its meaning are composed of parts.¹

870. Hence sentences will bear the same meaning in Scripture as they bear in secular literature; for, only ordinary words are used in Scripture in its own manner.

871. Doubts may spring up in lay literature owing to the intervention of human intentions; but, since Scripture has no human origin, it is direct authority for its meaning.

872. Even under the supposition that Scripture is injunctory, the mere combination of words will not convey that meaning. A word cannot convey a different meaning, without our understanding its connection with other words.

873. We have already established by arguments that Scripture² does not aim at injunction, nay more, that there is no injunction at all.

874. The relation of a word to its meaning is the result of the immemorial usage of elders. It need not therefore be suspected that it must have a beginning.

¹ यतो वाक्यतदर्थयोगतन्मोत्या भागवत्त्वमेव पदस्यैव स्वार्थयोग्यामित्येव
अतिप्रचलितता ततः समूहस्य वाक्यस्य वाचकत्वं प्राप्तावयं प्राप्तमज्ञातविषयत्वाच्च
वदवयवमाश्रयता. Anandagiri.

² i. e. *Vedānta*.

875. When the meaning of a word is not gathered from hearing it for the first time, the reason for it is the want of learning on the part of the hearer, and not the inability of the word to convey any meaning.

876. Though the eye is the organ of sight, it cannot perceive a thing in the absence of light. The eye does not thereby lose its property, nor does that property for that reason belong to something else.

877. The relation of the word to its meaning is not the result of our learning; when the relation is established, our knowledge of its meaning is got from the usage of elders.

878. The eternal character of the relation is established by the facts that none can create the relation, that such a creator is not spoken of in books, and that usage is independent of any such creator.

879. Though in cases like dilapidated wells, the non-mention of an author does not imply his absence, this case is not the same as the relation above spoken of.

880. In some instances doubt may arise, owing to distance and other causes, in regard to things which are seen, but never with regard to a thing that is not seen at all. Hence too the absence of an author for such a relation is established.

881. It is thus established, both in secular literature and in Scripture, that the sentence is authoritative, since it conveys its own meaning in relation to connected meanings.

882. Thus, Scripture is as authoritative as direct perception in regard to the Self, since it generates know-

ledge and since such knowledge is not shaken by any defective middle term.

883. Scripture has the same authority in regard to the unity of Self as in the case of injunction for the reason that it points out what we aim at (*purushārtha*), —or, perhaps, a greater authority, since what we seek¹ is something pre-eminent.

884. A person, desirous of gaining what he wants and avoiding what he does not, will also desire proper means if he is anxious to obtain the fruit.

885. One may like to reach a desired village not yet reached ; or, one may desire to regain the very coins in his hand under forgetfulness.

886. In the same way, one may like to avoid loathsome objects like thorns etc. which are to be avoided ; or, he may like to avoid things like a rope mistaken for a serpent, though there is nothing to be avoided in them.

887. In the case of objects to be attained or avoided, since they can be so done in a definite manner, the desire springs up for such means as are prescribed to the exclusion of such as are forbidden.

888. Further, in the case of things already got or avoided, since they are veiled by ignorance, nothing but a knowledge of their real nature will make us reach the aim.

889. For one who desires the destruction of all misery, when he understands the Scripture "Thou art *Brahman*," all his miseries disappear, owing to the cessation of ignorance.²

¹ viz. the supreme Self.

² Hence the authority of the *Vedānta*.

890. When thus the authority of Scripture is established by reason of its making known what is unknown, it must be granted that it is as authoritative in the case of the unity of Self as in the case of injunction.

891. If its authority must depend on its injunctory signification, then the latter too must depend on its inherent authority. Thus there will be mutual dependence, since neither of them can result from the other.

892. If so, prohibitions will lose their authority, since they mean only indifference. Indifference is only inaction; and inaction is nothing but the retention of an existing condition.¹

893. In sentences like "he cried," their authority depends on their being auxiliary to injunction, because they do not teach any human aim. As it is otherwise here, the above reason is inapplicable.

894. Nor should it be suspected that the statement of a means to realise the unity of Self is untrue, for, the means is neglected only when the end is attained and our aim is thereby fulfilled.

895. It is not untrue either before realising the unity of Self, for, there is no reason for such suspicion, or after such realisation, for, it is not needed because it has produced the desired result.

896. The truth of a proof consists in nothing else than its making known the object to be attained. Nor can a pot, though a true thing, imply fire, since it is not of the nature of a means.

¹ Hence neither the indifference nor the inaction itself can be said to be a कर्तव्य.

897. In the case where a smoky appearance induced by tears etc., does not imply the existence of fire, the reason for it is not its untruth but its not being of the nature of a means.

898. As in the case of smoke, the truth of the *Vēdāntas* is not established by their being a means; for, if so, the Scripture which treats of the unity of Self will become unauthoritative.

899. Nor, as in the case of tears, can the other part of Scripture be said not to be a means for the reason that it is untrue. The truth of the means is established by the fact that it removes our ignorance of the unity of Self.

900. Since the purpose of the proof is complete as soon as the unity of Self is understood from Scripture, an examination of the means is fruitless, like any thought of a raft when the crossing is over.

901. Perhaps such further doubt may arise in regard to external objects which are non-Self; but here, where the Self itself is the object to be gained, what doubt can exist as to the proof?

902. Further, unlike as in other instances, the meaning of the sentence¹ is not one of difference² or relation,³ since the supreme Self and the individual soul are identical.

903. The condition of not-soul imputed to the Supreme Self and that of the not-Self imputed to the soul, are the result of nescience and are destroyed by knowledge which springs from Scripture.

¹ तत्त्वमसि.

² e. g. गामानय.

³ e. g. नीलमुत्पलम्.

904. There is no Self apart from the soul and no soul apart from the Self. Hence their identity is different from that of the lotus and its blueness.

905. Though the conditions of not-Self and not-soul are the result of nescience, the conditions of Self and soul do not so result from the other. Hence they are self-established.

906. The connection between the two names thus results from the unity of Self independently of any active or qualitative meaning; nor can such meanings exist where there is no difference.

907. As the atmosphere is deemed big in comparison with the air in the pot, the infinitude of the soul is not in the same way by comparison with its individuality.

908. Infinity or secondlessness, like knowledge, does not depend on anything else. Knowledge, for example, does not spring from the negation of other things, but from the removal of ignorance regarding the thing to be known.

909. Though the Supreme Self is no other than the soul, it is affected by invisibility by reason of our nescience. So, too, the soul, though being no other than the Supreme Self, appears to be differentiated.

910. Scripture therefore encompasses our aim by removing the said invisibility and differentiation by the statement that the soul is *Brahman*. Thus my view is established.¹

911. "Is not the unity of Self, like its proof, contradicted by injunctory and prohibitory passages which depend on duality and also by direct perception etc ?

¹ That liberation is the result of understanding from the Scriptural passage the unity of Self.

912. "Nor can the text about the unity of Self be alternative or conjunctive with them in its authority; nor can their authority be affected by it in any way.

913. "Though there are two contradictory proofs, there can be no alternation in the thing itself; nor can difference and non-difference, which are mutually opposite, exist together in any one thing.

914. "You cannot say that the proofs are not contradictory, since the thing cannot be both differentiated and non-differentiated. Further, how can there be any idea of difference, when such difference is expressly negated by passages like 'nothing here is diverse etc.'

915. "Nor are direct perception etc. affected, which are the means to understand letters, words, etc.; nor is that part of Scripture affected which tends to purification¹ and is thus helpful to the knowledge of Self.

916. "The scope of Scripture, then, is flattery² or prayer. And how can it affect direct perception etc., which have no other scope?"³

917. This is the answer. The injunctory Scripture, dependent as it is on secular duality,⁴ has for its object the attainment of the end and not the teaching of that duality.

918. Since that duality is not a human aim, Scripture will become inauthoritative if that is its significance; for, the supporters of Vedic authority agree that that

¹ The कर्मकाण्ड.

² सामीकप्रधानपुंशोऽद्वयत्वोपधारवत्. Anandagiri.

³ सावकाशनिरवकाशयोर्निरवकाशं बलवदिति न्यायात्. Anandagiri.

⁴ Such as doer etc.

authority is based on the ground that Scripture teaches us our aim.

919. The knowledge that springs from direct perception etc. has reference only to the true nature of the thing perceived and not to any idea of duality. They cannot therefore militate against the unity of Self.

920. A proof deals only with its object ; the object is a reality ; and duality cannot be a reality, since reality is independent of a second thing.

921. On the floor which is visible, a pot which is invisible may be negatived. But a thing which is known by other proofs cannot be said to be unknown, lest everything be reduced to nothingness.

922. Direct perception etc., which are real can only signify a thing and not mere non-entity which is unreal nor the mere exclusion of a thing.

923. Hence there is no difference in the Self, since it is undifferentiated by nature. Further, the Self is not something different from the proof, nor the proof from the Self.

924. Non-entity and non-entity cannot be mutually different, since both are unreal ; nor, in the same way, can non-entity and entity, or entity and entity differ from each other.¹

925. The relation between an attribute like perishability or absence and a thing like a pot, must be either conjunction (*samyōga*) or inherent connection (*samavāya*) or identity (*tādātmya*).

¹ वस्तुनिभेदाभावानिरस्य भेदनिरासेहेत्वन्तरमुच्यते तत्रभेदस्य धर्मिप्रतिषेध-
ननावभावे वा भावाभावौ वा भावावेव वा.....योगश्च न भेदो लभ्यते. Anandagiri.

926. The knowledge of the presence of the pot etc. arises in all cases of connection like that of container and contained ; but no such knowledge arises in the mind of any one from any relation between entity and non-entity.

927. Mere non-entity is not amenable to proof, either as separate from or as identical with entity. Hence entity alone can give rise to practice (*vyavahāra*).

928. If it be said that non-entity too is real, since it generates the knowledge that a thing does not exist, what is the difference then between knowledge of entity and that of non-entity, since both become of the nature of entity.

929. For one to whom all is real, how can there be non-entity, since that too is perceived ? Nor can it be established, as entity itself cannot, as something apart from entity.

930. If entity admits of its relation with non-entity like that of the lotus with blueness, then, since they are not contradictory of each other, non-entity cannot militate against entity.

931. We see relation between two things that are established independently of each other, as, for instance, between two goats or two wrestlers. Such is not the case with entity and non-entity.

932. No relation exists between two non-entities like the offspring of a barren woman and the flower that grows in the sky ; nor between entity and non-entity, since each is contradictory of the other.

933. The non-existence of the pot is not, like the pot itself, perceived on the floor. There is neither con-

junction nor inherent relation between that non-existence and the floor.

934. If non-entity is included in entity, then every thing is real, and what is real cannot be non-existent.

935. If entity is included in non-entity, then since what is real is also non-existent, there is no foundation for any difference, and how can there be any relation where there is no difference?

936. As long as anything discriminative is found to exist on this earth, it is understood that that thing is no other than the real which is devoid of beginning, middle or end.

937. Scripture itself teaches us the unity of the real (*sad-aikātmya*) by clearly declaring that "all this is real &c." and "reality is the root &c."

938. It will now be explained how it is against reason that the absence of a proof should be a proof, and the absence of an object, an object.

939. The rule is that whatever makes known an unknown thing is a proof. There is no proof in this sense in the want of a proof. Hence it cannot be a proof.

940. If the absence of an object is proved by the absence of proof, what is there to prove that very absence of proof?

941. It cannot be proved by the five proofs, such as direct perception &c.,¹ since they relate only to what is real; nor by their absence, through inference, for that itself is a thing to be proved.

¹ प्रात्यक्ष, अनुमान, उपमान, शब्द, and अर्थापत्ति. The Mimamsakas add अनुपलब्धि ।

942. If, like blue and other colors, direct perception etc. is an attribute (*viśēṣhaṇa*) of the absence (*abhāva*), then, since the absence is always qualified by that attribute, how can it result from the above proofs? ¹

943. If, on the other hand, you say that absence is without an attribute, then, the absence of an object would itself be a proof for want of any distinction. ²

944. To distinguish absence as that of a pot etc. is not in my opinion, sound; for, the words have no connected sense, the two things being mutually exclusive.

945. If it is conceded that two words expressing a thing and an absence can be compounded only if there is a connection in sense (*sāmarthyā*) between them, then no such compound is admissible, since the pot &c. and the absence are not mutually complementary.

946. In the phrase "the absence of a thing," what is the exact force of the possessive; for, a formless, non-existent something can have no sort of connection whatever?

947. If absence be considered a separate thing, then how can one thing become another? ³ If, nevertheless, one thing can become another, then there will be no distinction as in the case of blue color. ⁴

¹ तर्हि नीलादिनोत्पत्तादेर्वैशिष्ट्यावच्छादना विशेषणेनाभावस्य वैशिष्ट्याद्विशिष्टोभावोनात्तादिविषयस्तस्यांशतः स्वविषयत्वापत्तेः । Anandagiri.

² Between the absence of object and the absence of proof, (which the opponent argues, is itself a proof).

³ viz. its absence.

⁴ The blue is of the very nature of the flower, and is inseparable from it. This cannot be said of a thing and its absence.

948. If absence is considered as not incapable of some connection (with the thing), then it does not make a negation of the thing with which it is so connected. If it does not express that with which it is to be connected, then the connection itself will be impossible.

949. Since no connection is possible in the absence of the thing, the possessive too admits of no meaning. Nor can there be simultaneous prescription (*vidhi*) and prohibition (*nishēdha*), owing to inconsistency.¹

950. Since thoughts are momentary, there is not even a continuity of thought, properly so called; nor is the blue color known by enquiring into the absence of every color but blue.

951. There can be no negating of an invisible thing, as the empty floor negatives the pot &c. Nor can it be said to be qualified by the absence of other things, for that will be only when the absence of *every* other thing is known.²

952. If a thing is no other than the absence of other things, the thing and absence will be as non-existent as a sky-flower. If the absence of a thing is said to be a different thing by itself, then the existence of the one reality is self-established.³

953. All proofs tend to establish this alone. Where then is difference or negation? Even when the object of vision is a many colored painting, the painting is only a single thing, since the proof is one.

¹ It has been stated in verse 941 supra that direct proof &c. do not negative the thing which is absent. The opponent now contends that they are partly affirmative and partly negative.

² This requires Godly omniscience.

³ Since there is neither difference nor absence.

954. If each color like blue, yellow, &c. is seen by itself, where then is variety? If a thing is no other than difference, then the thing itself will be non-existent.¹

955. If difference is an attribute of something else then the thing, being undifferentiated, establishes itself by proof. It cannot be both differentiated and undifferentiated, for, being inconsistent in itself, it cannot be amenable to a single proof. If it be said that there is no inconsistency on account of its reality, then it is the reality that becomes the object of proof.

956. How can what is real differ in itself? Difference is the result of human desires. In the case of filial and other relations, the son's birth &c. are of the very nature of things.

957. Though the acts of burning, melting and illuminating are different, there is no difference in fire. Since the thing is one, there can be no difference even as regards its actions.

958. As there is no inconsistency in the single thing, fire, being the possessor of qualities which give rise to various actions, why cannot the same be said of those actions also?

959. If you consider each of two things to be the absence of the other, then they will become interdependent, and a pot will be established by its own absence.

960. Even according to those² who consider separateness capable of proof as a quality, the proof affects the quality, as in the case of blue color etc., and not something unreal.

¹ भेदस्य विदारणात्मत्वात्तदात्मनो वस्तुनः शून्यतावातात् Anandagiri.

² The *Vaisēshikas*.

961. If again, a thing be said to be qualified by separateness, then too the proof is of the thing only, as in the instance 'the cow is white,' and not of the difference.

962. If separateness exists as not different from the things themselves, then it too becomes a thing. If different, then the thing becomes devoid of separateness.

963. If the separateness of a thing and its absence do not differ, then they are not separate. If they differ then the separateness cannot be mutual.

964. If separateness is dependent on another thing, then a pot by itself has no separateness. Though its quality may be twofold,¹ the thing is one, like the lily, etc.

965. Though qualities are differently understood it is always the rule that there is no difference in the thing qualified. Hence, though cows etc. are different from each other, the reality (*san-mātra*) remains one.

966. Even supposing that what is cognised is the abstract nature of the cows etc. in general, then, since the essential reality is unaffected thereby, that reality alone is cognised. The character of cow etc. will be anomalous, as in the case of the *sabalā*.²

967. All talk about intermediate things³ is understood as not independent of their real nature. The reality of existence always dwells in them.

968. The nature of substance etc. does not differ even from existence in the abstract. How can they

¹ i. e. separateness as to other things and non-separateness in itself.

² A spotted cow which is of the same form as the ordinary cow but to which the name of 'cow' is not ordinarily applied.

³ Like pillar, pot etc.

differ, then, from anything else? Thus knowledge is of only one sort; for example, substance is real, quality is real, etc.

969. This unity cannot be the result of inseparable connection (*samavāya*) between two different things. If so, there is no certainty that it is the result of that connection alone, for the idea of unity exists even as regards a genus.

970. Nor can there be any connection at all ¹ since they cannot be thought of as separate from each other. There is no reason to justify an inseparable connection (*samavāya*).

971. If there is conjunction, there must be disjunction too, and an inseparable connection would become uncertain. If such connection exists by itself, then there is no need for assuming it at all, since the unity of substance etc. will also be self-established.²

972. All things are surrounded by reality at all times, but yield themselves at times to relative talk. To talk of them as always different is an illusion.

973. Even according to those who say that a thing is both generic and individual, there is no difference, since the thing is one owing to the absence of any difference in the thing qualified (*dharmin*).

974. Even if there be a sense of difference between generality and individuality, that sense extends only thus far, and cannot imply any difference in the thing of which they are attributes.

¹ e. g. between *सामान्य*, a species, and *सत्ता*, the generality of existence.

² The above is a refutation of the *Vaiśeṣika* doctrine that *सामान्य* and *विशेष* are two different categories (generality and individuality).

975. If a thing is one, there can be no differentiation ; and if there is differentiation, there can be no unity. It cannot be said that a thing may be both generic and individual, for, owing to the fault of inapplicability, it cannot be both.¹

976. Further, how can you speak of non-entity, since there is only one reality amenable to cognition, whose form alone is existence, while all other forms are non-existent.

977. If the absence of proofs like direct perception etc. be said to establish non-entity, tell me of what nature is that absence. If you say it is the complete inactivity of the self, it is that very reality, viz., the self, which I insist on. If you say it is the knowledge of some other thing, then it is *a fortiori* an entity.

978. If you say that non-entity (*abhāva*) is another condition (*bhāva*), that is wrong, since its name and nature contradict each other.² Hence no difference is knowable by perception and other proofs, since the reality (*vastu*) is one.³

979. In the knowledge "this is a pot," what is cognised is the pot. Its differentiation from all other things like a cloth &c. is not present therein, since they are not in the knowledge of a cloth.

980. The negation of the pot cannot be in the pot itself, for, it will be inconsistent, or in any other

¹ For the quality of white cow cannot extend to a brown cow.

² For a *bhāva* cannot be called *abhāva*.

³ अभावनिरासेन भेदमपि निरस्य सामान्यमेव वस्तुस्वविषयमङ्गीकुर्वन्भेदा-
प्रामाणिकत्वमुपसंहरति । तस्मादिति । वस्तुनस्त्रेविध्यायोगात्परिशेषतः सामान्यमेव
तदिति स्थितत्वात्तस्य च सम्प्राप्तस्य सर्वत्रेक्याचप्रामितोभेदोऽस्तीत्यर्थः ॥ Anandagiri.

thing, for, there can be no relation expressible by the genitive case. Such a vague theory, therefore, cannot apply to reality.

981. The pot, by generating a knowledge which is distinguished by its own shape, establishes itself and not its differentiation from the cloth etc.

982. So, too, in the knowledge of the cloth, the only thing which distinguishes it is the cloth. And one sees nothing else therein, such as non-entity etc. which are spoken of so often.

983. Doubt, certainty, and other attributes of the mind, while qualifying knowledge, do not differ from the object or from the knowledge, and there is no idea of differentiation at all.

984. Thus too, "I alone, who am the perceiver, know," and such other functions of the knower (*mātrīdharmāḥ*), merely particularise the knowledge which effects them, but do not admit of any differentiation.

985. There is but one knowledge which is self-established, which is identical in definition with the Self, and which alone gives rise to all acts and conditions (*vyavahāra*) like being, non-being, etc.

986. Hence, irrespective of knowledge (*anubhava*), there is neither difference nor unity. There can be no proof but is consonant with that knowledge. On what proof, then, can any contradiction be founded? ¹

987. Logicians are agreed that the object of all proofs is something unknown. But that unknown thing is not *a priori* established by the proof, for it exists even before any proof comes in.

¹ अनुभवानुसारेण मानानां मानत्वं सत्कथं तमनुसरन्तो वेदान्तामानान्तरैर्वि-
धेरन् ॥ Anandagiri.

988. If you ask "How can the unknown nature of a thing not depend on proof?" I ask, on the other hand, how, without an unknown thing, any proof can exist without an object.

989. A proof is a proof only in so far as it destroys the nature of being unknown. And, if the being unknown is consequent on proof, its destruction cannot be the result of the proof.¹

990. Thus direct perception etc always make known an unknown thing already established by experience, and are proofs only by virtue thereof, and not of themselves, or by virtue of any other reason.

991. For, the idea, "I did not know it till now" which arises when a pot is cognised is but the repetition of the experience relative to its previous unknown condition.

992. A proof, when applied to its object, exhausts its purpose by particularising that object. It cannot extend its operation to the known or unknown nature of the object, since, if it does, it will cease to be a proof.

993. Any one, be he a mere child, will say, when questioned about a thing, "I know nothing of it," by virtue of his own experience and not by means of any proof.

994. Even in sleep wherein all the sensory functions are latent, there is self-experience not different from the knowledge during waking, owing to the non-cessation of consciousness.³

¹ For, instead of making the object known, it will only establish its unknown nature.

² Sureśvara's contention is that unknownness is established by experience.

³ An unknown thing is as much unknown during sleep as during wakefulness.

995. So too, in the case of objects like the products of Himalayan heights which are entirely beyond the pale of experience, the experience of their un-knownness during waking is not at all different from that during sleep.

996. There is no cessation of experience in this case, since there is the knowledge "I do not know." Also, when an unseen thing is seen, there is the knowledge "I did not know."

997. Thus, too, a person waking from sleep recognises the cessation of perception etc. by experience alone. There is, therefore, no cessation of experience in the interval.¹

998. Nor can the absence of perception during sleep be inferred from the perception which exists during waking; for, difference in time does not cause difference in knowledge.²

999. Differences of time, condition etc., as well as perceiver, perception &c., are themselves the result of knowledge. How then can knowledge be modified by them?

1000. While the three, perceiver, perception and the thing perceived, are subject to appearance and disappearance, knowledge, without cessation or commencement, shines supreme and alone.

1001. All things around, whether in the region of the known or the unknown, come within the clutches of experience. Nothing can result from or disappear into, anything other than experience.

¹ Between sleep and waking.

² ज्ञान or the faculty of perception or knowledge.

1002. Thus, experience alone is the sole object of perception and other proofs. Its nature is unknown, and it is self-established,—this, whereunto perception &c, are proofs.¹

1003. Hence, perception &c., which remove non-knowledge, become thereby proofs of things which are already established by experience. And there cannot be a thing which is neither known nor unknown.

1004. Things like the pot &c., which are established by proof, abandon their unknown nature. The self too though self-established, being a thing like any other, does not leave off its unknown nature without proof.

1005. The establishment of all things other than self, while ignorance screens off the self and before the advent of its opposite (viz. knowledge of self), is itself by virtue of the inherent nature of the self.²

1006. The destruction of non-knowledge (lit. darkness) which gives rise to everything like knower &c., is the result of knowledge of the complete unity of self derived from passages like "That thou art."³

1007. Therefore, the authority of scripture regarding the nature of self is established, since it destroys the unknownness of self. And that alone⁴ is the sole goal of existence for the wise.

¹ न हि स्वप्रकाशस्वप्नमेव स्वयोर्विप्रतिषेधः संविदेकतानस्यपि स्वयताच्चाणा-
पनयनाच्चे ज्ञानापेक्षयादित्यर्थः ॥ Anandagiri.

² This stanza is intended to refute the argument that, if the unknownness of self cannot be removed but by proof, the self can not be said to be self-established, being dependent on proof.

³ This negatives the supposition that scripture is redundant if knowledge of self is based on proof.

⁴ Namely, the self, in contrast to worldly pleasures.

1008. "Indeed what greater happiness fulfilling the end of human existence is there to be desired than the destruction of the multitudinous miseries of the irresistible chain of births and deaths? ¹

1009. "Even in common parlance a person is said to be happy when the affliction of disease is at an end. And ascetics do not exert themselves to attain any other happiness than liberation.

1010. A happiness that is unknowable cannot be the *summum bonum*; ² nor can a happiness that is knowable, since that would introduce duality in the self, owing to the impossibility of the knower and the knowable being one."

1011. It is not so. Happiness and misery are known to exist severally in the same object. ³ How then can they be identical? And why can it not as well be asserted that misery is nothing but the avoidance of happiness?

1012. Avoidance of misery cannot properly be identical with happiness, since even persons free from misery are found to be desirous of obtaining happiness and seek expedients therefor.

1013. Even those who possess enough means of happiness like sandal etc. and are thereby happy, obtain

¹ This is the argument of the *वैशेषिका* who holds that the avoidance of misery is alone happiness, since two opposites like happiness and misery cannot coexist.

² Since it would be as useless as an unused treasure hidden in a house or cave.

³ As in the case of a sunburnt person half immersed in cold water.

greater happiness from causes such as hearing the news of the birth of a son.

1014. You cannot in the above case postulate the misery of the non-birth of a child, since that is a thing unknown.¹ A thing that is unknown cannot constitute misery, as, for example, the misery of an enemy.²

1015. It is for this very reason that even the lower animals desire to attain happiness and avoid misery, the only difference being that they are ignorant of the means.

1016. Scripture too is authoritative as regards the *summum bonum*, since it points out the pure self as the prime-most happiness and the not-self in the same way as misery.

1017. That self alone is happiness is declared in various ways by Scriptural passages like "This self is the most desirable," "For the love of the self" and so on. Hence nothing but self can be happiness.

1018. You acquiesce in renunciation of desire as being connected as cause with the *summum bonum*, namely, liberation. And what is the inconsistency in regarding the desire for supreme bliss in the same light?³

¹ i. e. not an object of experience in the present.

² One does not feel the misery of his enemy as he would his own.

³ This answers the objection that the desire for supreme happiness like any other desire may pin down the सुसुख to संसार. Suresvara says that if this be so, why not the same be said of the सुसुख's hatred of wordliness, treating it like any other hatred?

1019. If it be said that the desire for supreme bliss implies (worldly) attachment, is there not the same element of attachment in the desire for resorting to solitary places etc ?

1020. This is also clearly enunciated in passages of the *Taittirīya-upanishad* like "So too a hundredfold of the pleasures of—etc." and "This alone gives happiness etc."

1021. It is for this very reason also that that a person enjoying the bliss of self during sleep¹ is pained when awakened in the same way as when interrupted in the enjoyment of contact of woman etc.

1022. There is no need for the attribute of knowability in the self, since its sole inherent nature is bliss. This attribute is essential in a thing which is devoid of intelligence, and not in a thing which is nothing else than intelligence itself.²

1023. The passage of the *bhāṣya*, "for all men etc.," is intended to convey the idea that the privilege³ is easily available for all. This has been explained before.⁴

1024. For, even a person desirous of heaven also desires liberation ; but a person desiring liberation does not so much as cast a side-glance at anything else.

1025. Since no one of all men is prohibited the privilege, the commentator says "for all men etc."

¹ The reference is to *सौप्तिकबुद्धि* or the experience during deep sleep.

² This is in answer to verse 1010.

³ The privilege to acquire knowledge.

⁴ See verse 290 supra.

1026. When the words "bring the white cow" are uttered, a person ignorant thereof, looking at the doer of some act whose object is the cow, infers that he is the cause of the act.

1027. But the act of which the cow is the object must surely have been known by the doer, for nowhere have we witnessed the accomplishment of a thing unknown beforehand.

1028. If injunction has to be inferred as the cause by looking at an act dependent on a doer &c., then, being amenable to other proofs, it will cease to be scriptural.

1029. If action does not depend on a doer etc., how can a known purpose be carried out? Further, neither an established entity nor a non-entity is known to stand in need of a doer etc.

1030. If the word¹ directly signifies doer etc., then it will not have authority by its own intrinsic force.² If, on the other hand, the word merely suggest the thing to be done, then the authority of Scripture would be wasted on a thing already established.³

1031. The authority of scripture cannot be applicable to a thing that is non-existent; and, if the thing to be done is not non-existent, the authority would be wasted on an established thing.

1032. If the thing to be done is of the nature of

¹ Namely, the verb in the potential mood.

² For the ~~शब्द~~ would itself be a कारक.

³ For it is only an established thing that can be merely suggested.

being both established and non-established, then both the fallacies above pointed out would result. Further, no such thing is known to exist anywhere.

1033. A proof merely deals by way of suggestion (*jñāpaka* or *vyanjaka*) with a thing already established but does not itself produce the thing. If, therefore injunction (*chōdanā*) is only a proof, how can it be said to be also the thing to be done ?

1034. If the contention is that it is considered as the thing to be done by reason of the fulfilment of the object, then since, before the success of the sacrifice, it is non-existent, how can the injunction have scriptural authority then ?

1035. If it be said that, before the sacrifice, the sacrificer is established, then of what consequence is the completion of the sacrifice ? If it be said that the injunction is fulfilment by the completion of the sacrifice also what is the import of the verb "to sacrifice ?" ¹

1036. If it be said that the doing of the sacrifice etc. assists in establishing the injunction in the same way as the potter's action assists in bringing into existence the pot, then, why not injunction be treated as similar to the pot in all respects ? ²

1037. If so, an injunction which is not a means to an end will be meant. In that case how can the injunction be heeded by the wise, since its opposite, a means to an end, is present.

¹ यज्यर्थस्य प्रयोज्यत्वं नाम नियोगप्रयुक्तानुष्ठेयत्वं तच्च सिध्यति सिद्धस्य नियोगस्य सिध्यनपेक्षतया धात्वर्थानुष्ठानं प्रत्यप्रयोजकत्वादित्यर्थः ॥ Anandagiri

² i.e. नियोग will not be a पुरुषार्थ or the means of achieving a desired object.

1038. The act to be done, as understood by a person who hears the potential mood etc., depends for its coming into existence on some benefit to the speaker or the doer.¹

1039. It cannot be said that in the case of any injunction, the doer does not have an end in view, for no one in the world acts on the mere utterance of a precept.

1040. No independent person will, for the mere sake of fulfilling the object of the precept, set his mind to do difficult tasks like sacrifices etc. by virtue of the injunction.

1041. If one engages oneself in sacrifice etc. with a view to achieve an end, then that end, and not the injunction, becomes the incentive.

1042. If action (*pravṛtti*) is the direct result of the imperative mood etc. as of an incantation², then no one will stand in need of a purificatory ceremony, since, in going astray, he would be dependent on the injunction.

1043. The incantation is an incentive by itself and not by virtue of the thing to be incited to action. If the same be the case with injunction, then sacrifices &c will cease to be obligatory of performance.³

1044. Whether it is the incentive to action, or the action itself, or its result, injunction will cease to be of scriptural authority, since it becomes amenable to secular proofs.

¹ either the attainment of happiness or the avoidance of misery.

² i. e. in exorcising, the exit or entrance of the possessing spirit is the direct result of the incantations used.

³ Since, in the absence of a *व्याप्ति* for the emission, the action need not necessarily be performed.

understood who is the authorised in the section on rituals, the commentary "nor if it were not so etc." was spoken.¹

1052. Those that desire, from the performance of rites, fruits, whether perceivable or not, should state the authority for the correlation of the self with other bodies and other conditions.

1053. How can it (the self) be the doer since, being all-pervading, it is devoid of action? If it be not a doer, there can be no fruit. If its enjoyment of the fruit is only in a secondary sense, then that will not be right.²

1054. If the self is asserted to be a doer in the primary sense, then liberation will be out of question.³ Ignorance may be destroyed by proof, but not the quality of doer which does not induce knowledge.⁴

1055. The relation to a future body is not amenable to perception, since it is yet to spring into being; nor can there be an inference (by syllogism) or analogy for want of a predicate or comparison.

1056. Nor, as already explained, is there an inference based on inconsistency, since the self is clearly

¹ कर्मधिकारस्तर्हि कस्येत्याशङ्क्य देहाद्यतिरिक्तस्य तेनाध्यासेन संबद्धस्येत्यन-
भाष्यमवतारयति. Anandagiri.

² The self cannot be an enjoyer without being a doer, If it is a doer or enjoyer only in a secondary sense (गौण्या दृष्ट्या), there must be a principal doer or enjoyer. But as the latter is non-existent, the argument loses ground.

³ For the self will, by nature, be bound to action.

⁴ वास्तवमपि कर्तृत्वादि माननिरस्यमित्याशङ्क्याह. Anandagiri.

understood from the words ;¹ nor proof by absence, since there is a proof.

1057. Nor can the self in any way be derived from the conception of "I." The words that signify the self are intelligence, experience, consciousness, knowledge.²

1058. How can experience be dependent on the conception of "I" which, like a pot, depends for its own establishment on experience ?

1059. If the self (*anubhava*) is the result of proof, it will be non-sentient (*jaḍa*) like the pot. If not, its sentient nature is established without a proof ; also, the dependence will be mutual.

1060. The conception of "I" would result from the self, and the latter would result from the former. So the self and the conception of "I" will each become dependent on the other.

1061. The conception of "I" is a result of the self and is invariably dependent on the cause. How then can the self be invariably dependent on such a conception ? And ; if there is no such dependence, how can the self be said to be proved by the conception ?

1062. The doer can not by any means be proved by the conception of "I," since the doer is but an attribute during the action, and ceases to exist after its cessation.

1063. If abstract consciousness³ is the object of

¹ There is no *वर्थापत्ति* since the words "योगिनमन्त्रेणैव शरीरत्वाद् etc." do not show any inconsistency to justify a rectifying inference. This and the previous stanza dispose of the five proofs of the *mīmāṃsaka*, namely, प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान, उपमा, वर्थापत्ति and कभाह (or मानानुसङ्ग).

² And these words prove that the self is self-illuminative.

³ *सर्वज्ञ* or the supreme self,

proof, the result would be another such consciousness. Two such consciousnesses cannot exist, nor can a second consciousness be inferred in any way.

1064. If a pure consciousness is suggested like the consciousness of the form of a pot etc., then one consciousness will be qualified by another consciousness ; and, no such consciousness exists in the case of the self.

1065. If the knower is itself the thing to be proved, then whose is the result ? ¹ Not of the knower, for it is also the thing to be proved ; nor can the thing to be proved produce the result.

1066. If it be said that, owing to the non-sentient nature of the object in the case of the pot etc., the resulting knowledge is that of the knower,² the same fault of being non-sentient will vitiate the thing to be known in the present instance also. If on the other hand you suppose sentiency (in the self) that sentiency will not be the result of proof.

1067. Even considered as an attribute, the conception of "I" cannot be different from the self of which it is the attribute. Form, for instance, cannot differ from the substance, though it differs from other qualities like taste etc.

1068. As regards the statement that substance etc. which are perceptible, also form the nature of the self, that nature, like the pot, can not be amenable to the

¹ i. e. the knowledge resulting from the proof. आत्मनि संविद्धकाराभावादमेयत्वमुक्तत्वाफलभावावसङ्गाच्छेषमिति विवक्षुरादिपत्तिः. Ananda giri.

² Whereas in this case it is not so, and therefore the result belongs to the object (which is also the knower).

conception of "I" which has only the inner self for its object.¹

1069. There is no difference (between you and the Buddhist) if you argue, as you have done, that knowledge coupled with the conception of "I" establishes the self which is the very author of that knowledge.²

1070. The self is not established by the manifestation of knowledge, nor knowledge by the manifestation of self. The self cannot be both the known and knowledge, since that would create a difference in its nature. If there is no such difference, then it is established by its own experience.

1071. Say which is the proof, the conception of "I," or the self? Not the former since it is direct perception; nor the latter, since it would then become non-sentient in its own case.

1072. Further, even according to you, without the self being known, the conception of "I" cannot exist. The conception of "I" from which the self is to result, is itself the object of mere inference.

1073. It is not proper, moreover, to create a division in the divisionless. Again, if the object of a proof depends for its very existence on that proof, then the result of the proof will be ever-existent.³

¹ आत्मनो द्रव्यबोधरूपत्वादद्रव्यरूपेण मेयत्वं बोधरूपेण मातृत्वमित्येकस्यैव बाह्यबाह्यकात्मकस्याहंभिया सिद्धिरिति केचित्ताग्रत्वाच्च. Anandagiri.

² Suresvara's opponent would disprove the अविक्तज्ञानवाद of the Buddhist by asserting the impossibility of the same thing being both बाह्य and आत्मक. This objection applies equally to his own theory.

³ If अहंत्वत्वं is to be proved by the self on which it entirely depends, then since self is eternal, the former too will become such and there will be nothing against it too being self-established.

1074. The conception of "I" cannot be a proof of the self unless the latter is unknown. This theory therefore requires that the self, like a pot etc., should be unknown.

1075. If that unknownness too, like a pot etc., be said to result from experience, then the self is established independently of the knower. If not, even the knower cannot be established.

1076. The convergence of proofs asserted by some ¹ has been shown to be remote and inapplicable. Even in the other school ² it is not possible to accept such a convergence of proofs.

1077. Just as the first proof, in making known what is unknown, establishes only the knower and not the thing to be known, so must be the case with the succeeding proofs also.

1078. Thus, since there is no individual applicability, how can there be a convergence of all the proofs. Even if it be known as the result of other proofs, it would differ from that which was unknown in connection with the previous proof.

1079. Even on the supposition that the object is established by these proofs, there can be no convergence, since the former proof refers to the unknown and the latter to what is known.

1080. If the succeeding proof establishes what is already ascertained from a preceding one, then it will

¹ वार्तिककारमतोऽनुपपत्त्ययगम्यत्वमात्मनो निरस्तं, शब्दादिधीविषयत्वेन शब्दादस्वप्रकाशत्वेन स्वरूपमात्रयत्वेनाऽऽत्मानं च साधयतीति सर्वार्थधीरात्मनि मानमिति गुह्यमतमाशङ्क्याह. Anandagiri.

² आत्मन्यध्यासानुमानयुतीनां मरणत्वाच्चास्य वेदेकवेद्यतेति तार्किकास्तान्प्रत्याह. Anandagiri.

cease to be a proof. Further, doubt (or repetition) will result from the one, and certainty from the other.

1081. No convergence of proofs is therefore possible in the case of things which have neither generic nor individual properties. And, just as in other cases, so too must be the case in the *vēdānta*.¹

1082. It is taught.² that "I" am that supreme self (*brahman*), from which do result all proofs, as well as the three states of waking etc., and the division into entity and non-entity.

1083 and 1084. By which non-established things are established, on which entity and non-entity depend, which is not for any other sake but for whose sake all else is, which is never dependent on anything else, from which the three things viz. the known, knower and knowledge, obtain their being,—such is the true, all-seeing self inculcated herein.

1085. This self has its flower of consciousness as much fully opened in deep sleep as in the dreaming and waking states.³ Likewise, it has its flower of knowledge closed during dreaming and waking as much as in deep sleep.⁴

1086. The self is the seer in virtue of its relation

¹ यतो दर्शितविधया सामान्यविशेषकसु सम्भावितसंयुक्तेष्वपि ब्रह्मादिषु च निरस्तोऽतो निर्गतसामान्यविशेषेषु चिन्मात्रेष्वात्मस्वसौ दूरोत्सारितस्तेषु स्वप्रकाशचिन्मूर्तिष्वेकस्यापि मानस्याप्रवेष्टादीपनिवदत्वस्य सामन्तरमेव वेदनाद्यैवमात्मनेदस्य प्रतिभाधिकत्येऽप्यवस्तुत्वादित्यर्थः ॥ Anandagiri.

² By passages like अहं ब्रह्मास्मि etc.

³ जागरादौ सदा नुभवव्यवसायेऽपि कालसम्यगे "अहं ब्रह्म" रित्यादि कुतश्च न सत्यं सर्वानुसन्धिषा सरोजवत्प्रकटितानुभवत्वदृष्टेः ॥

⁴ स्थाप्यदमस्याद्वयेऽपि विषयेषु वस्तुसोऽप्रसारितप्रमेयः प्रत्यक्षतया "अहं ब्रह्म" रित्यादि कुतः ॥

to the seen. It is not a seer by its own virtue. It is beyond the scope of thought and speech since it is amenable only to the inner vision.

1087. For our purpose the assumption of nescience (*avidyā*) alone is necessary. By its cessation, all bondage, both past and future, also ceases.

1088. The nescience, though natural and manifested by experience, is completely destroyed by knowledge, like darkness by sunrise.

1089. Nescience, which exists without a beginning is seen to be destroyed in one moment by knowledge which has a beginning. Nor does this knowledge stand in need of recurrence.

1090. This self, though of the above nature and though the witness of all knowledge etc., is unknown by self-experience prior to the birth of knowledge.

1091. Therefore, from passages like "that thou art" and from none else, results the direct and unshakable knowledge of the One Self.

1092. The commentary "by all means &c." is begun as an answer to the question suggested by the previous statement "this is connected with the chapter on rituals etc." ¹

1093. "May it not be said that, if it be as stated above, there is no need for the *vēdānta* at all, since all possible benefit is derived from the rituals previously referred to?"

¹ The connection between the कर्मकाण्ड and the ज्ञानकाण्ड is that a person first purifies his intellect by the performance of rituals, and then acquires in succession renunciation and knowledge which lead to liberation.

1094. It is not so; for the rituals mentioned previously do not preclude the *cause*¹ of the desire for happiness and the aversion for misery.

1095. The attainment of all pleasures and the avoidance of all ills are the natural aim of every creature.

1096. This again is the established nature of the self, like consciousness,² as is evident from passages like "then this which is fullness &c,"³ from inference and from experience.⁴

1097. The word "heaven (*svarga*)" is also used to signify the human aim referred to above, in passages like "heaven etc."⁵ and in the *vēdāntās*.

1098. "Then this activity of speech, mind and body and the pursuit of the means therefore, which are manifested by all creatures, are enough towards the accomplishment of heaven which is the final aim (liberation)"⁶

1099. All these rituals, whose scope is limited to production etc.,⁷ cannot extend their application to heaven (self) which is self-established.

¹ i. e. non-knowledge.

² सर्ववैद्यमुभयविधं कलमात्मनः स्वरूपत्वेन चैतन्यवचित्यात् न चाऽऽप्तेः स्वार्थेनेच्छा तेन तत्राज्ञानमेवोपादानं कर्मादिनिमित्तमिति भावः ॥ Anandagiri.

³ अथैव एव परम आनन्दः, एवाऽस्य परम आनन्दः, एवमेवानन्दयाति, यो वै भूमातत्सुखम्, etc.

⁴ During deep sleep.

⁵ स्वर्गं लोकमित् ऊर्ध्वं विमुक्तः, अहरहर्वा एवैवित्स्वर्गं लोकमेति, अनन्तं स्वर्गं लोके ज्येष्ठे प्रतिष्ठितम्, &c.

⁶ This is the argument of the opponent who confuses स्वर्गं in its ordinary sense with the word as applied to the self, and argues therefrom that rituals are enough and that *vedānta* has no place to come in.

⁷ उत्पत्ति, आप्ति, विकृति, संस्कृति,

1100. No means can accomplish a result other than its own. *A fortiori*, how can it accomplish a result which is impossible ?

1101. Though this human end is permanently established by reason of its being of the very nature of the self, yet, it is not attained by reason of non-knowledge.

1102. The obstruction of nescience cannot, irrespective of the knowledge of the self, be removed by rituals alone, for rituals are not proofs.

1103. A means which is incentive and not instructive,¹ is not sufficient to establish a self-established thing.

1104. Thus the nescience regarding the self is not removed by rituals which are no proofs.

1105. And not till this nescience is burnt down by the fire of true knowledge can any happiness, untainted by misery, be attained.

1106. Though rites with special objects are not by themselves sufficient for liberation, yet they must be conceded to be helpful by way of creating renunciation in men.

1107 and 1108. Just as a prohibited act, by virtue of its resulting in unbearable misery, induces renunciation and thereby turns one away from its performance, so too do all rites with special objects turn one away from their performance by reason of the miserable nature of their fruits, even to the inclusion of the kingdom of *Brahman*.

1109. The subsequent commentary was spoken to

¹ कारक as opposed to व्यञ्जक. Even a व्यञ्जक साधन is not enough in the present case ; much more so, the other.

elucidate the above principle.¹ It is only on that principle that there can be undoubted consistency between the two parts of Scripture.

1110. The performer of rituals whose intellect is blinded by ignorance of self, wanders eternally in misery, through the southward, northward, and downward worlds.²

1111. He who is laden with the burden of ritual, attains the southern worlds by rites with special objects, the northern worlds by rites coupled with knowledge, and lower births by prohibited rites.

1112. When the proportion of merit and demerit is equal, human birth is attained.

1113. This transient and primeval state, from *Brahman* down to the inanimate, is thus the result of non-knowledge of self, is, like dreams, delusions or magic, variegated by names, forms and movements, and has for its cause the performance of righteous and unrighteous acts.

1114. Though, according to Scripture, this condition is defined by name and form, it is not stated to be manifest owing to the non-manifestation of the reality of the self.

1115. When the darkness of nescience is destroyed, there is not one atom, either cause or effect, which is unmanifest; and, for the same reason, no darkness that is undestroyed.

¹ Vide note ¹ supra' p. 161.

² These correspond to the देवयान, पितृयान and नरक, the former two being the result of death during उत्तरायण and दक्षिणायन respectively. Compare *Bhagavad Gītā*, VIII. 23—27. This is also explained in a different way in the next stanza.

1116. Since it is as explained heretofore, this important Upanishad of the *vēdānta* has been begun with every effort.

1117. "If (says the opponent) this Upanishad is begun to accomplish the end above mentioned,¹ why does it not begin in some such way as "all this is *Brahman* etc."

1118. This declares that the fruit of the horse-sacrifice can be obtained by the mere knowledge of it by those who are not privileged to perform the horse-sacrifice.²

1119. This knowledge cannot be said to be included in the ritual itself, since Scripture speaks of rituals and knowledge as alternative means.³

1120. An equal reward is obtained by the doer of rituals who performs the horse-sacrifice and by the wise man who knows this sacrifice as herein mentioned.

1121. Since this knowledge of the sacrifice is as much a rite as the horse-sacrifice itself, the declaration of fruit is not a mere explanatory passage, much more than so as it is specially prescribed.⁴

1122 and 1123. "If (says the opponent) no more than this is your explanation of the context, then the object is easily gained even if it occurred in the ritual portion of Scripture. Tell me then why this passage should occur in the knowledge portion."

1124. It is as an incentive to the acquisition of know-

¹ Namely, ब्रह्मज्ञान.

² e. g. the *Brāhmana* caste.

³ विद्यया वा कर्मणा वा.

⁴ य एवं वेद etc.

ledge that it is declared that horse-sacrifice, though the greatest of sacrifices and though combined with knowledge of itself, is nevertheless productive of bondage (births and deaths.)

1125 and 1126. How else can aspirants for liberation strive to know the self,—people, who have known only too well the meanness of the fruits derived from all rituals and who do not seek any means other than the knowledge of the self?

1127. “You may freely say that the fruit of all rites with special objects is bondage; but since necessary rites have no fruit, why not say that their fruit is liberation?”

1128. Not so; for, Scripture speaks of all rites in general as bearing fruit. Further, passages like “by rites one attains the world of the *manes*” refer to the fruit of necessary rites alone.

1129. If it be said that, since they have fruits, necessary rites are also rites with special objects, it is not so, for necessary rites have purification as their aim while the aim of rites with special objects is the enjoyment of pleasure.

1130. There is purification even in rites with special objects, but that is for the sole sake of securing enjoyment. For, the kingdom of Indra cannot be enjoyed with the body of a man or of a pig.

1131. Since, in the case of necessary rites, purification is most important, the enjoyment of fruit is not contradictory thereto. But, in comparison with the purification of intellect, enjoyment is considered perishable.

1132. For this reason and by virtue of passages like "this self etc.," people try to know the supreme state by the contemplation of Scriptural passages and by renouncing all worldly attachment.

1133. Regularly prescribed rites render only indirect help by way of purifying the mind, being not inconsistent with the knowledge of self. But they are not direct means like the knowledge of self.

1134. They therefore who, giving up all rites and free from attachment, throw off all taints such as passion etc., and direct their intellect to the supreme self, realise their own self within themselves.

1135. Therefore is begun with effort this great *Upanishad* of the *Vedānta*, in order that it may root out ignorance of self which is the cause of all the greatest miseries, and in order that the sun of the knowledge of the true nature of self may be made to rise.

1136. The stanzas of this *sambandha-bhāshya*¹ are altogether one thousand one hundred and forty eight in number.²

¹ Or the commentary explaining the connection between the *Mīmāṃsa* and the *Vedānta*.

² Of the difference of 12 stanzas between this number and ours, 2 are on account of re-adjustments to suit the sense and 10 are not extant at all, and are not traceable.

END.

APPENDIX.

The *Upanishad* belonging to the *Brāhmaṇa* of the *Vāja-sanēyins* begins thus: "The dawn is indeed the head of the sacrificial horse." This concise commentary thereon is undertaken for the purpose of imparting, to those who strive to get rid of the bondage of births and deaths, the knowledge of the unity of the supreme self and the individual soul, which is the means of destroying the root cause of such bondage. This science of the self is called '*Upanishad*' by reason of the permanent destruction of bondage and its cause for those who take to it. This is the meaning of the verb *sad* with the prefixes *upa* and *ni*. This book is also called an *Upanishad* since it deals with that object. It consists of six Sections, and is called an *āranyaka* as it is to be recited in the forest (*aranya*). Owing to the largeness of its size, it is called *Bṛihadāranyaka*. The connection which this book bears to the portion of the *Vēda* dealing with rituals, will now be explained. This *Vēda* as a whole has, for its object, the elucidation of the means for the attainment of desirable and the avoidance of undesirable results which are not known either by direct perception or by inference; for, the attainment and avoidance mentioned above are, by their very nature, the aim of all human beings. In the case of results which are directly perceptible, the knowledge of the means of attaining the desired and of avoiding the undesired is established from direct perception and inference alone, and therefore there is no need for Scripture. Further, without a knowledge of the existence of a soul connected with a future birth, there cannot arise a longing for obtaining the desired and of shunning the undesired in that future birth. See, for instance, the natural philosopher (i. e. the atheist or sceptic). Thus, the Scripture deals with the existence of a soul in relation to another birth and with the special means of attaining desired results and of avoiding undesired ones in other births. The

existence of a self as distinct from the body is declared by portions of Scripture such as "There is this doubt when a man is dead, some saying that he is and some that he is not," the final conclusion being "he must be understood as still existing"; also, "so, too, after death.....some souls enter the womb for bodily birth and some enter inanimate objects, all in accordance with their past actions and with the dictates of scripture"; also, "he is himself the light.....him knowledge and action follow"; also, "merit is attained by meritorious acts and sin, by sinful acts"; also, "I shall instruct you.....it is knowledge." This self cannot be said to be amenable to direct perception alone, for there are philosophers who do not believe in the self. If the existence of a soul in connection with a future body can be known by direct perception, the atheists and the *Buddhists* will not assail us with their assertion that there is no self; for, when a pot or other thing is the object of direct perception, no one disbelieves it, saying that there is no pot. This is not like the case of mistaking a post for a person, for, when it is known, the disbelief vanishes. Thus, when the post is known to be such by direct perception, the mistaken belief ceases to exist. The *Vaināṣikas* (a Buddhist sect), though accepting a belief in an ego, assert at the same time the non-existence of a self as distinct from a future body. Therefore, since the self is different in character from any object of direct perception, its existence cannot be established by such perception, nor, in the same way, by inference. This cannot be denied on the ground that Scripture speaks of certain characteristics from which the existence of self may be inferred and that these characteristics are objects of direct perception; for, there is no mention of any relation to a future birth. When the existence of the self is understood from Scripture and from its characteristics in the material world as indicated by Scripture, the vedic scholars (*Mīmāṃsakas*) and the logicians (*tārkikas*) imagine the ego and its characteristics which too are Scriptural, to be the products of their own intellects, and assert that the self is amenable to direct percep-

tion and inference. Howsoever it be, the chapter on rituals is intended to point out special means for him who, knowing that there is a soul in relation to a future body, seeks particular means to attain the desired and to avoid the undesired, as affecting such future body. But ignorance of self, in the shape of adherence to the conception of being doer and enjoyer, which is the root of all longing in the self to attain the desired and to avoid the undesired, has not so far been removed by its contrary, namely, the knowledge of the real nature of the supreme self and the individual soul. And as long as that is not removed, the human being, prompted by love or hatred of the fruits of action and other inherent weaknesses, will act even in transgression of the injunctions and prohibitions of Scripture and will accumulate, by thought, word and deed, actions which are classed as unmeritorious and which give rise to evils both seen and unseen; for inherent weaknesses, being numerous, get the mastery. Thus a creature descends in the scale even to the level of inanimate objects. Occasionally, the knowledge acquired from Scripture gets the predominance. Then, by thought, word and deed, one largely accumulates merit which is the means to attain what is desirable. This merit is of two kinds, one based on knowledge, and the other pure and simple. The latter has for its result the attainment of worlds like that of the *manes* (*pitrīs*), and the former, of the worlds from that of the gods to that of *Brahman*. So, too, it is said by Scripture "he who does sacrifice for the self is greater than he who does it for the gods" and so on. Law-books (*smṛiti*) also state "Scriptural rites are of two kinds" and so on. When merit and demerit balance each other, human birth takes place. Thus, from the creator down to inanimate nature, the course of births and deaths, founded on name, form and action, is brought about by means of the merit and demerit of the individual possessed of inherent ignorance and other weaknesses. This selfsame world which is now manifest in the shape of cause and effect, was unmanifest prior to its origin. This course of births and deaths which sprang up like

the shoot from the seed, as the result of nescience, represents an erroneous supposition in the self of action, doer, and reward, and is an evil without beginning or end. And this *Upanishad* is begun for the purpose of inculcating, by contrariety, the knowledge of the supreme self, and thereby destroying the nescience of anyone who may feel renunciation on the above grounds. The use of knowledge in connection with the ritual of the horse-sacrifice is that those who are not accorded the privilege of performing the horse-sacrifice, can yet attain its reward by the knowledge in question, as declared by Scripture in passages like "by knowledge or by ritual" and "this too wins the worlds." It cannot be said that the knowledge is only with reference to the rite, for the words of Scripture, "who-soever does the horse-sacrifice, or who knows it as such," are alternative, and occur in a context dealing with knowledge. Since, even in the case of other rites active acquisition is spoken of, it is evident that their fruit can be got from knowledge. And the horse-sacrifice is the highest of all rites, for it has for its fruit the attainment of the unmanifest (*samashṭi*) or the manifest (*vyashṭi*) self. Further, its enunciation here at the beginning of the science of self is intended to show that all rites conduce to births and deaths. Scripture too speaks of the fruit being hunger which is the same as death. It cannot be said that regularly prescribed rites do not produce fruit with a view to births and deaths, for Scripture speaks in general terms of the fruit of all actions. All ritual is indeed connected with the wife. Having shown by the passage, "may I have a wife! for that is my desire," that all rites are rites with special object and having by the passage, "this world, the world of the father and the world of the gods," indicated the fruit of the knowledge of the ceremony concerning the son and other rites, Scripture summarises in the end the threefold character of the material world by saying "this is threefold, name, form and action." The manifest fruit of all rites is of course birth and death. This threefold aspect, then, was before its origin unmanifest. The same again is, by virtue of the actions of all

creatures, made manifest like the tree from the seed. This same world, both in its manifested and unmanifested conditions is the object of nescience and is, by that very nescience, wrongly imagined as being identical with a self whose nature is action, doer and reward, consisting as it does of the embodied, the unembodied and their actions. Of an entirely different character therefrom is that which has no second, which is neither name nor form nor action, and which, though of an eternally pure, enlightened and free nature, yet shines seemingly in different shapes as action, doer and reward. This science of the self is therefore begun for the purpose of dispelling, like the supposition of a serpent in a rope, the nescience which is the seed of desire and other sins and of actions and their results, for the benefit of him who feels disgust at the insufficiency of all this which is of the form of means and ends, and which appears differently as action, doer, and reward.



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